YUGOSLAVIA'S NATIONAL MINORITIES UNDER COMMUNISM

BY PAUL SHOUP

I

The Yugoslav nationalities question has always been a source of fascination for Western scholars. Inevitably, discussion has centered on the differences between the major Slav nationalities—the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. Less attention has been paid to the problem of the national minorities, although this issue has belied the Yugoslav state since its formation in 1918. Minorities make up approximately a fifth of the Yugoslav population. In times of peace they have been the object of discrimination and exploitation. In times of crisis, the minorities have been the greatest single threat to the internal security of the Yugoslav state.

Over the years since 1918, four nationalities have proven particularly troublesome for the Yugoslavs: the Albanians, Hungarians, Germans, and Italians. The majority of the Albanians live in the autonomous oblast of Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet) and are Moslem, belonging to the northern, Gheg, Albanian clan. There is a sizable Albanian minority in Macedonia, and a smaller group of Albanians in Montenegro. No census figures, even those taken on the basis of nationality after World War II, give a completely accurate account of their number, but it is now over three-quarters of a million. The Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia has remained, before and after the Second World War at around half a million. Most of these Hungarians are scattered throughout Vojvodina, forming a majority of certain districts of Backa. Other Hungarian settlements are found in Baranja (in Croatia) and Prekmurje (in Slovenia). The Germans numbered half a million before the Second World War, and were concentrated in the Banat region of Vojvodina. Only a handful of Germans—less than 60,000—remain today. There was an insignificant number of Italians in Yugoslavia before the war—between 9,000 and 12,000; but when her border with Italy was redrawn in 1945, Yugoslavia acquired an area which had had, at the time of the

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2 A Yugoslav census immediately after the war gave the number of Italians in the newly acquired territories (Istria, Zone B and Pula, excluding Rijeka) as 85,814. The census was conducted on the basis of registers of names (not direct inquiry) and the results were largely discounted. See Cadastre National de L'Istrie: L'après le Recensement du 1er Octobre 1945 (Zagreb, 1946). The Austrian districts comprising Istria and Rijeka at the time of the 1910 census had 147,843 Italians. (Derived from figures given in J. Roglic, Le Recensement de 1910: ses Méthodes et son Application dans la Marche Julienne [Zagreb, 1946] and A. E. Moodie, The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary: A Study in Political Geography [London, 1945]).

3 The Turkish minority is located almost entirely in Macedonia. Their present number is difficult to estimate, since postwar figures fluctuate wildly, but it is probably around 100,000. If one agrees that the Macedonians should not be considered a separate nation, then the existence of a Bulgarian minority of some 60,000, forming almost the entire population of the Karabrod and Bosoilgrad districts of Serbia. The Rumanians number some 60,000 and are found in the Alibunar, Vrsac, and Panevacki districts of the Banat. There are some 85,000 Slovaks in Vojvodina and 34,000 Czechs, chiefly in Slavonia. In addition, the census of 1953 listed some 87,000 Ukrainians (in Vojvodina and Croatia) and 20,000 Russians (in Serbia).

4 The Treaty of Trianon of 1921, while not mentioning the minorities directly, provided, in Article 4, that all citizens were "equal." In the Agreement on Minorities signed at St. Geno, the Yugoslav minorities were guaranteed the right of equal treatment and education in their own languages was guaranteed, on paper, by the constitution and by treaty. These guarantees did not, however, extend to the Albanians and Bulgarians, whose very existence in Yugoslavia as national minorities was denied by the government. Conditions in Kosovo-Metohija were perhaps the worst in all Yugoslavia. Albanian guerrilla bands—motivated partly by a spirit of national resistance and partly by a desire for plunder—maintained an active opposition to the Yugoslav government until 1924, and acts of terrorism and brigandage continued long thereafter. Entry into the state service from any minority group was extremely difficult. By
the use of such devices as "name analysis" the number of children eligible for minority schools was significantly reduced. The inadequate educational facilities provided the minorities could thus be excused on the grounds that no qualified students were available for minority schools.

It was hoped that these tactics would speed the assimilation of some of the minority population and crush the national spirit of the rest. But successive Yugoslav governments, whether for reasons of foreign policy or out of a desire to further party interests, could never follow this policy consistently. The history of the German and Hungarian minorities in the interwar period provides a perfect example of this vacillating approach to the minorities problem. The political parties of the Germans and Hungarians were not permitted to participate in national elections until 1923. They were dissolved and reinstated a second time in 1924, and finally banned, along with other national parties, under the dictatorship of King Alexander. The German cultural organization, the Schwäbisch-Deutsche Kulturbund, was first permitted to organize by the Radicals in 1923 as a political favor; when the Germans withdrew their support from the Radicals in 1924 the Kulturbund was dissolved, then reinstated in the same year by the Davidović government. The Hungarian cultural organization was first banned in 1923 and replaced by a more moderate group, which was in turn banned in 1929. When Yugoslavia drew close to the Axis powers in the 1930's, both German and Hungarian schools and cultural organizations were allowed to function unmolested. The effort of the Yugoslavs to eliminate the threat posed to the security of the country by the German and Hungarian minorities had been in vain.

Only when the country was overrun by the Axis powers in April, 1941, was it fully apparent how completely the Yugoslav regime had failed in its contradictory policies of oppression and appeasement. In addition to the Kulturbund, the Germans had ready para-military organizations in Vojvodina, the DM (Deutsche Mannschaft), and

* For a child to be refused entry into a Hungarian school, for example, it was sufficient for one of the parents to have a name such as Flovat, Rac, or Oroz, which was taken as an indication of the parent's Slavic origins, for it was claimed that these names in Hungarian meant "Croat," "Serb," "Russian," and so on. After 1929, opening minority schools was made particularly difficult by the Law on National Schools of that year, which permitted minority sections or schools for basic education alone, and only upon permission of the Ministry of Education.

1 The Catholic Bachelors' Association (Katholikus Legény Egylet) was the first of these organizations; it was replaced by the People's Circle (Nép Kör). By 1941, the Hungarians were organized in Nép Kör and its rightist competitor, the Southern Hungarian Civic Union or DMKS (Délvidék Magyar Közművelődési Szövetség).

2 The privileged position of the Germans in education was established in the early 1930's when a series of decrees gave them the right to their own schools. "Name analysis" was forbidden in their case; "family language" was to be taken into consideration in determining nationality, and the Germans were permitted to establish their own private schools. For the German schools, see K. E. Türke, Das Schulrecht der deutschen Volksgruppen in Ost und Südosteuropa (Berlin, 1938), pp. 460-61.

"Ready Groups" (Bereitschaftseinheiten) in Croatia and Slovenia. These groups, in cooperation with the Croatian Ustaši, seized control of local administration in German areas without opposition. The Hungarians organized a national guard, which quickly took control of the Hungarian districts of Vojvodina. In Macedonia there sprang up groups variously referred to as "national committees" or "Macedonian committees" to welcome the Bulgarians. During the rest of the war the minorities, with the exception of the Czechs, Slovaks, and Turks, continued to cooperate closely with the occupying powers. The German minority administered the Banat as a virtually autonomous region for the Germans; out of the ranks of these "Volksdeutsche" was formed the VII SS, Prince Eugene division, which fought the Communist Partisans. The Hungarians eagerly welcomed the annexation of Backa to Hungary, turned their backs on Yugoslavia, and immersed themselves in domestic Hungarian politics. Albanian units provided valuable support to the Italians and Germans in the struggle against the Partisans in Kosovo-Metohija and Macedonia.

The intractable minority question also posed many problems for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in the interwar period. As a result of their Marxist training, the Communists were skeptical of national claims, especially of smaller nationalities or minorities. In the sphere of practical politics it was difficult, however, to determine on what side the interests of the party lay. As part of the international Communist movement, the CPY had to take into account Soviet plans for weakening the Entente powers by encouraging dissident national groups in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the Yugoslav Communists risked arousing the hostility of Yugoslav public opinion if the party became too closely associated with the minority cause.

In practice, Yugoslav Communist policy toward the minorities during the interwar period came to focus on two demands: first, equal treatment and recognition of minority rights in the fields of education and culture; secondly, self-determination.

Throughout the interwar period and World War II, the Communists urged an end to discriminatory policies directed against the minorities. The demand for self-determination of the minorities, including the right of secession, was vigorously advanced or discreetly ignored as the party shifted its support first to the nationally dissident groups in Yugoslavia, then to the forces of national unity. Thus, between 1928 and 1934, when the Communists were deliberately seeking to undermine the Yugoslav state by exploiting national differences, the party supported the right of the Hungarian minority to secede from Yugoslavia, and gave its support to the inclusion of Kosovo in Albania. 8

Between 1934 and 1939 (the period of the popular front against fascism), the slogan of self-determination for the minorities was dropped, although not explicitly repudiated. The Communists have been reluctant to reveal the extent of their anti-Yugoslav activities in the period of the Soviet-German alliance (1939-41). By November, 1940, however, the CPY had disassociated itself from revisionist or fascist elements and urged the minorities to ignore the Italian, German, and Bulgarian fifth columns in Yugoslavia. From November, 1940, to the present day, the Yugoslav Communists have studiously avoided all mention of self-determination for national minorities.

In the long run, the CPY had little choice but to identify itself with the national and patriotic loyalties of the Yugoslav peoples, even at the risk of alienating the minorities. This became painfully clear during the war, when the party tried to draw the minorities into the ranks of the Partisans in the struggle against the occupying powers. Units were organized for all the national minorities. However, all these groups were exceedingly small. The Hungarian Petőfi Sándor unit numbered only a hundred men. The German Ernst Thälmann unit existed only on paper. In Kosovo-Metohija the Albanian hatred of the Serbs, with whom the Partisans were associated in that region, was so great that the Communist leaders in the area were forced to suggest radical changes in Partisan tactics. Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Tito's deputy in Macedonia, urged the Central Committee to give up the slogan of armed struggle against the fascists and concentrate on mass demonstrations for bread and other nonmilitary activities among the Albanians. Miladin Popović, Yugoslav adviser to the Albanian Communist Party, recommended the inclusion of the Metohija party in the Albanian Communist Party, and the creation of a single command for all Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija which would be responsible to the Albanian party. The Central Committee of the CPY, mindful of the political implications, rejected the scheme. Plans were also set afoot by Tempo for the transfer of Albanian Partisan units from Albania to Kosovo-Metohija in the spring of 1944. In the latter years of the war, the ranks of the minority units were filled by conscription. It was practically the only way the minorities could be brought to join the Partisan cause, with the notable exception of the Slovaks of the Srem, who contributed materially to the Partisan campaign in that region.

II

The failure of the Partisans to rally minority support during the war highlighted the fact that the national minorities had never reconciled themselves to their position in Yugoslavia. Equally important, it revealed that most of the minorities were little attracted by the Communist revolutionary appeals, and tended to view the party as a nationalistic Yugoslav movement. It was only natural, as a consequence, that the Yugoslav Communists would consider the minorities a potentially dangerous source of opposition to the new system established after the war, just as the old regime had viewed the minorities as a threat to the integrity of Yugoslavia during the interwar period.

In certain crucial ways the situation nevertheless differed from that of the prewar period. First, the Communist regime gained an initial advantage from the fact that the Communist parties of Albania, Hungary, and Bulgaria had all agreed (albeit reluctantly) during the war not to dispute Yugoslavia's claims over her minorities. Until 1948, at

10 See the report of the fifth party conference of November, 1940, in V Kongres Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1949), p. 197. The conference demanded freedom and equality for the minorities but did not mention self-determination, and attacked fascist designs on Yugoslavia.

11 The Italian Pino Buducin battalion, the Albanian Zejnel Ajdini unit and the Emin Durak brigade, the Bulgarian brigade Hristo Botev, the Czech-Slovak brigade janislkova, the Hungarian Petőfi Sándor unit, and the German Ernst Thälmann unit. For official accounts of these brigades, see J. Stojkovic and M. Malovic, Nationalne manjine u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade, 1953); V. Dedijer, "Italijanske, Bugarske, Cehoslovacke i Madjarke narodne jedinice u sastavu ovog vojske," Za oladbinu, No. 4 (Apr., 1950), p. 21; "Nacionalne manjine FR Jugoslavije," Informacini priručnik, No. 10-12, Book II (1952), pp. 10-12.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., p. 289.


16 The pledge was never honored. The Yugoslavs claim the autonomy of the Albanian people, while the Albanians claim the autonomy of Kosovo-Metohija.

17 See the report of the fifth party conference of November, 1940, in V Kongres Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1949), p. 197. The conference demanded freedom and equality for the minorities but did not mention self-determination, and attacked fascist designs on Yugoslavia.
least, the minority problem was not linked with any external threat to the country's security. More important was the revolutionary character of the Communist regime. This had two consequences, both of which served to set the new situation sharply off from the old. First, the ruthless and extremely effective dictatorship of the party made it possible to control the activities of the minority population in a way undreamed of before the war. By the same token, the Communists were in a position to restrain the Yugoslav population from venting its anger against the minorities. Second, the revolutionary creed of the Communists effectively divorced the Communist leaders from narrow national prejudices and thus created the possibility of an impartial and fair settlement of genuine minority grievances.

These two new conditions in the postwar period roughly correspond to two major aspects of the minority problem: first, the question of loyalty and of the measures used to restrain both the minorities and the hostile Yugoslavs around them; second, the broader issue of formulating a policy that would bring about the final solution of the minorities question. These two sides of the problem—in effect, the carrot and the stick—are closely related. In particular, the rights granted the minorities depend upon the ability of the regime to channel the activities of the minority population in directions not endangering the security of the state or the stability of the political system. The problem of security and control will therefore be discussed first, and followed by an examination of positive steps taken by the Yugoslav Communists since 1945 in dealings with the national minorities.

At the close of the war the Yugoslav Communists faced an extremely difficult situation in the minority regions. It must be kept in mind that most of these areas, because of the hostility of their inhabitants towards the Yugoslavs and the Communists, had seen little Partisan activity. In effect, these regions were enemy territory seized and occupied by the Yugoslavs. In Kosovo-Metohija the situation was particularly critical. Partisan units occupied the area in November, 1944. In the course of a ruthless mobilization of the population to fight on the Srem front against the Germans, atrocities were committed against the recalcitrant Albanians.19 Whether for this reason or at German instigation, as is claimed by the Yugoslavs,20 the Albanians rebelled in late 1944 and early 1945.21 Bitter fighting continued into spring, and martial law was not lifted in the area until July, 1945.22 In the midst of this revolt Miladin Popović, then acting party leader for Kosovo-Metohija, was assassinated by Albanian terrorists—an ironic fate for the one man who had taken a favorable view toward the Albanians in the Kosovo question during the war.23 After the revolt was crushed, the “National Democratic Army of Albania” continued a precarious underground struggle against the Communists.24 Reports from a later date suggest that the National Democratic Albanian Movement (Levizja Kombëtare Demokratike Shqiptare) has continued to exist illegally in Kosovo-Metohija throughout most of the postwar period.25

The brutal treatment of the Albanians, with all its disastrous consequences, was not the result of a deliberate policy of national persecution. Any Yugoslav who was anti-Communist was exposed to equally harsh punishment. The same appraisal can be made of the punitive actions taken by the Communists against the Hungarians and Italians. The former were treated with extreme severity for collaboration during the war.26 Mass arrests were also carried out by the Communists in the Julian region. Italians certainly felt the brunt of this persecution. But the object seemed to be the crushing of all potential opposition, Slav and Italian alike.

Although punitive measures were harsh, the Yugoslav Communists

19 The action of the Partisan commanders at this time was the subject of criticism at the first congress of the Serbian CP held in May, 1945. Speaking to the congress, Alexander Ranković, secret police chief, cited the following incident: “On the occasion of transporting one group of Albanians to reinforce the IV army one incident occurred which was such that it could not be localized [and whose results could not be contained] . . . . One Albanian provoked by some guard took down his rifle and killed him. That is, he killed one of our fighters. But our comrades obviously didn’t recover their wits and instead of settling the whole thing so as to prevent any further clash, wished to punish them, wished to carry out reprisals, wished to execute forty Albanians for one dead fighter. This stupid intention and completely foreign method for us was taken advantage of by enemy elements in that group of Albanians and [they] succeeded in provoking a revolt. . . . On that occasion about 200 Albanians were killed.” A. Ranković, Izabrani govori iisci, 1941-1945 (Belgrade, 1951), p. 46. Another incident which was described as the result of “bureaucracy”

20 The Yugoslavs claim that the Albanian uprising was planned by the Germans and sparked by the remnants of the Skanderbeg division which had fought the Partisans during the war. See Jedinstvo (Pristina), Aug. 4, 1946, p. 1.
21 See Jedinstvo, Jan. 21, 1946, p. 5, which makes reference to Drenica, the center of the fighting. “It is known that this uprising [in Drenica] cost thousands of lives,” the report said. Other areas of fighting were Tropče, Urosevac, and Gnjilane. Ibid., July 9, 1946, p. 2, and Aug. 4, 1946, p. 1.
24 See Jedinstvo, Aug. 4, 1946, p. 1, where mention is made of the continued existence of opposition groups. The Albanians concerned probably used the title the Albanian National Democratic Army (Ushtria Kombëtare Demokratike Shqiptare) rather than the National Democratic Army of Albania. The Communists refer to the Albanian opposition as “Balista”—followers of the Balli Kombetar movement which opposed the Communists in Albania during the war. For the trial of a group of Albanians in Macedonia who were said to have established connections with the National Democratic Army, see Nova Makedonija (Skoplje), Jan. 28-31, 1947.
25 See the report of Fatidj Hodža given at the seventh conference of the Kosmet regional party organization, in which he mentions the great Albanian chauvinism still being spread by “various committees of the National Democratic Movement.” Sedna konferencija Saveza komuniste Srbije za Kosovo i Metohiju (Pristina, Sept., 1956), p. 135.
26 In an effort to ease the minority problem a plan was worked out in Paris, in 1946, between Kardež for the Yugoslav party and Gerő, for the Hungarian party, which foresaw the exchange of 40,000 Hungarians from Yugoslavia for an equal number of Serbs from Hungary. (From information supplied by a member of the Hungarian Foreign Office present in Paris at the time.) The plan was never acted upon.
granted the Albanians, Hungarians, and Italians equal status with the rest of the population. The German minority was not so fortunate. As early as 1943 the Communists made it clear that the Germans would be expelled from Yugoslavia. At the end of 1943, a decision of the Communist-dominated Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation divested the Germans of all their rights and confiscated their land, which was then made available to colonists from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro. Cast outside the pale, the half-million Germans of before the war dwindled to a tenth that number. Most left with the German army in the last days of the war; some were deported to the Soviet Union, and a large number remained unaccounted for.

The ruthless methods of the Communists were strikingly effective. In a period of no more than several months after the end of the war, the new regime thoroughly demoralized the minority population. Although in open revolt in the spring of 1945, the Albanians of Kosovo-Metohija voted, practically to a man, for the government lists in the election for the constituent assembly held in November. At the same time, energetic action was taken to prevent persecution of the minorities by the rest of the Yugoslav population. By a law promulgated in May, 1945, criminal sanctions were applied against those who incited national, racial, or religious hatreds or denied any person the exercise of his national rights. Punishment was severe, and the law was frequently applied at the end of the war. Indeed, by its ruthless impartiality, the revolutionary Communist regime seemed to prove

28 Decision No. 2 of Nov. 21, 1944, published in Slubeni list Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije, No. 2, p. 13. Decision No. 1, never published, stripped the Germans of all civil rights, including citizenship. For mention of this decision, and an interpretation which excluded from its provisions those who fought in the Partisans, non-Germans in mixed marriages, or those assimilated before the war, see Privremena narodna skupština DFJ, Rad sakonadanilh odbora predsednica AVNOJ . . . (Belgrade, n.d.), pp. 85-86.
29 The most careful estimate, published in 1954, calculated that 200,000 Germans were known to be in Germany and Austria, some 50,000 had been deported to Russia, and some 185,000 remained unaccounted for. Werner Markert, ed., Jugoslawien: Osterreich-Handbuch (Cologne/Graz, 1954), p. 56. For other estimates of the size of the German exodus from Yugoslavia, see J. Schechtman, “The Elimination of German Minorities in Southeastern Europe,” Journal of Central European Affairs, VI, No. 2 (July, 1946), pp. 169-62, and Dolf Vogelhut, “Demografiski gubici Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu,” Statistitska recijevi, II, No. 1 (May, 1952), p. 29.
30 In Kosovo-Metohija more registered voters (97.68 per cent) went to the polls than in any other region. Of those who voted, only 3.2 per cent opposed the government list, the lowest number of opposition votes with the exception of Montenegro. Informacioni reportnik, 1948, p. 66.
32 The number of convictions brought under the law in 1945 and 1946 is not known to the author, but was certainly high. For the number and type of convictions brought between 1947 and 1959, see the author’s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, “Communism and the National Question in Yugoslavia” (Columbia University, 1961), p. 111.
core of minority discontent remains a serious problem in Yugoslavia, even today.

Immediately upon coming to power the Communists initiated far-reaching changes in the status of the minorities. Free use of the native language was guaranteed all minorities, bilingual administration was put into effect in Kosovo-Metohija (Serbo-Croatian and Albanian) and, after the outbreak of the Cominform dispute, in Rijeka, Zadar, and parts of Istria (Serbo-Croatian and Italian). Provision was made for the use of native tongues in the courts. Determined steps were taken to provide the minorities with schools. This entailed the construction and staffing, at great expense, of an entire primary and secondary system of education for those minorities not recognized before the war (the Albanians and Bulgarians). For the rest of the minorities, the first task was to expand primary education and create a new system of secondary schools. The basic objective has been achieved: the minorities now have free access to schools with instruction in their own language.

Nevertheless, the number of minority schools has been decreasing in recent years for reasons that will be discussed shortly.

Cultural organizations for the minorities were also formed after the war under Communist supervision. State aid was provided for newspapers, the publication of books in minority languages, and the maintenance of theaters, libraries, folklore groups, and choirs. Although the minority press consisted largely of material translated from Yugoslav

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47 Article 13 of the constitution of 1946. In Kosovo-Metohija, bilingual administration is provided for in the statute of the oblast (infra). For the use of Italian, see the directive of the Central Committee of the CPY, Mar. 26, 1914. "Obligatory Directive on the Use of Italian Language," Narodne novine, No. 67, 1948, p. 231. Bilingual administration is not practiced in Vojvodina, although it was once proposed for the city of Subotica. See Borba, Jan. 25, 1953, p. 2.

48 See Article 120 of the constitution, which provides that the individual has the right to be acquainted with the entire material of the trial in his native tongue; "The Law on Criminal Procedure," Sl. L., No. 40, 1953, p. 421, which states the same principle in more detail, and "The Law on Marital Procedure," Sl. L., No. 4, 1957, p. 63.

49 Until 1958, the subject of minority schools was regulated by a single unpublished directive of August, 1945, which stipulated that minority schools would be formed if there were twenty or more students, that teachers must belong to the minority in question, that the administration of the school would be carried out in the minority language, and that registration in a minority school would depend on the wishes of the parents. The general law on schools of 1958 states broadly that minorities have the right to education in their own language, and that within a period of two years the republics will bring further laws to assure the necessary cadres. (d) Weed out enemy elements." (From an unpublished report to the Regional Party Committee of the CPY for Vojvodina.)

42 Autonomy had been promised the Italians in 1943 (infra), and the Communists of Sandzak were led to believe during the war that their region might be granted special status. Serb and Croat Communists were at odds over the question of Vojvodina. The former group wished the area to be included in Serbia (the eventual solution), the latter in Croatia.


44 The number of their legislative acts has been small, and limited to such matters as setting prices, founding schools and other institutions, and approving the budget and economic plan. In 1950, there were only two acts passed by the Oblast Committee for Kosovo-Metohija: the budget and the audit.

45 The Rumanians in the Alibunar District of Vojvodina were a source of concern to the Yugoslav Communists in the late 1940's and early 1950's. They had put up a stiff resistance to collectivization, and party members of the district were considered under the influence of "kulaks" and "remnants of the Iron Guard." In order to correct this situation, it was recommended that: (a) "Practice has shown in Vrsacki district that the use of 'good' Rumanians, members of the CP, for political work among the Rumanians in the villages has been very useful. (b) For the time being, use good Rumanians from Vrsacki district in the Alibunar district, and send cultural groups from the former area to activate cultural life. (c) Investigate people in the districts carefully, and send those approved to party schools to assure the necessary cadres. (d) Weed out enemy elements." (From an unpublished report to the Regional Party Committee of the CPY for Vojvodina.)
reluctance to accept members from minority groups, and it has been admitted that persons from the minorities have not been eager to join the party. The problem is reflected in the national composition of the party in minority areas. Albanians made up 64 per cent of the population in Kosovo-Metohija in 1953 and 48 per cent of the party in that region in 1958; Hungarians, 25.4 per cent of the population in Vojvodina in 1953, and 8.4 per cent of the party in that region in 1958. Elsewhere the picture is similar. The situation in Kosovo-Metohija must have been particularly delicate, at least until recently. In a revealing but not surprising statement made in 1953, a leading Macedonian Communist admitted that party members still looked on the Albanians with distrust, and that "the theory is still widespread that it is not possible to talk with them and that they can only be persuaded by force." It must be remembered, in addition, that in Kosovo-Metohija over one-third of the male Montenegrin population belongs to the party, and that relations between Albanians and Montenegrins in the area have long been marked by bitter enmity.

Lingerling distrust of the minorities is also reflected in the fact that the Yugoslav Communists have not been eager to promote Communists from the minorities to positions of real responsibility. On the other hand, the minorities receive their share of party and government posts available in their own districts.

In principle, the Yugoslav Communists continue to advocate the policies described in the preceding pages—to provide schools, cultural activities, and local participation in government and the party to the minorities. But since the early 1950's a re-examination of minority policy has been going on, and it is clear that the Yugoslavs have not been entirely pleased with what they have discovered. To a large degree this new critical attitude has been prompted by the development of Titoist communism, which has raised the question of how the minorities are eventually to be assimilated. In the early revolutionary years of the Yugoslav Communist regime, it was enough to believe that assimilation would eventually be achieved through communication, that is, through a process of political re-education. In practice, minority policy was a curious combination of concessions, bureaucracy, and neglect, which was brilliantly successful in pacifying the minorities but failed to educate them politically and did little to bring them into the mainstream of Yugoslav life. Steps taken in recent years are a tacit admission of this fact.

The change in minority policy first became evident in 1952 and 1953. At that time a cautious but far-reaching campaign was initiated to break down the isolation of the minorities created by the powerful cultural organizations and the separate system of education. In 1953 there were 524 local cultural societies serving the minorities in Vojvodina; in 1954, 194 such groups; and today, there are only a handful. The societies have been replaced by cultural groups organized by local people's committees. All nationalities participate equally in these new organizations, which are not meant to eliminate the cultural activities of the minorities but to integrate them with those of the rest of the population. The Yugoslavs say that in practice each minority remains free, within these new cultural groups, to organize its fair share of purely national theatrical performances and the like.

The system of minority education has also been revamped: stress is placed on the teaching of the official language of the Republic (Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian, or Slovenian), a subject neglected in earlier years, and the purely minority schools have been consolidated with three members of the party oblast committee in 1956, at least twenty were Albanian. Sedna konferencija, op. cit., pp. 151-53. In 1958, 38.5 per cent of the functionaries serving in government organs in Kosmet were Albanian. Bujalić, op. cit., p. 11. This is still well below the percentage of Albanians in the population of Kosovo-Metohija (64 per cent). In Vojvodina, where the minorities are equal or superior to the Yugoslav population in education and culture, the situation in government posts is probably more favorable to the minorities than in Kosovo-Metohija. The process of reorganization actually began when the Union of Cultural-Educational Societies of Vojvodina (Unija kulturno-educacionih societa na Vojvodini) was replaced by the Cultural-Educational Community of Vojvodina (Kulturo-educaciona zajednica na Vojvodini), which administered the cultural activities of the autonomous province along strictly functional (not national) lines. Provincial cultural committees continued to exist for each of the minorities, but only on paper, and were finally abolished in 1957. Figures for the dissolution of the cultural societies at the local level, given above, can be found in Mikloš Hadžić, ed., Vojvodina, 1944-1955 (Novi Sad, 1954), p. 322. The only organization in Yugoslavia today actively responsible for the over-all cultural program of a minority is the Union of Italians of Istria (Unione degli Italiani dell'Istria) located in Rijeka.

Teaching of the official language now begins in the third year of primary school.
those of the Yugoslav nationalities. In areas of mixed nationality, the minorities are now taught in sections attached to the regular state schools; where there are no Yugoslavs, independent minority schools remain in existence.64 Plans are now afoot for the creation of "bilingual" schools. Although the significance of this move is still not entirely clear, the reform seems directed primarily toward limiting the use of minority languages to the classroom; this could spell the end of all independent minority schools that remain in existence today. Some effort may be made, however, to acquaint the Yugoslav nationalities in these schools with the language and culture of the minorities.15

The Yugoslav Communists, fearful of offending the sensibilities of the minority population, have carried out these changes with great caution. There were few open criticisms of minority schools and cultural organizations.65 In Vojvodina, certainly, the new policy met some resistance. Weeks later by the Zrenjanin People's Committee. The Communists, for their part, cannot completely avoid treating the minorities as second-class citizens. Repressive measures, carried out in

Yugoslavia's National Minorities under Communism

Thus the device of autonomy is being cautiously divorced from the nationalities question.

These moves are intended to drag the somewhat reluctant minorities into the mainstream of Yugoslav life. In addition, the Yugoslav Communists have seriously attempted for the first time to make the minorities feel that they have a stake in the country's development. This is particularly evident in economic policy. Although the Yugoslav Communists made many statements over the years about their intention of aiding underdeveloped areas in the country, little was actually accomplished in the first decade after the war. The Perspective Five-Year Plan for 1957-61 for the first time provided large investment sums for Kosovo-Metohija, where a feverish campaign has been initiated to lift the area out of its grinding poverty through the development of new industries and public works.66 More attention is now being paid to increasing minority representation in the party, and there has been a slight rise in minority representation in party and government bodies at the federal and republic levels.

The minorities probably have a better over-all position under Titoism. Although they have lost certain privileges in the educational and cultural spheres, they now enjoy greater security and their problems are receiving more attention from government and party organs. Current Yugoslav theory holds that the minorities should not be a bone of international contention, but should be a bridge between countries—a "catalyst" for integrating states at the international level. For the Communists, however, the minorities promise to be a continuing headache. Communism alienates the minorities from the regime far more than it alienates the rest of the Yugoslav peoples. Most of the minority population take no national pride in the achievements of the regime, associate communism with the Slavs, and in varying degrees remain unreconciled to their position within a Yugoslav state. The Communists, for their part, cannot completely avoid treating the minorities as second-class citizens. Repressive measures, carried out in the population generally to assure the security of the regime, always fall most harshly on the minorities because of their political attitudes. Granting cultural autonomy, on the other hand, corrects an old injustice but does not satisfy national aspirations; rather it encourages the minorities to draw apart from the rest of the Yugoslav people.

These general remarks must, of course, be qualified in the case of each particular minority. A detailed description of the history of each minority since the war cannot be given here, but some brief comments
may aid the reader in understanding the particular problems presented by each group.

Since 1948 there has been a steady improvement in the position of the Germans remaining in Yugoslavia. They now enjoy equal rights and privileges with the remaining minorities. Still, emigration of Germans from Yugoslavia continues; the Yugoslav government, for its part, has not placed obstacles in the way of their departure. The condition of the Italian minority has taken a marked turn for the better since the settlement of the Trieste question in 1954. Nevertheless, the Italians have fled or emigrated to Italy in great numbers; the results of this mass exodus over the years can still be seen in the deserted and decaying fishing villages along Istria's western coast, where most of the Italians were concentrated. Emigration—after the Balkan Pact of 1958—has also substantially reduced the size of the Turkish minority.

Little is known of the Bulgarian minority, one of the poorest and most backward in Yugoslavia. During the Cominform dispute it was cut off from Bulgaria, but since 1955 the traditional meetings of friends and relatives separated by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border have been renewed. Information is equally scant on the Rumanians, but references made to this minority in the preceding pages suggests they have not always behaved in a model fashion. The Czechs and the Slovaks, on the other hand, are highly industrious and valuable minorities, and have always been friendly to the Yugoslavs. A number of Czechs and Slovaks emigrated between 1945 and 1948; some subsequently returned to Yugoslavia when the Communists came to power in Czechoslovakia.

Today the Hungarian and Albanian minorities pose the greatest problem for the Yugoslav Communists. More than any other minority, the Hungarians have displayed their nationalist feelings and their lack of respect for the rest of the Yugoslavs. This is highly irritating to the regime, but the deviations of the Hungarian minority should not be overemphasized. The Yugoslavs are making truly heroic efforts to overcome the hostility of the Albanian minority, but much of this work may have been nullified by past abuses of authority by local Communists and continued efforts by the Albanian government to stir up national discontent. The existence of widespread dissatisfaction among the Albanians was revealed in the curious results of the 1953 census. The number of "Turks" in Macedonia grew from 95,940 to 203,938, and in Kosovo-Metohija from 1,315 to 34,583. There is no doubt that these "Turks" were in part Albanians who hoped in this way to be allowed to emigrate to Turkey. On numerous occasions Albania has been accused of supporting subversive activities in Kosovo-Metohija. The Yugoslav government recently announced that from 1948 to 1960, 675 agents had been smuggled into Kosovo-Metohija from Albania, and that from 1957 to 1961, 115 Albanian agents had been tried in Yugoslav courts. Still, there is no doubt that Kosovo-Metohija is at last awakening from its past stagnation and feeling the fresh air of economic and cultural progress. Despite their spotty record in the past, the Yugoslav Communists may have already succeeded in convincing the majority of the younger generation of Albanians that they should abandon their distrust of the regime and participate in the program of raising the social and economic level of the Albanian minority.

The rights of the Italians in what was formerly Zone B of Trieste are spelled out in an annex appended to the 1954 four-power agreement on Trieste. Language rights are guaranteed, and the closing of Italian schools is made conditional upon prior agreement of a mixed Yugoslav-Italian commission. See "Memorandum o soglasnosti izmedju vlade Italije, Ujedinjene Kraljevine, Sjedinjenih Drzava i Jugoslavije ... Medjunarodni ugovori FNRJ, No. 2, 1955.


Lazar Kolisevski, leading Macedonian Communist, answered questions on the subject of Turkish emigration in the press in 1954, and it was obvious that the whole matter had caused quite a stir. He attacked those who urged leaving while the getting was good, and denied that anyone who wished to leave would be refused permission to do so. Up until that time, he reported, 2,204 families had received permission to emigrate. Borba, Mar. 28, 1954, p. 2.