
Ćosić has asserted that he took up the cudgels against Pirjevec only at the request of leading figures in the Serbian Party (Dukić, Ćošek, 125-26.) And some of Pirjevec's contemporaries reported that his texts bore corrections by a top Slovene official, Boris Krajger. Dimitrij Rupel, *Slovenski intelektualci: od vojaške do civilne družbe* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1989), 103.

The Ćosić-Pirjevec polemic, which began with an interview Ćosić gave to the Zagreb *Telegram* on January 20, 1961, was conducted through the pages of *Nasa sodobnost* [Ljubljana] and *Delo* [Belgrade] between March of 1961 and May of 1962. The Pirjevec quotation is from his "Oprostite, kako ste rekli?," *Nasa sodobnost* 9/3 (March 1961), 287. The Ćosić quotation is from his "O savremenom nesavremenom nacionalizmu," *Delo* 7/12 (December 1961), 1417-21. The polemic is discussed at length in Chapter 1 of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question, 1961-1991."


During the war, Ranković had served as the first head of the Communists' security service. He maintained a degree of control over this service even after he officially moved on to higher offices, until his fall from power. For basic biographical data on Ranković, see Zoran Sekulić, *Pad i ėutnja Aleksandra Rankovića* (Belgrade: Dositej, 1989), 9-12; and (for Ranković's continuing de facto control over the security forces) Krste Crvenkovski, quoted in Jovan Kesar and Pero Simić, *Oproštaj bez milosti* (Belgrade: Akvarijus, 1990), 192-23.

For an account of the political events surrounding Ranković's fall, see Rusinow's *Yugoslav Experiment*, 183-91. See also pp. 156-7 for a balanced evaluation of Ranković's career.

When the taboo on discussing the Brioni Plenum crumbled in the late 1980s, politicians who had known Ranković portrayed him as an old-style Communist, deeply suspicious of decentralization and democratization, but also unsirvingly loyal to Tito. The politicians - all participants at Brioni - who in later interviews expressed their conviction that Ranković was loyal to Tito included Koče Popović, Krste Crvenkovski (who headed the Party commission that investigated Ranković), and Miko Tripalo (who also served on the commission). In their later statements, Crvenkovski and Tripalo stood behind the commission's findings that the security services had become a force above the Party, but rejected the idea that Ranković was plotting against Tito. (Tripalo, however, believed that although Ranković did not aim to overthrow Tito, he was trying to position himself to succeed him.) For Popović's views, see Aleksandar Nenadović, *Razgovori s Kočem*, 3rd expanded edition (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), 140-42. For Crvenkovski's, see Kesar and Simić, *Oproštaj*, 178-85. For Tripalo's, see Miko Tripalo, *Hrvatsko proljeće* (Zagreb: Globus, 1990), 69-81 and Kesar and Simić, *Oproštaj*, 198.

*Šesta sednica*, 63 and 322. In the post-1945 Yugoslav political lexicon, "unitarism" or "unitarist Yugoslavism" covered a multitude of sins. Defined as the "theoretical or practical denial" of Yugoslavia's multinational character and resultant political arrangements, it could mean anything from seeking more powers for the federal government to advocating the creation of a Yugoslav nation - which was also called "integral Yugoslavism." Stipe Šuvar, "Unitarizam i nacionalizam u suvremenoj jugoslovenskoj stvarnosti," in *Nacionalno: nacionalističko: eseji i polemički priloz* (Split: Marksistički centar, 1974), 160. Cf. Jovan Raičević, "O centralizmu i decentralizmu, jugoslovenstvu i nacionalizmu," *Socijalizam* 9/4 (April 1966), 450-53. For the usage of "integral Yugoslavism," see Edvard Kardelj, *Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprašanja* (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, 1957), lxiv; and Raičević, "O centralizmu," 451. Unitarist Yugoslavism was held to be the most common and most dangerous form of Serbian nationalism (though it was also emphasized that Serbian nationalism had other forms, and unitarism other sources.) In addition to Šuvar's "Unitarizam," see his *Nacije in medunacionalni odnosi v socijalističski Jugoslaviji* (Zagreb: Naše teme, 1970), 97-107.

It was for the same reason that each of the positions Ranković vacated upon his fall was filled by another Serb (Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 190). Casting Ranković as a Serbian nationalist ultimately encouraged Serbs themselves to perceive his fall in national terms. At the Sixth Plenum, Serbian leaders warned that some ("isolated") voices were warning that Serbia had lost its representative at the top, and that now its interests would be neglected. (See, *inter alia*, the speech of Dobrivoje Radosavljević, *Šesta sednica*, 25). As time went on - above all, as Serbs came to feel increasingly threatened in Kosovo - the picture of Ranković as protector of the Serbs gained mythic
proportions. When he died in 1983, his funeral became the scene of the first Serbian mass demonstration in Yugoslavia's post-war history.


92 For constitutional changes affecting Kosovo, see Sami Repishti, "The Evolution of Kosova's Autonomy Within the Yugoslav Constitutional Framework" in Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti, Studies on Kosova (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), 195-232; and Monika Beckmann-Petye, Der jugoslawische Föderalismus (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984), 106-117. It should be noted that all the constitutional changes cited affected Vojvodina as well as Kosovo.

93 For the region's names in Albanian and in Serbo-Croatian, see Roux, Les Albanais en Yougoslavie, 41-44.

94 Haberl, Parteiorganisation, 85-6.
96 See Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, Chapter Four; Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 283-87; and Dušan Bilandžić, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, Glavni procesi 1918-1985 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1985), 373-81.
97 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 285.
99 For the Ninth Congress, see Haberl, Parteiorganisation, 87-102; Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 255-60; and Bilandžić, Historija, 341-6.
100 All figures in this paragraph are taken from Bilandžić, Historija, 385-89.
101 Croatian economist Branko Horvat, in an interesting contemporary discussion of the problem, points out that this anomic was an unintended consequence of Yugoslavia's having abandoned the regimented work forces of Stalinism. Branko Horvat, in "Da li je nacionalizam naša sudbina?", (a roundtable discussion held at the Belgrade Dom omladine, 5 February 1971), Delo 17/1 (1971): 7.
102 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 202-09.
103 According to both Yugoslav and foreign observers, insecurity was pervasive in the Yugoslavia of the late 1960s. See, e.g., Horvat, in "Da li je nacionalizam...", 7. Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 266-73, describes the phenomenon as a "grande peur."
104 The Croatian national movement has been extensively covered in academic literature. It is the subject of one monograph: Ante Cuvalo, The Croatian National Movement, 1966-1972 (Columbia University Press: East European Monographs, 1990). It is also thoroughly discussed in the standard works on post-war Yugoslavia: see Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, Chapter 7 passim and pp. 308-15; Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, Chapter 7; and Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, pp. 121-66. See also George Schöpflin, "The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism," Survey 19/1 (Winter 1973), 123-46 for an interesting analysis of the movement's content. In recent years, important participants have produced a flood of memoirs and interviews. See especially the collection of interviews edited by Milovan Baletić, Ljudi iz 1971: prekinuta štANJI (Zagreb: Dopunski izdavački program Vjesnik, 1990); and Miko Tripalo's Hrvatsko proljeće.
105 See Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 98-104.

"Differences between the Croatian and Serbian Literary Languages," Journal of Croatian Studies 25-26 (1984-85), 104-21, clearly states the Croatian case for two separate languages, explaining that the argument is qualitative (based essentially on literary tradition and national consciousness), rather than quantitative (based on the differences between Croatian and Serbian standards). Cf. Ivo Banac, "Main trends in the Croat language question," in Aspects of the Slavic Language Question, Volume I, (New Haven: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984), 189-259. See also the works of Dalibor Brozović and Ljudevit Jonke, the two most important linguists associated with the Masopk.


108 Slovene liberalism is the subject of an excellent monograph by Božo Repe, "Liberalizem v Sloveniji," Borec 44/9-10 (1992), 673-949. (Besides an in-depth treatment of Slovenia, the work includes an interesting comparison with contemporary developments in other republics.) This summary of the Slovene leaders' aims is based mainly on Repe's discussion on p. 944.


111 See especially Pavlowitch, "The Orthodox church in Yugoslavia," 381-83.


113 This view was reflected in the census of 1953, which introduced a "Yugoslav - undetermined" category and (unlike the census of 1948) offered no specifically Muslim options.


115 Among people who chose one of the "Muslim" options the breakdown was as follows: 71,991 Serb-Muslims, 25,295 Croat-Muslims, and 788,403 "nationally undetermined." See Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims, Tables 6.1 (p. 155) and 6.2 (p. 156); and Irwin, "Fate of Islam," 389. The census figures cited in this section are taken or calculated from Irwin.


117 See, e.g., the 1959 speech by a delegate to the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Third Congress cited in Höpken, "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten," 196.
118Cited in Hüpken, "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten," 197.
119See the sources collected in Isaković, O "nacionaliziranju" Muslimana, 149-226. Cf. Baskin, "The secular state as ethnic entrepreneur," 115-16.
120Ramat, Nationalism and Federalism, 184.
121Baskin, "The secular state as ethnic entrepreneur," 119.
122Wayne S. Vucinich, writing in 1969, argued that "attempts to foster the idea that Montenegrians are not Serbs but a distinct nation have thus far not been successful." Vucinich, "Nationalism and Communism," 268-69. Cf. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 116.
123While in Yugoslav practice, narod was the standard word for "nation," in this context it must be understood as an ethnic group, and nacija as a nation in the modern sense. The same distinction was sometimes used at this time to argue that the Muslims were a nacija, but not a narod.
125Petar II Petrović Njegoš, prince-bishop of Montenegro from 1830 to 1851, was Montenegro's greatest poet, best known for Gorski vijenac (The Mountain Wreath). Mihailo Lalić (1914-1994) was the leading Montenegrin novelist of the post-war period.

For examples of the "Whose is..." form of argument, see, M. Jurišević, "15 dana," Književne novine 24 December 1966, pp. 1-2; Đorđije Rašović, "Jedinstvo jezika," Književne novine 24 May 1969; and especially the speech of Veselin Duranović at the Symposium on Montenegrin Culture, reported in Pobjeda, 4 February 1968.

For the Symposium, held on January 29-30, 1968, see Pobjeda, 4 February 1968. For a relatively hard-line anti-Serb tone, see, e.g., the speech of Veselin Duranović (reported in Pobjeda). For a more moderate tone, see, e.g., the speeches of Vuko Pavicić and Vukašin Mićunović (NIN, 4 February 1968, pp. 8-9). The Symposium was controversial from the time it was planned, and some Serbs saw it as an example of the promotion of artificial disunity. See Književne novine 24 December 1966, 1-2; and 21 January 1967, 1. For the Platform on Culture, see Borba, 24 December 1970.


For flag use, see Jens Reuter, Die Albaner in Jugoslawien (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1982), 47.

129See Roux, Les Albanais en Yougoslavie, 290-91, for the significance of the various names.

130Post-1945 education and language policy are well-covered in Roux, Les Albanais en Yougoslavie, Chapter 14.


133For examples of the Party's policy statements, see Budding, "Yugoslavs into Serbs," 410-12, from which this paragraph is adapted.


135For statements of the liberal position on this issue, see Nikezic, "Srbija v socialistički skupnosti jugoslavskih narodov in narodnosti," Teorija in praks 7/12 (1970), 1694-96; and Perović, "Međunacionalni

136 See statements by Nikezić (Borba, 12 March 1971) and Perović (Borba, 11 September 1969). See also Perović, Zatvaranje, 65 and 110. and Đukić, Slom srpskih liberala, 212 and 240-245. For the economic effects of centralism, see Perović, "Međunarodni odnosi u Srbiji," 126.

137 According to Bilandžić (Historija, 426), the Serbian leadership accepted decentralizing proposals in 1970, and radicalized them in 1971. The liberals' most important speeches in support of the amendments of 1971 are collected in Ustavne promene (Belgrade: Republički sekretariat za informacije, 1971).

138 Perović in Politika, 6 December 1971 (just after the Karadordević meeting where Tito brought down the Croatian leaders).

139 Politika, 13 December 1970.

140 The liberals' faith in economic modernization as a solution to national problems was particularly evident in their approach to Kosovo. See Perović, "Međunarodni odnosi," 127; Nikezić in Politika, 8 February 1969; and Đukić, Slom srpskih liberala, 131-2.

141 For examples of all these approaches, see Chapter Three of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."


145 Of course, some of the Plenum's significance depended on hindsight. In the 1980s, Cosić's 14th Plenum warnings about Kosovo gave him the aura of a prophet. Slavoljub Đukić, Čovek u svom vremenu (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1989), 189.

146 14. sednica, 105-08. By May of 1968, Cosić's use of the term "Šiptar" was itself controversial. "Albanian" [Albanac] had become the approved term for Yugoslavia's Albanians. See Mahmut Bakalli's speech, 14. sednica, 80.

147 14. sednica, 108-09.

148 14. sednica, 111.

149 See 14. sednica, 314, and Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 246. Historian Jovan Marjanović, who had put forward related though not identical arguments at the Plenum, was similarly censured and dropped. For more on the 14th Plenum, see Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question," Chapter Three.

150 Founded in 1892, the Zadruga was a publishing house devoted to the promotion of Serbian culture. Before the creation of the Yugoslav state, its efforts to link Serbs living under Habsburg and Ottoman rule with Serbia had often served as a substitute for forbidden political activities. The Zadruga's history from 1892 to 1992 is the subject of an excellent monograph: Ljubinka Trgovčević, Istoriija Srpske književne zadruga (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1992). For more on the Zadruga under Cosić's presidency, see Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question," Chapter Three.

151 Cosić called the Zadruga the "first pluralist forum in Serbian society after the war." Đukić, Čovek, 211.

152 Economist Kosta Mihailović, historian Radovan Samardžić, linguist Pavle Ivić, and philosopher Mihaílo Marković - all later members of the commission that produced the draft Memorandum - came onto the Zadruga board in May of 1971. "64. godišnja skupština Srpske književne zadruga," Glasnik Srpske književne zadruga 26/10 (20 June 1971), 31.

154See especially Čosić's speech at the Zadruga's 64th Annual Convention in May of 1971 (Glasnik Srpske književne zadruge, 26/5 (20 June 1971), 4-9), reprinted as "Porazi i ciljevi" in Čosić, Stvarno i moguće (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1988), 85-95. Čosić's presidency made the Zadruga the closest surrogate available for an opposition political party with a Serbian national platform. As an exasperated Party official from Kosovo put it, Zadruga recruiters in his city relied on the pithy slogan "Join - you know who is at the head." Speech of Miloš Vujaković (Kosovska Mitrovica) at the 41st Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Aktivnost Saveza komunista Srbije u borbi protiv nacionalizma i šovinizma u SR Srbiji (Belgrade: Komunist, 1972), 37-41.


156See, for instance, the emotional plea for Serbian unity delivered by a representative of Prosvjeta, the cultural society of Croatia's Serbs. Speech of Stanko Korač, in "64. godišnja skupština Srpske književne zadruge," Glasnik Srpske književne zadruge, 26/5 (20 June 1971), 21-22.


158Cf. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, 209-211, and Haberl, Parteiorganisation, 139-42.

159These citations are from the speeches of Pavle Ristić (Anali 19/3, 220), Radovan Pavičević (Anali 19/3, 282), Budimir Košutić (Anali 19/3, 300), and Stevan Vračar (Anali 19/3, 334). See also the speeches of Andrija Gams (Anali 19/3, 234), and Aleksandar Ivić (Anali 19/3, 287).

160The Law Faculty discussion was printed in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu 19/3 (May-June 1971), 207-359. (This issue was banned, but later reissued in facsimile.) The words cited are those of Mihailo Đurić (Anali 19/3, 232) and Radoslav Stojanović (Anali, 19/3, 263).

161Professor Živomir Đorđević (b. 1922) expressed his own commitment to Yugoslavia, but urged the necessity of envisioning a possible post-Yugoslav and post-socialist future for Serbia: "It is possible that in the foreseeable future six or eight independent states will be formed on this soil. It's understood that I don't want this, but it shouldn't be excluded...Because of this no one has the right...to neglect the interests of Serbia. For Serbia existed before them and will exist after them. Serbia existed before socialism and will exist after socialism. Classes and social orders change, but the people and the land remain." Anali 19/3, 252.

162Anali 19/3, 232-33.

163Anali 19/3, 232.

164Đurić was sentenced to two years in prison, a sentence reduced on appeal to nine months. Rajko Danilović, Upotreba neprijatelja: politička sudenja 1945-1991 u Jugoslaviji (Valjevo: Agencija Valjevac, 1993), 182-84.

165Of course, the territorial principle was not applied within already-established political units. Republican leaders held firmly to their prerogatives: Macedonian leaders rejected any suggestion of territorial rights for their Albanian minority as firmly as Croatian leaders opposed the idea of autonomous Serb units. For the Macedonian stance, see Repe, "Liberalizem," 915.

166Budimir Košutić, Anali 19/3, 301-2.

167See the speeches of Pavle Ristić (Anali 19/3, 219); Andrija Gams (Anali 19/3, 239); and Živomir Dordević (Anali 19/3, 249-51).


169The word odnosno indicates that the objects mentioned are (in the present context) equivalent. For instance, Amendment 35 of the 1971 package stated: "The President and Vice-President of the Presidency cannot be from the same republic or [odnosno] the same autonomous province." Ustavne promene: šestnaesta sednica, 254. (If Kardelj had used the word odnosno in its other sense, to correct a misstatement, it would presumably have been edited out before his speech was published.)

171 Much of this material is adapted from Chapter Four of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."

Useful interpretive discussions of the 1970s include Bilandžić, Historija, 385-461; Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, Chapters 5-6; and Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, Chapter 8. See also William Zimmerman, Open borders, nonalignment, and the political evolution of Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), Chapter 3. Burg offers the most material on the renewal of elite cooperation; Rusinow, on the Tito cult.

172 The Letter (Pismo) was published in the Yugoslav media on October 18, a few weeks after its distribution to Party members. Its text appears in Dragan Marković and Savo Kržavac, Liberalizam od Bilasa do danas (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1978), 2:187-95; the "Pismo" citations below refer to this source. For the Letter's history, see Marković and Kržavac, Liberalizam, 2:173-86 and Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 321-26.


175 "Pismo," 194.

176 A number of cases in which intellectuals were arrested and imprisoned are discussed in Danilović, Upute nepriratela, 178-94.

177 For instance, in this period Dobrica Ćosić, though barred from the official media and almost all opportunities for public speaking, continued to publish his novels. Similarly, the Praxis (critical Marxist) professors known as the "Belgrade Eight" (whose case became an international cause celebre in the mid-1970s), were forced out of teaching, but were offered research positions. For more on the Belgrade Eight see Gerson S. Sher, Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 226-32, and Chapter Four of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."

178 The reasons for this dramatic increase in debt are discussed in Bilandžić, Historija, 447-53; David A. Dyker, Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), Chapters 5 and 6; Lampe et al., Yugoslav-American Economic Relations, Chapter 6; and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, The Yugoslav Economic System and its Performance in the 1970s (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980).

179 Dyker, Yugoslavia, 171.

180 Zimmerman, Open Borders, 61-63.


182 Cf. Serbian politician Dragoslav Marković's comment in Mirko Đekić, Upute Srbije: optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića (Belgrade: Beseda, 1990), 41.

183 In practice, the process of "reaching agreement" was frequently applied even where not constitutionally required. For a sense of how federal decision-making worked under the 1974 constitution, see Chapter 5 of Burg, Conflict and Cohesion. It provides as clear an explanation as the subject matter allows.

184 Sruk, Ustavno uredenje, 304.

185 This interpretation of the 1974 Constitution follows Dušan Bilandžić's; see Bilandžić, Historija, 438-47.

186 Tyson, Yugoslav Economic System, Chapters 1 and 2, offers a good introduction to the theory and practice of associated labor and the OOUR. See also Bilandžić, Historija, 438-45 and Potts, The Development of the System of Representation in Yugoslavia, Chapter 5. For the "workers' amendments," see Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 284.
As William Zimmerman has put it, "The attack on the market and on "technocratism" redistributed power away from the enterprise managers, the workers' self-management units, and the economy to the regional Party organizations and the political system." Zimmerman, Open borders, 51. Cf. Tyson, Yugoslav Economic System, 8-9.


The Blue Book's text was finally published in 1990, in Đekić's Uptroba Srbije (his book of interviews with Dragoslav Marković), pp. 123-74. In the notes below, "Plava knjiga," refers to this text. For Marković's account of the writing of the Blue Book, see Đekić, Uptroba, 102-16.

The texts of the Serbian and provincial constitutions of 1974 can be found in Ustav SR Srbije; Ustav SAP Vojvodine; Ustav SAP Kosova: sa ustavnim zakonima za sprovođenje ustaw (Belgrade: službeni list SFRJ, 1974).

"Plava knjiga," 141-45.
"Plava knjiga," 159.
"Plava knjiga," 131-36.
"Plava knjiga," 132-34.
"Plava knjiga," 153-54.
"Plava knjiga," 164-69.
"Plava knjiga," 172. The original is: "...da li i srpski narod, ravnopravno sa drugim narodima Jugoslavije ostvaruje svoje istorijsko pravo na nacionalnu državu u okviru jugoslovenske federacije koja počiva na principu nacionalnog samoopredeljenja."

This section is adapted from Chapter 5 of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."


Slaven Letica, Intelektualac i kriza (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1989), 52.


Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 9.
The most eloquent exponent of this view is undoubtedly Ivo Banac, who calls the failures of both Yugoslav states "structurally unavoidable," attributing them to the clash of irreconcilable national ideologies (above all, those of Serbs and Croats). See Banac's "Preface to the Second Paperback Printing" of his *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*, (Ithaca, 1991), p. 15, and his "The Origins and Development of the Concept of Yugoslavia (to 1945)," *Yearbook of European Studies* 5 (1992): 22. Banac and similarly-minded scholars do not, of course, subscribe to the primordialist view of Yugoslavia's national conflicts often summarized as "ancient ethnic hatreds." Rather, they share a conviction that by 1918 (or by 1945 at the latest), two or more of Yugoslavia's peoples had acquired cultural, ideological, or historical freight that made their coexistence in a Yugoslav state impossible.

This author's view is closer to that put forward by John Lampe in his *Yugoslavia as History*. Lampe argues that "state-building rationales" competed with national ideologies throughout the existence of both Yugoslavias, and that the ideologies' eventual victory depended on external as well as internal factors. Cf. the broader argument in George Schöpflin, "Nationhood, Communism, and State Legitimation," *Nations and Nationalism* 1/1 (1995): 81-91.


For differing Serb and Albanian perceptions of the demonstrations, see Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths started a War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), Chapter One.


A good discussion of the emergence of Kosovo Serbs' organizations is Veljko Vujačić, "Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia." (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1995), 220-30.

The insistence that Kosovo authorities were punishing the wrong people recurred in Belgrade petitions. Thus, in June of 1986, the Board for the Defense of Freedom of Thought and Expression petitioned the Kosovo Presidency for clemency for a group of Kosovo Albanians convicted of political crimes under Article 133. Aleksa Djilas, ed., *Srpsko pitanje* (Belgrade: Politika, 1991), 268-70.

The petition (with its list of signatories) is reprinted in Djilas, *Srpsko pitanje*, 260-68.


A few good starting-points for considering the causes of post-war Slavic emigration from Kosovo are Marina Blagojević, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova," in Nebojša Popov, ed., *Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju* (Belgrade: Republika, 1996); the collection of articles in Gaber and Kuzmanić, eds., *Kosovo-

221 All the figures available involve some approximation, particularly for the period after the 1981 census. For the period between 1941 and 1981, about 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins emigrated (Marina Blagojević, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova"). Petrović, Migracije u Jugoslaviji, 104-115, presents more detail for the period 1971-81. For estimates of post-1981 emigration, see Roux, Les Albanais, 390-93; Dragović, "Les intellectuels serbes et la "question" du Kosovo," 57; and Vučković and Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova, 126-7.

222 These census figures are cited in Petrović and Blagojević, Seobe Srba i crnogoraca, 84.


224 For various views of the demographics involved, see Hivzi Islami, "Demografski problemi Kosova i njihovo tumačenje," in Gaber and Kuzmanić, eds., Kosovo - Srbia - Jugoslavija, 41-43; Roux, Les Albanais, 143-58; and Blagojević, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova," 240-42. Lenard Cohen, citing Islami and other sources, notes that by 1971 the urban percentage of the Kosovo Albanian population had reached only 23.4% (up from 16.7% in 1961). Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom, 38 (n. 43).


227 Unemployment figures are cited in Ramet, "Limits," 231. For a consideration of emigration from Kosovo in the context of other migrations within Yugoslavia, see Islami, "Demografski problemi," especially 58-66.

228 For instance, compare Blagojević, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova," with discussions of the study in Gaber and Kuzmanić, eds., Kosovo - Srbia - Jugoslavije, 29 and 132-33.

229 Petrović and Blagojević, Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca. Some of the study's main findings are summarized in Blagojević, "Iseljavanje sa Kosova," 244-46.

230 Against the presumption that the Academy's institutional role influenced the survey's results, it should be noted that the study included measures to prevent the survey-takers' views from influencing the emigrants' (written) responses. For the study's methodology, see Petrović and Blagojević, Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca, 11-56. In part because respondents could give more than one reason for emigrating (see the questionnaire reprinted in Petrović and Blagojević, Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca, 39-56), the study's findings were open to widely different interpretations. For instance, compare Blagojević, "Iseljavanje Srba sa Kosova," with discussions of the study in Gaber and Kuzmanić, eds., Kosovo - Srbia - Jugoslavije, 29 and 132-33.

The poll was conducted in November 1985 (for four of the areas polled) and May of 1986 (for the fifth). Petrović and Blagojević, Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca, 26. For the timing of emigration, see Petrović and Blagojević, Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca, 232.

231 Petrović and Blagojević, Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca, particularly 122-97. For a summary of the findings, see Blagojević, "Iseljavanje Srba sa Kosova."


233 This discussion of the Memorandum is adapted from Budding, "Systemic Crisis and National Mobilization" and from Chapter 6 of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."
The full text of the Memorandum (which was first published in Yugoslavia in 1989, in the Zagreb journal Naše teme, v. 33/1-2) appears in Kosta Mihailović and Vasilije Krestić, "Memorandum SANU" Odgovori na kritike (Belgrade, 1995), pp. 101-47. This work by two of the Memorandum's authors is a defense of the Memorandum against its many critics. It also includes a brief account of the work of the Memorandum Commission. It has been published in English as Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: answers to criticisms (Belgrade, 1995).

Useful discussions of the Memorandum and its political context include Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York, 1995), pp. 31-33; Slavoljub Đukić, Kako se dogodio voda (Belgrade, 1992), pp. 111-21 and the same author's slightly different discussion in Između slave i anateme: politička biografija Slobodana Miloševića (Belgrade, 1994), pp. 43-48. Two in-depth analytic discussions are Olivera Milosavljević's "Upotreba autoriteta nauke: Javna politička delatnost Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti (1986-1992)," and the same author's "Jugoslavija kao zabluda," both in Popov, ed., Srpska strana rata. (In the same volume, Ljubomir Madžar, "Ko koga eksploataše" offers an interesting discussion of the Memorandum's economic argument.) See also Miloš Mišović, "Od Memorandum do rata," Vreme (24 August 1992): I-VIII.


No one has conclusively established who was responsible for which parts of the draft document that eventually emerged from the Working Group. Both internal and external evidence, however, suggests that key roles were played by economist Kosta Mihailović (b. 1917), historian Vasilije Krestić (b. 1932), novelist Antonije Isaković (b. 1923), and philosopher Mihailo Marković (b. 1923).

Internal evidence for this assertion is presented in Chapter Six of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question" and in Budding, "Systemic Crisis and National Mobilization." To sum up important external evidence: Isaković headed both the Commission and the Working Group (Krestić and Mihailović, "Memorandum SANU," pp. 14-15). Krestić described himself in a 1991 interview as "one of the authors of the Memorandum, and precisely of that part which deals with national problems," Miloš Jević, Istoričar: Radovan Samardžić, Sima Ćirković, Vasilije Krestić, Čedomir Popov (Belgrade, 1992), p. 160. Kosta Mihailović's biographical entry in the SANU Yearbook describes him as "one of the authors of the Memorandum" (SANU Godišnjak 100 [1994]: 365). Moreover, a pair of usually well-informed journalists have written that Mihailović "is widely believed to be the Memorandum's main author." Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 36 n.1. Finally, Krestić and Mihailović co-authored the defense of the Memorandum ("Memorandum SANU:" Odgovori na kritike) published by SANU in 1995.

A number of observers have claimed that novelist Dobrica Čosić was one of the Memorandum's authors, or even its principal author. (See, e.g., Ramet, Balkan Babel, p. 200.) Čosić was not a member of the Commission, and both he and the Memorandum's acknowledged authors have repeatedly denied that he wrote any part of the Memorandum. Čosić has said, however, that he received the draft of the Memorandum in September, and offered the Commission thirty-eight pages of comments just before its work was interrupted.

The present author has found no reason to believe that Čosić wrote any part of the Memorandum. Its heavily economic emphasis is quite foreign to him, and much of what is common to both the Memorandum and Čosić - such as the interpretation of events in Kosovo - is too general, and was too pervasive among Serb intellectuals in the mid-1980s, to be proof of either authorship or influence. Nevertheless, some parallels between the Memorandum and Čosić are close enough to suggest his influence, whether exerted directly during the Memorandum's preparation, or indirectly through prior influence on its authors. It is difficult to distinguish between the two, because Čosić's ideas were so well-known among nationally-minded Belgrade intellectuals by the time the Memorandum was written.

Having said all this, one must also note that at a later period (1989-90) Čosić used his immense prestige to support the idea that Yugoslavia was untenable (because Slovenes and Croats did not want it) and should be dissolved on the basis of nationally-organized referendums. See, e.g., his June 1989 speech in Budva and his 3 August 1990 interview in NIN. The Budva speech is reprinted in Čosić's Srpsko pitanje - demokratsko pitanje (Belgrade: Politika, 1992), 187-201.

236 See Mihailović and Krestić, "Memorandum SANU" pp. 14-17. Except for the composition of the Working Group, it adds relatively little information to the report that SANU General Secretary and Commission member
Dejan Medaković delivered to the SANU Extraordinary Convention held in December of 1986 (Vanredna skupština, pp. 11-16). See also the convention speeches of Ivan Maksimović (Vanredna skupština, pp. 65-69) and Kosta Mihailović (Vanredna skupština, pp. 112-13).  

237 See Vanredna skupština, passim.

238 All citations are taken from the text of the Memorandum published in Krestić and Mihailović, "Memorandum SANU," pp. 101-47. The translations are mine.

244 "Memorandum SANU," pp. 121-25.
245 "Memorandum SANU," p. 126.
246 "Memorandum SANU," p. 128.
247 "Memorandum SANU," pp. 134 and 136 (for Kosovo), and p. 139 (for Croatia).
248 "Memorandum SANU," p. 146.
249 "Memorandum SANU," p. 144.
251 "Memorandum SANU," 146.
252 Belgrade Party chief Dragiša Pavlović, cited in Borba 16 October 1986. Similarly, academician and historian Vasa Ćubrilović (speaking at the Academy) said that he had heard the Memorandum's argument before: in 1937, when Slobodan Jovanović founded the Serbian Cultural Club on the premise that Serbs must develop their own national program as others were doing. (Ćubrilović had himself been a founding member of the Club.) The Second World War and the defeat of the Chetnik movement, Ćubrilović argued, had discredited this Serbian option once and for all. Serbs had chosen the Yugoslav way, and could not solve their own problems without accommodating the interests of others in Yugoslavia. Vanredna skupština, 26-27.
255 See, for instance, Stambolić's speeches at the Presidency of the CC JCy on 9 July 1985 (Stambolić, Rasprave, 106-12), at the Serbian Central Committee on 10 January 1986 (Stambolić, Rasprave, 146-53), and to the citizens of Kosovo Polje on 6 April 1986 (Stambolić, Rasprave, 166-68). In his public reply to the Memorandum, Stambolić took care to rebut its claim that the Serbian leadership had neglected Serbia's interests. See his speech at Belgrade University, 30 October 1986, in Stambolić, Rasprave, 215-19. See also the speech of Vukoje Bulatović,
For instance, Sabrina Petra Ramet has asserted that the Memorandum "did more than any other tract or pamphlet written up to then to mobilize Serbian resentment of non-Serbs and legitimate Serbian hatred of all non-Serbs, whether inside or outside Yugoslavia." Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia (Boulder, CO, 1996), p. 200. Branka Magaš calls the Memorandum "a document that provided the blueprint not only for Serbia's onslaught upon the entire Federal order, but also for the 1991-92 war." Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-92 (London, 1993), p. 4.


258 For Milošević's public reaction to the Memorandum, see Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom, 58-60.

259 When Milošević formed his Socialist Party of Serbia in July of 1990, four members of the Memorandum Commission were elected to the party's Main Board of one hundred and eleven people. Antonije Isaković won 1105 out of 1297 delegate votes, second only to Milošević ally Borisav Jović (at that time president of the Yugoslav presidency). Mihailo Marković, with 1073 votes, came in fifth on the list of candidates and also became the party's Vice President. SANU president Dušan Kanazir and economist Miloš Macura were also elected to the Board. Moreover, economist Kosta Mihailović became an important Milošević adviser. See Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 36, n. 1, and the post-1987 functions listed in Mihailović's biography in SANU Godišnjak 100 (1994), 365-71.

260 Belgrade Communist leader Dragiša Pavlović, in a speech of 11 September 1987, charged Serbian nationalists with pledging "easily promised speed" (olako obećana brzina) in solving Serbia's problems. This famous speech served Milošević as the occasion to bring down Pavlović and, with him, Ivan Stambolić, leaving himself as the unchallenged leader of Serbia's Communists. Pavlović later commented that he had meant the phrase to apply to SANU and the Association of Writers of Serbia - i.e., nationalists in the opposition - but that those who believed the phrase pointed at Milošević understood Milošević's program better than he did at the time. Pavlović, Olako obećana brzina, 94-100 (for the text of the speech), and 371-72.


263 This account of Milošević's speech draws on Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom, 62-65 and Sell, Slobodan Milošević, 1-4.

264 Milošević's speech to the Kosovo Polje delegates is reprinted in Slobodan Milošević, Godine raspleta (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989), 140-146.


I have also made particular use of Lenard Cohen's Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001) and Louis Sell's Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). These works incorporate extensive material from the Yugoslav press and other sources, as well as drawing on the authors' interviews with participants in the events described. Other sources used are cited in the individual notes below.

266 Some scholars have argued that a post-Communist Yugoslavia was impossible: see Ivo Banac's assertion that "...post-war Yugoslavia is itself the product of Communist rule. In Yugoslavia, post-Communism also means post-Yugoslavism" ("Post-Communism as Post-Yugoslavism: the Yugoslav Non-Revolutions of 1989-1990," in Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 186.
The political conflict between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians escalated in step with the general Yugoslav crisis. On July 2, 1990 (the day on which Slovenes declared their sovereignty), 114 of the 123 Albanian delegates to the Kosovo assembly – meeting outside the assembly building, because the Serbian government had earlier taken steps to adjourn the assembly – declared that Kosovo was "an equal and independent entity within the framework of the Yugoslav federation." In response, the Serbian parliament dissolved the provincial parliament, instituting direct rule from Belgrade. See Cohen, Broken Bonds, 121-23 and (for the quotation) Malcolm, Kosovo, 346.

A good source for this is Jens Reuter, "Vom ordnungspolitischen zum Nationalitätenkonflikt zwischen Serbien und Slowenien," Südosteuropa 39/10 (1990), 576-77

The competing programs are summarized in Cohen, Broken Bonds, 58-64.

In the spring of 1990, the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia ruled some of the Slovene amendments (as well as various other amendments passed by other republics) illegal, but the rulings remained a dead letter.

This section is adapted from portions of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question," Chapter 7.

Milošević, Godine raspleta, 153.

Milošević, Godine raspleta, 277. The speech included Serbian rhetoric also, which was typical for Milošević throughout 1988. For more on this point, see Veljko Vujatić's "Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia" (Ph.D. Diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1995), 330-335.

Milošević, Godine raspleta, 330.

In his published diary, Borisav Jović (who was at the time Serbia's representative on the Yugoslav Presidency and one of Milošević's closest allies) has asserted that in a meeting held on March 26 1990 leading members of Serbia's political establishment (the "koordinacija") concluded that "the process of the collapse of Yugoslavia is being realized in the same way that this happened with the LCV. It seems unstoppable to us. Serbia will pursue... the survival of federal Yugoslavia, but will prepare itself to live without Yugoslavia also." According to Jović, the leaders argued that Serbia could not accept a confederal solution because it would then be unable to protect the interests of Serbs in other republics, and believed that a war for territory in some areas (Bosnia-Hercegovina was specified) would inevitably follow from Yugoslavia's dissolution. Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ: izbori iz dnevnika (Belgrade: Politika, 1995), 131. Cf. the discussion of this meeting in Sell, Slobodan Milošević, 108.


The relevant portion reads: "Član 72. Republika Srbija ureduje i obezbeđuje:

i. suverenost, nezavisnost i teritorijalnu celokupnost Republike Srbije i njen međunarodni položaj i odnose s drugim državama i međunarodnim organizacijama;". Ustav Republike Srbije ca Ustavnim zakonom za sprovođenje Ustava i Izbornim zakonima (Belgrade: PJ Pravno ekonomski centar Beograd), 19.

In the original, "odlučuje o ratu i miru" and "ratifišuje međunarodne ugovore."

Article 135 in its entirety reads: "Prava i dužnosti koje Republika Srbija, koja je u sastavu Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, ima po ovom ustavu, a koji se prema saveznom ustavu ostvaruje u federaciji, ostvarivače se u skladu sa saveznim ustavom."
Kad se aktima organa federacije ili aktima organa druge republike, protivno pravima i dužnostima koje ona ima po Ustavu Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, narušava ravnopravnost Republike Srbije ili se na drugi način ugrozavaju interesi Republike Srbije, a pri tom nije obezbeđena kompenzacija, republički organi donose akte radi zaštićite interes Republike Srbije."

286 See Articles 108-112, and Article 130.
287 The translation of this passage is from The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Belgrade: Kultura, 1990), 35, as cited in Cohen, Broken Bonds, 126.
288 Politika 26 June 1990.
289 See, for instance, Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 357 and Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 130.
290 In his memoirs, Janez Drnovšek (at that time Slovenia's representative on Yugoslavia's federal presidency) states that from August of 1990 both Milošević and Borisav Jović made it clear to him that they would not oppose Slovenia's independence. Janez Drnovšek, Echappes de l'enfer: la verite d'un president (Martigny: Editions Latour, 1996), 207. Jović's diary confirms this; see, e.g., his entry for 30 July 1990 (Jović, Poslednji dani, 173). See also Silber and Little, Death of a Nation, 113-14 (citing Slovene president Milan Kučan's account of a January 1991 meeting with Milošević).
291 For background on JNA-LCY relations, see James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter, 1992), 56-61 and passim.
292 Cf. Sell, Slobodan Milošević, 120.
293 For contrasts between the JNA and the Serbian leadership's policies at this time, see Gow, Legitimacy and the Military, Chapter 6; Cohen, Broken Bonds, 181-92 and 206-7; and Sell, Slobodan Milošević, 120-24.
294 An interesting assessment of how the generals' Partisan convictions shaped their attitudes during Yugoslavia's dissolution is in Drnovšek, Echappes de l'enfer, 190-91. See also Sell, Slobodan Milošević, 122.
295 For background on JNA-LCY relations, see James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter, 1992), 56-61 and passim.
296 For contrasts between the JNA and the Serbian leadership's policies at this time, see Gow, Legitimacy and the Military, Chapter 6; Cohen, Broken Bonds, 181-92 and 206-7; and Sell, Slobodan Milošević, 120-24.
297 Borba, 30 April - 2 May 1990.
298 Borba, 1-2 September 1990.
299 This discussion of the SPO is adapted from Chapter 7 of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question."
300 Srpska rec #1 ((1 June 1990), 34.
301 Srpska rec #6 (5 November 1990), 20.
302 Borba, 11 May 1990.
303 Vjesnik, 19 September 1990.
305 Srpska rec, 8 July 1991.
307 Chapter 15 of journalist Marcus Tanner's Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997) offers a balanced presentation of the HDZ's initial policies.
Zapisnik, 01510566-67.

309 During the meeting, Tuđman read out a letter from Croatia's Interior Minister describing the clashes.

Zapisnik, 01510550, 01510629-29).

310 Kovacević and Đajić, Hronologija jugoslovenske krize, 35. The political context of spring 1991 is set out in Chapter 7 of Cohen, Broken Bonds.

311 Tanner, Croatia, 242, provides Tuđman adviser Slaven Letica's account of the meeting.

312 For example, he stated: "Slovenija je donijela svoje odluke, samo je pitanje njihov [sic] efektuiranja i to je vreme koje je tada bilo oročeno na 6 mjeseci, ono ističe 23. juna, bilo vrijeme u kojem je trebalo napraviti napor da li je moguće sa drugim republikama dogovoriti da se to uradi sporazumima" (Zapisnik, 01510628-29). Without completely excluding the possibility of some future form of association, Kučan considered this a separate issue that could only be addressed after independence was realized (Zapisnik, 01510550, 01510629-10634).

Because this document is unpublished, I have included fairly extensive citations to substantiate my conclusions. I have translated them only where their exact wording affects my argument.

313 At this meeting, Gligorov's main proposal was that the republics should agree to dissolve the existing union, but at the same time create a new one on a different basis. He believed that this was consistent with Slovenia's position, but Milan Kučan did not. For example (in the context of a discussion of national self-determination), Gligorov said:

"Ako to obezbedimo da teče paralelno i to u momentu kada prestaje kako da kažem dosadašnja zajednica, istovremeno stupa u dejstvo nova dogovorena zajednica, to je onda nešto drugo. To je druga jedna sigurnost.

Tu se ja sporim sa Kučanom i ne prekidno ne možemo da se razumemo." Zapisnik, 01510669.

Izetbegović, for his part, offered to accept any proposal for Yugoslavia's future organization that recognized Bosnia's sovereignty and was acceptable to both Serbia and Croatia. "U ovom trenutku nama uz uslov priznanja suverenosti Bosne i Hercegovine odgovara svako rješenje buduće Jugoslavije koje odgovara republikama Srbiji i Hrvatskoj." Zapisnik, 01510610.

314 In explaining his stance, Tuđman referred to the fact that many Croats lived outside Croatia. "Gospodine Srbskoj, mi bismo već davnio i prije Slovenije donijeli odhuku kakvu Slovenija forsira da je donese u roku od 15 dana itd.

Prema tome jasno je da je to složeno, ali kažem ovo, na temelju sveukupnog iskustva da težimo da se jugoslavenska zajednica izradi na osnovama suverenosti, dobrovoljnog ugovora, dogovora suverenosti republika i ostavimo onda sva pitanja ova o kojima vi govorite da raspravljamo." Zapisnik, 01510654.

315 For instance, he said "Šta će se desiti ako se npr. sada zbog toga što mi prihvatićemo ovde da smo svi suverene države, polazim od primera Crne Gore formira Muslimansko nacionalno veće i proglasiti odjecenje od Crne gore, proglasiti se Srpsko nacionalno vijeće i proglasiti odjecenje krajine od Bosne i Hercegovine, kninska krajina ide do kraja." Zapisnik, 01510647.

316 In the original and without ellipses, the exchange runs: "Dr Franjo Tuđman: AVNOJ-evska Jugoslavija ne postoji od onda kada ste vi u Srbiji proveli one prornjene. To je činjenica i kada se desilo sve ono što smo konstatirali i ustavom poslije vas Ustavom Hrvatske i plebiscitom Slovenije, deklaracijom Makedonije itd.

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317 For instance, he said "Često se dežiako ako se npr. sada zbog toga što mi prihvatićemo ovde da smo svi suverene države, polazim od primera Crne Gore formira Muslimansko nacionalno veće i proglasiti odjecenje od Crne gore, proglasiti se Srpsko nacionalno vijeće i proglasiti odjecenje krajine od Bosne i Hercegovine, kninska krajina ide do kraja." Zapisnik, 01510647.

318 at one point, Milošević stated this position as follows:
"Yugoslavija kao državna zajednica ravnopravnih naroda u medjunarodno priznatim granicama postoji i bilo kakva promena njenog državnog uređenja moguća je jedino na osnovu slobodno izražene volje svakog njenog naroda ponašob na referendumu, s obzirom na pravo svakog naroda na samoopredjeljenje uključujući i pravo na odcjeljenje.

U slučaju korišćenja ovog prava, neophodno je prethodno regulisati pitanje medjusobnih granica uz uvažavanje nacionalnih, historijskih, kulturnih i drugih interesa svakog jugoslovenskog naroda." Zapisnik, 01510581.

519 For the terminology applied to "national minorities" in Yugoslavia, see Šuvar, Nacije i međunacionalni odnosi, 120.

520 The entire relevant exchange runs as follows:

"Slobodan Milošević: To nije pitanje perfekcije, ne postoje nigdje perfekte granice, ali primjerom te konfederalne formule, ne postoji narod koji bi bio više podeljen nego što bi to bio slučaj sa srpskim narodom.

Ako vi to ne možete da uvažite...

Dr Franjo Tudman: Albanski, makedonski...a Nijemci.

Slobodan Milošević: Što se Albanaca tiče oni su nacionalna manjina, a koji je to procenat Njemaca, molim vas izvan Njemačke...

Dr Franjo Tudman: Austrija, Švicarska...


321 intervju, 23 November 1990.

322 Milošević on 25 April 1987, in his Godine raspreta, 147.


324 "Meni bi trebao netko da objasni što znači nacionalni referendum i što bi on praktično značio u jednom Sarajevu, u kojem od 600 hiljada ljudi živi 250, 350 hiljada Muslimana, 170 ili 180 hiljada Srba, 80 hiljada Hrvata i još onih ostalih naroda i narodnosti." Zapisnik, 01510611.

325 "Alija Izetbegović: Na nacionalni referendum, i onda gradjanski rat u Sarajevu, pucaju ljudi s prozora jedan na drugog, to će nam se dogoditi." Zapisnik, 01510752.

326 Alija Izetbegović: Onda je manji problem, ali zato mišlim da bi trebalo držati jugoslovensku zajednicu država u kojoj bi bilo dovoljno garancije, to bi bila ta zajednica, ne bi bila ista država, ali bi bila jedna zajednica država.


327 Kučan said: "Evropa je bila problem stvorila zaštito onih dijelova naroda koji ne mogu živjeti u matičnim svojim državama.

I ja s time najviše imam iskustva, znam kako te izgleda." Zapisnik, 01510693.

328 Bulatović said: "Ja vas molim da imamo u vidu da mi živimo u jednoj uzavređenoj političkoj klimi i objektivno živimo na Balkanu. Mnoga rešenja koja su ovdje u optičaju meni su veoma bliska, i zaista poštovanje gradjanskih i ljudskih prava bi riješilo sve ovo što kod nas ima.

Ali kod nas upravo vri zbog toga što mi dugo godina nismo poštovali elementarna, ljudska, gradjanska prava. Pojavila se mržnja i nepovjerenje, nedoumica.

To je ono što kod mene samo uliva pesimizam." Zapisnik, 01510648.

329 An exchange between Kučan and Milošević is worth citing at length, for it goes to the heart of the problem.

"Milan Kučan: "Ovdje u tom dokumentu nijde ne stoji, ono je pretpostavka, ali mora biti jasno napisano, da prvo da bi rešili političku krizu priznajemo svakom narodu, odnosno republici u kojoj živi zajedno sa drugim gradjanim, ne svoje nacionalnosti, pravo da ostvari svoje pravo na samoopredjeljenje.

Slobodan Milošević: Dobro, je li ti stavljaš znak jednakosti između naroda i republike?

Milan Kučan: Da.

Slobodan Milošević: Ja ga ne stavljam.

Milan Kučan: U tome je sada problem.

Slobodan Milošević: A znaš zašto ga ti stavljaš, ti možeš da ga stavljaš zato što je Slovenija u specifičnom položaju. Ja ne mogu da ga stavljam...

Milan Kučan: Oprosti, ja sam tebi već na to odgovorio, Slovenija je u mnogo nezgodnijem položaju nego Srbija, odnosno srpski narod.

Naš narod je podijeljen na četiri države. I ne malim procentom."
I ja ne mogu rešavati problem Slovenaca koji žive u drugim političko pravnim tijelima.

Slobodan Milošević: Možeš problem Slovenaca koji žive u Jugoslaviji.

Milan Kučan: Ne. Problem Slovenaca koji žive u Sloveniji."

Zapisnik, 01510637-39.

Kučan’s frequent use of "narod, odnosno republika" ("the people, that is to say the republic") also shows great continuity with earlier Slovene positions: it was noted above that Kardelj made use of this expression in explaining the 1971 amendments.

In this regard, a statement Tudman made during the Split meeting is highly illuminating. Trying (yet again) to find a formula for a joint press statement, Tudman suggested using the expression "narod, odnosno republika" to cloak disagreement on fundamental issues, and resuming discussions later. It is impossible to read his words without imagining that they were repeated over and over during socialist Yugoslavia's constitutional evolution.

"Dr Franjo Tudman: Dajmo prihvatimo ovu formulaciju koja svakog njenog naroda, odnosno republike pa prema tome, podrazumijeva i ovo što vi hoćete. Može braniti, znači ne može biti po nacionalnom republika, a vi možete braniti zahijev da može, pa ćemo se u daljnjim razgovorima o tome raspraviti." Zapisnik, 01510761.

The context for this remark shows the participants' frustration after hours of trying to reach agreement on a joint statement for the press:

"Slobodan Milošević:....Novinarima ćemo da objasnimo da se ni u čemu ne slažemo, to će da bude najbolji efekat koji smo postigli na današnjoj sednici.


Ako je tako onda od toga podjimo sledeći put. Kako rešiti u uslovima kako su se historijski stvorili problem srpskog naroda." Zapisnik, 01510692.