table, as its enemies hope. Yugoslavia, won with a great struggle, will also defend itself with a great struggle.279

At the same time that he insisted on his loyalty to the Yugoslav state, however, Milošević served notice that he would not support just any Yugoslavia. Only a few months after the "Brotherhood and Unity" meeting, at the Twentieth Plenum of the LCY in January of 1989, Milošević asserted:

If Yugoslavia were to be imagined as a political community in which Serbia is divided into three parts and on its knees, then Serbia would be against such a community, against such a Yugoslavia. Then we would be for another kind of Yugoslavia, that is for the only possible Yugoslavia - for a Yugoslavia in which all are equal, including Serbia.280

In the eighteen months between the January 1990 collapse of the LCY and the June 1991 disintegration of the Yugoslav state, the Serbian leadership (without completely relinquishing its Yugoslav claims) increasingly cast itself as the defender of the interests of Serbia and - at first tentatively, and then more explicitly - of Serbs elsewhere. Its focus shifted, in other words, from a revived Yugoslav federation to an expanded Serbian state.281 This shift was reflected in the Serbian constitution adopted on September 28, 1990. Much of the constitution was written in language befitting an independent state.282 For instance, Article 72 referred to the "sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and its international position and relations with other states and international organizations."283 (In some ways, this echoed the Declaration on the Full Sovereignty of the State of the Republic of Slovenia adopted by the Slovene assembly on July 2, 1990. This Declaration included the provision that republican laws would take precedence over federal ones.) Article 73 of the Serbian constitution stated that the republican parliament "decides about war and peace" and "ratifies international agreements."284 Article 135 used ambiguous language with regard to Serbia's position within the SFRY. It stated that certain "rights and duties" would be carried out in accordance with the federal constitution, but also suggested that the republic could act independently to defend its interests if these were threatened by "acts of the organs of the federation or acts of the organs of another republic."285 (By contrast, the constitution's provisions very clearly subordinated the autonomous provinces to the republic.286)

The constitution included another very significant provision: its statement that the Republic of Serbia would "maintain connections with the Serbs who live outside the republic of Serbia, working to guard their national and cultural-historical identity."287 This in itself did not
necessarily imply border changes. However, it was in the discussions leading up to the adoption of the constitution that Milošević first publicly raised the idea that Yugoslavia's dissolution would involve the revision of republican borders. He stated that while Serbia supported a federal Yugoslavia, current moves toward confederation raised the possibility of an independent Serbia. The current borders, he said, were contingent on a federal Yugoslavia. If Yugoslavia were to become a confederation, the question of borders would be open and Serbia would protect Serbs outside Serbia. Milošević did not say what areas Serbia would claim, or what methods it would use.288

That Serbia was increasingly acting independently of federal authority was shown not only in the new Serbian constitution, but also in various actions of the Serbian regime – notably its December 1990 appropriation without the authorization of the National Bank of Yugoslavia of a reported $1.5 billion worth of dinars from the federation's funds. (The money was used to pay wages and pensions in Serbia just before that republic's elections.)289 With the Serbian change of course came a realignment in inter-republican relations. Serbia's pursuit of a stronger federation had done much to strengthen pro-independence sentiment in Slovenia, and as long as Serbia sought to restructure Yugoslavia the two republics were on a collision course. But - given the virtual absence of Serbs in Slovenia - Slovenian independence (which came a step closer to realization with a pro-independence referendum on 23 December 1990) was consistent with the pursuit of a post-Yugoslav expanded Serbia. According to a number of accounts, Milošević conveyed his acceptance of Slovene secession to the Slovene leaders on various occasions in the last half of 1990 and the first months of 1991.290

As the Serbian leadership moved away from its self-appointed position as defender of Yugoslav unity, this role was to some extent taken over by the leadership of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The collapse of the LCY had been particularly traumatic for the Army, which was closely linked with the party not only historically (through the Partisan struggle), but also institutionally.291 The Army's mission had previously been defined as defending both socialism and the Yugoslav state; now it was unclear. The JNA leadership - deeply conscious of the dangers of civil war - continued to view the Army as the guardian of Yugoslav unity. It was largely unable either to conceive of Yugoslavia in post-socialist terms or to imagine a peaceful dissolution of the state.292 The JNA leadership's policies were not identical with those pursued by the Serbian leadership: in particular, some JNA leaders pursued the goal of a unified
Yugoslavia even after Serbian leaders had abandoned it. Nevertheless, important factors linked the two groups. Their common commitment to socialism was crucial. Within Serbia, both were on the Partisan side in the Partisan vs. Chetnik divide that reemerged as Serbia moved toward a multiparty system. With regard to other republics, the Army’s top leaders were deeply suspicious of the reformist and then post-communist Slovene leaders and still more hostile to Croatia’s Franjo Tudman. This orientation, as well as the predominantly Serb and Montenegrin origin of the officer corps, ultimately shaped the JNA’s policies in a "Serbian" direction.

Publicly, Milošević continued to straddle the Yugoslav-Serbian fence into the December 1990 Serbian elections and beyond. The platform of his Socialist Party of Serbia (formed through the merger of the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance) called for "a modern federation of equal citizens and [equal] federal units" (with the equality of citizens to be assured by one-man, one-vote elections for one chamber in the federal parliament), while also saying that the Yugoslav peoples "must have the right to self-determination and secession." The platform also said that a new Yugoslav Constitution should allow autonomous provinces to be formed within Yugoslavia "on the basis of the expressed will of the population and national, historic, cultural and other specifics." (The main goal of this proposal, which had surfaced in similar form during the 1971 constitutional amendment debates, was a Serb autonomous province in Croatia.) The platform called for Serbia to exert authority over its whole state, including the autonomous provinces. Most important (echoing the newly-adopted constitution), it promised support to Serbs outside Serbia:

The Socialist Party of Serbia will constantly follow the conditions of life and development of parts of the Serbian people in other republics and abroad, and maintain active ties with their political, cultural, and other organizations, thinking it natural that others will also maintain such relations with parts of their people in Serbia. It will offer them material and moral support, contributing to the improvement of the conditions of their life, the preservation of their national identity [and] cultural tradition, and to a more intensive cultural development.

In the context of Serbia in 1990, the SPS’s expressed position on the national question was moderate. With regard to the national issue the regime was in an enviable position. By restoring Serbian rule over the provinces, Milošević had established his national credentials beyond any
reasonable doubt. He was thus free to position himself in the campaign as the voice of national moderation, promising peace if he won the election and threatening civil war if the opposition did. (Milošević's most prominent campaign slogan - "With us, there is no uncertainty" - offered a fearful electorate an illusory stability, rather than appealing to national passions.)

It was left to the opposition parties to bring the border question into the election, and most of them did. (Anti-nationalist parties were politically marginal in this election.) Few political figures were prepared to discuss the problems raised by Yugoslavia's impending dissolution in terms of minority rights rather than border changes. A notable exception was Zoran Đinđić. "Effective means to protect the collective rights of minorities," Đinđić argued, was the *sine qua non* for peaceful separation. Drawing new borders could not be the solution, for in ethnically-mixed Yugoslavia: "If the land shook with the wish of its inhabitants to go elsewhere with "their territory" there would be a permanent earthquake in some parts of Yugoslavia."

Most prominent in putting forward specific border claims in the 1990 Serbian elections was novelist Vuk Drašković's anti-communist Serbian Renewal Movement (*Srpski pokret obnove*, or SPO). The SPO was the only opposition party to achieve double-digit returns in the election, winning 15.8% of the vote for parliament. SPO adherents embraced the legacy of the Second World War Chetniks (and the traditional values of monarchy, church, and peasantry) as well as the liberal ideals of parliamentary democracy. The SPO's draft program proclaimed the party's support for a (strengthened) Yugoslavia, but also acknowledged the possibility of Yugoslavia's collapse. In that event, it said, Serbia should claim territories according to two criteria. It should demand all territories that belonged to the Serbian state on December 1, 1918, as well as all territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in which Serbs were in the majority before the *Ustaša* genocide. Drašković put forward the same position in October 1990, adding that a referendum in the contested territories would be valid only if it counted the votes of all Serb victims of the *Ustaša*, and their unborn descendants.

During the election campaign, Drašković repeatedly accused Milošević of insufficient national zeal. A May 1990 exchange between the two is characteristic. In one speech, Milošević had asserted that the Serbian government was in full control of its territory "from Dragaš [in southwestern Kosovo on the Albanian border] to Horgos [in northeastern Vojvodina on the Hungarian border]." With this phrase, Milošević emphasized his success in restoring Serbian control over the provinces. He went on to promise "...we will not sit with our hands folded in the
face of any violence against the parts of the Serbian people outside Serbia." Later that month, Drašković responded "Serbia is not just from Dragaš to Horgoš, as you were pleased to say... You are mistaken if you think that you traced the borders of Serbia on March 28, 1989 [when the Serbian constitutional amendments were adopted]." Drašković also questioned the sincerity of Milošević's promise to protect Serbs outside Serbia, predicting that the Communists would ultimately choose power in Serbia over the defense of Serbdom. The SPO continued its attempts to outflank the regime on the national question up to the election. For instance, in September of 1990, when the SPS promised that in the case of confederation Serbia would use "peaceful means" to protect Serbs outside Serbia, Drašković denounced the formula as "capitulation." This technique ultimately worked against the SPO, lending credibility to Milošević's claims that an opposition victory would mean civil war.

Even while putting forward extremist border claims, Drašković – a Serb from Herzegovina - showed considerable awareness that implementing them would be impossible. In September of 1989, Drašković indicated that he saw his border claims less as a program to carry out after Yugoslavia's collapse than as a threat that would forestall collapse by intimidating advocates of a Greater Croatia. Dividing Yugoslavia's mixed territories, where "the ethnic map looks like a leopard-skin," would be impossible, Drašković said. As war approached, Drašković repeated the leopard-skin metaphor and emphasized the impossibility of division on several occasions. In a speech delivered in June 1991, just before war broke out, he called Yugoslavia the only reasonable solution for its peoples: "There is no magician who can draw ethnically pure borders across that leopard-skin and between thousands of husbands, wives and their children."

In this period, though the Milošević regime might decline to set out explicit border claims in public, it took a variety of actions directly and indirectly aimed at aligning Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia with Belgrade, and against the newly elected governments of those republics. This process advanced most rapidly in Croatia. In some instances, Serbian officials reportedly intervened directly to block independent contacts and negotiations between Serbs in Croatia and the Zagreb leadership. By August 1990, with Belgrade's encouragement, Serbs in the Knin area had essentially severed relations with Zagreb, and begun the so-called "log revolution."
At this time, a flood of stories in the Belgrade media – as well as the public exhumation and reburial of the bones of Ustaša victims – promoted the idea that Serbs outside Serbia were again threatened by the genocide they had suffered during the Second World War. Of course, the perception of endangerment was not created solely by Belgrade's actions. It was also fed by personal and family memories of the war, and – in Croatia – by the Tudman regime's highly nationalist rhetoric, partial rehabilitation of the Ustaša state, and many acts of insensitivity toward the Serb population. The Croatian leadership justified some of its measures – e.g., dismissing many Serbs from the police – as a way of undoing Serbs' overrepresentation in the republic's political and security cadres (itself the result of Serbs' role in the Partisan struggle). Such actions, however, could only reinforce Serbs' fears that minority status would inevitably result in discrimination.

All of these actions were aimed at promoting a territorial rather than a political solution to the reemerging "Serbian problem." They indicated that in the ever-more-likely event of Yugoslavia's collapse Serbia would attempt to bring territories populated by Serbs within its own borders, rather than seeking legal or constitutional protections for them within newly-independent states based on the preexisting republican boundaries. This basic orientation found particularly clear expression at a meeting of the six republican presidents held on March 28, 1991 in Split. A consideration of the positions put forward at this meeting (based on a transcript held at the ICTY) will conclude the consideration of how Milošević's national program shaped the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution.

By the end of March 1991, though Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of independence and the beginning of large-scale combat were still three months away, the post-Yugoslav wars had in some sense begun. At the beginning of March, armed clashes between Serbs and Croatian police units had occurred in Pakrac (Western Slavonia); clashes at the Plitvice Lakes occurred during the meeting itself. (On April 1, just a few days after the meeting, the Executive Committee of the National Council of the self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Area of Krajina declared that Krajina was joining itself to the republic of Serbia, and that henceforth Serbia's laws would apply there.) The situation within Serbia itself was also extremely tense: on March 9, the Army had intervened to put down a major opposition demonstration demanding an
end to regime control of the media. Finally, on March 25 Tudman and Milošević had met secretly at Karadordevo, and had reportedly discussed the division of Bosnia.311

The positions that the republican presidents put forward at the March 28 meeting were consistent with their publicly-expressed views, but took on sharper form in their sometimes-acerbic exchanges. Slovenia's president, Milan Kučan, argued that Slovenia's decision to leave Yugoslavia had already been made (through the December 23, 1990 referendum in which 86% of voters supported independence). While expressing his government's wish to reach independence through a process of agreement, he made it clear that Slovenia would act unilaterally if agreement was not reached by the referendum's June 23 deadline.312 Kiro Gligorov, Macedonia's president, and Alija Izetbegović, president of the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, attempted to find a compromise solution that would allow some form of Yugoslav union on the basis of republican sovereignty.313 Croatia's president (and the meeting's host and chair), Franjo Tudman, took a position like Slovenia's on the issue of republican sovereignty but showed more hesitation in implementing it.314 Montenegrin president Momir Bulatović emphasized the difficulty of reconciling republican and national claims in the event of Yugoslavia's dissolution.315

A striking aspect of the presidents' meeting was that both Kučan and Tudman charged that Milošević and Serbia had taken the first steps toward undermining the 1974 constitution and the Yugoslav state. In a particularly heated exchange, Tudman and Milošević debated this point:

"Dr Franjo Tudman: AVNOJ Yugoslavia has not existed since you in Serbia carried out those changes....Moreover, you were the one who said both institutionally and extra-institutionally and so forth that you are changing the situation, and you have changed it....
Slobodan Milošević: We changed the situation in Serbia, we didn't change the situation in Yugoslavia.
Dr Franjo Tudman: That changing of yours influenced..."

(At this point in the exchange Milošević interrupted Tudman and returned to a previous topic.)316 Similarly, at another point in the meeting Kučan said to Milošević: "You constantly talk about a constitutional path [to separation], about the constitution which you do not recognize, you first and most."317

Milošević's basic stance - put forward both in the course of discussion and as a formal proposal - was that Yugoslavia's dissolution was possible only on the basis of the self-
determination of peoples, that such self-determination could be carried out through national referendums (i.e., one referendum for Serbs, one for Croats, and so on), and that dissolution would have to be preceded by an agreement on borders, based on "respect for the national, historical, cultural and other interests of each Yugoslav people." This was essentially a more-developed version of the position Milošević had first put forward in June of 1990. The criteria he now cited for determining post-Yugoslav borders were sufficiently vague to allow for almost any claims.

Several other points are noteworthy about the position Milošević put forward at this meeting (and elsewhere). First, like the majority of Serbian politicians and intellectuals at this time, Milošević took it for granted that the socialist distinction between "nations (narodi)" and "nationalities (narodnosti)" or "national minorities (narodne manjine)" would survive Yugoslavia. The most important political corollary was that Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia would have the right to self-determination if Yugoslavia collapsed, but Albanians in Kosovo would not. When Tuđman - challenging Milošević's assertion that in the event of confederation no people would be more divided than Serbs - cited Albanians, Milošević responded simply that they were a national minority (even though it appeared from the context that Tuđman was referring to all Albanians, not just those in Yugoslavia).

Illustrating the other side of the equation, in November of 1990 Antonije Isaković (then prominent in Milošević's SPS) had said that anyone who wanted to leave Yugoslavia was free to do so but could not take Serbs along, for "in Yugoslavia Serbs cannot be a national minority." The taboo against calling any Yugoslav "people" a minority sometimes led to quasi-comic circumlocutions, as when Milošević said of Kosovo's Serbs and Montenegrins, "We cannot say that they are a minority, but it's a fact that there are many fewer of them." When Yugoslavia disintegrated, however, the taboo had tragic results, contributing to the pressure to make every minority a majority by changing borders.

Another striking aspect of Milošević's proposal was that he insisted on national referendums without acknowledging that there could be any difficulty in implementing them in Yugoslavia's many nationally-mixed communities. Alija Izetbegović (who was facing the demands of the Belgrade-backed Serbian Democratic Party for a national referendum in Bosnia-Herzegovina) commented: "Someone would have to explain to me what a national referendum means and what it would mean in practice in Sarajevo, where of 600,000 people live 250, 350
thousand Muslims, 170 or 180,000 Serbs, 80,000 Croats and also those of other nations and nationalities.”324 Later, Izetbegović answered his own question, saying: "To a national referendum, and then civil war in Sarajevo, people shooting at each other from the windows, that will happen to us."325

Milošević’s rejection of "minority" status for Serbs and his insistence upon national referendums were linked with his rejection of any idea of (non-territorial) guaranteed minority rights. In fact, Milošević was insistent that if republics were recognized as sovereign such rights could not be guaranteed, even if the republics remained within some Yugoslav association.326 On the other side of this debate, Izetbegović and Kučan argued that guarantees were both necessary and feasible, with Kučan citing his experience with Slovene minorities in Europe.327 Bulatović agreed that "respect for civil and human rights would solve all this," but was pessimistic about realizing these rights.328

Parts of the meeting seemed a continuation of what I earlier referred to as a Serb-Slovene "dialogue of the deaf" over the respective rights of nations and republics (a dialogue that can be traced back at least to the Ćosić-Pirjevec polemic of 1961.)329 Kučan, however, fully recognized the centrality of the Serbian problem. At one point he even proposed that at their next meeting the republican leaders should discuss "How to solve the problem of the Serbian people in the circumstances that have arisen historically."330 Milošević’s statements at the meeting, however, provided little basis for any concrete discussion of the issue, for they included no mention of the specific interests of Serb communities in any part of Yugoslavia. What was clear was only that Milošević excluded all but territorial solutions to the Serbian problem.
ENDNOTES


Section 1 includes some material adapted from the Introduction to "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question, 1961-1991."


3 The Serbian uprisings of 1804 and 1815 were led, respectively, by Dorde Petrović, known as Karadorde (1752-1817) and Miloš Obrenović (1789-1860). They were the founders of the two competing Serbian dynasties, Karadordević and Obrenović. A standard treatment of the uprisings in English is Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 1: 193-203 and 238-246.


5 For instance, while Ilija Garašanin's 1844 *Načetanje* obviously did not envision recreating Dušan's empire, it did refer to it in defining Serbia's national mission. Belgrade historian Radovan Samardžić interpreted the connection as follows: "Sasvim u skladu sa idejama romantizma, pisac *Načetanje* je zasnovao program s pretenzijama da upravo Srbija potisne Tursko carstvo iz jugoistočne Evrope na istorijskom pravu. Srednjovekovna Srbija, pre svega u vreme Štefana Dušana, započela je potiskivanje istoričniriskog carstva i uspostavljanje jednog velikog srpskoo-slovenskog carstva." Radovan Samardžić, "Istorijske osnove Garašaninovog *Načetanje*," in *Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874)* Međunarodni naučni skup 9 i 10. decembar 1987. (Belgrade: SANU, 1991), 15.

6 Pavlowitch, *Serbia* (Chapters 3 and 4) offers a lucid treatment of Serbian state aims in their international context for the period 1839-1914.


8 This is a major argument of Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt, *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten, 1830-1914*, Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1980). Behschnitt argues that Serbs developed a form of nationalism suited for their struggle with the Ottomans, and that their success in the struggle reinforced this form.


10 The article was "Srbi Svi i Svuda," ["Serbs All and Everywhere"]. For the national significance of Karadžić's work, see Behschnitt, *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten*, 65-81.

11 The *Načetanje* calls for Serbia to seek opportunities to expand into Ottoman lands with Serb populations (Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular), and to strengthen its influence among Serbs and other South Slavs in both empires. Garašanin's basis for the *Načetanje* was a draft prepared by the Czech František Zach, an emissary of Polish exile Prince Adam Czartoryski. (Czartoryski's aim was to promote South Slav unity independent
of Russian influence.) As Charles Jelavich has convincingly demonstrated, Garašanin’s changes to Zach’s draft involved the substitution of Serbian for “South Slav” language in many passages. Charles Jelavich, “Garašanin’s Načertanije und das grossserbische Programm,” Südost-Forschungen 27 (1968), 131-47.

The Načertanije’s “Great Serbian” or “Yugoslav” character has been the subject of a protracted and sometimes anachronistic debate. See the discussion in Ćurčišević, Istorija političke misli, 146-53 and (for the debate within Yugoslav historiography) Behnisch, Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten, 267-270 (Note 5.) Lampe, Yugoslavia as History (52-53) and Pavlovitch, Serbia (44-46) both offer nuanced discussions that avoid anachronism in interpreting Garašanin’s aims. See also Mihailo Vojvodić, “Ideje Garašaninovog ‘Načertanija’ i politička misao u Srbiji krajem XIX veka,” in Iljja Garašanin (1812-1874), 1-11.


The question of the intersection between confessional and ethnic identity in Bosnia – for instance, at what point it may be considered accurate to impute a Serb national identity to Orthodox inhabitants – is complex and contested. Donia and Fine argue that “By the mid-nineteenth century... Bosnians’ differing religious affiliations had resulted in the elaboration of cultural, economic, and political distinctions that were gradually transforming the major religious communities into recognizable ethnic groups” (Bosnia and Hercegovina, 83-84).


15 The development of the “Kosovo” myth from a religious cult of the martyred Lazar to a national cult of heroism is thoroughly treated in Thomas A. Emmert, Serbian Trojan: Kosovo 1389 (New York: Columbia UP, 1990). An interesting analysis which brings the treatment of the “Kosovo” myth up through the war in Bosnia is Chapter 8 of Gerlachus Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).


17 Discussing the polemical character of much historiography dealing with the region, Roux offers a telling example of the lack of common ground. Two works on Kosovo published in 1984 in the United States – one reflecting the “Serb” point of view and one the “Albanian” – treated similar subjects, but their bibliographies hardly overlapped. Roux, Les Albanais, 20-21.

18 The phrase “cycle of status-reversal” is applied to Kosovo by Veljko Vujačić, “Historical legacies, nationalist mobilization, and political outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian view.” Theory and Society 25 (1996), 769-70. Vujačić states: “The superimposition of physical, religious, and linguistic markers of status differentiation, accompanied by a constant process of status/power reversal, which revived negative historical memories, cemented the solidarity of each group [i.e., Serbs and Albanians] as a ‘community of political destiny.”

A similar argument appears in Chapter One of Lenard J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), which offers an excellent introduction to the cycle of political upheaval in Kosovo’s twentieth-century experience. Cohen notes: “the alternating sequence of political domination between Albanians and Serbs, and the strong animosities dividing the two groups, generated in part by the experience that each ethnic community endured under the control of the other, is crucial to an understanding of contemporary conflict in the region” (6).

19 Duijzings emphasizes this point in the Introduction to his Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo. In his formulation: “...Kosovo also has a history of coexistence with considerable movement across its ethnic and religious frontiers, through trade, cultural diffusion, religious exchange and conversion. Many cultural traits were and still are shared across group boundaries, and throughout its history the ethnic and religious barriers have been
anything but watertight. Instead of two 'ethnic' societies, I prefer to speak here of one single 'frontier' society, in which periods of confrontation alternate with periods of contact and co-operation across ethnic and religious boundaries" (1).

20 See Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, Chapter Three; and Malcolm, Kosovo, 228-35. The numbers involved are, of course, disputed. Pavlowitch, Serbia, cites calculations that 71,000 Muslims ("including at least 49,000 Albanians") left the newly-acquired Serbian territories during the war or after 1878 (68), while 150,000 Serbs emigrated from Kosovo between 1878 and 1912 (121). Malcolm (228) cites contemporary reports of 60-70,000 Albanian refugees from Serbia, and (while acknowledging that "only a rough estimate is possible") suggests that about 60,000 Serbs left Kosovo between 1876 and 1912 (230). With regard to the deterioration of intercommunal relations after 1878, Malcolm notes: "All sources are agreed that the mujahirs [Muslim refugees], for their own part, were particularly hostile to the local Christians, especially to the Orthodox Serbs" (229).

21 In the oft-quoted words of the Carnegie Endowment's 1914 Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, "Houses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind - such to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians." International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, The other Balkan wars (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1993), 151. To place this assertion in its context, it should be noted that the Commission did not see these atrocities as uniquely Serbian. It detailed many atrocities committed by Bulgarian and Greek soldiers, and saw the problem as a regional one: "the object of these armed conflicts, overt and covert, clearly conceived or vaguely felt, but always and everywhere the same, was the complete extermination of an alien population" (148).


23 See Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom, 10-12; Roux, Les Albanais, Chapter 10; and Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, Chapter 6. With regard to education, Roux argues that discrimination was largely a matter of practice, rather than being institutionalized; the system was not an apartheid one. "Il convient de souligner que le traitement appliqué aux Albanais en matière d'enseignement et de culture ne relevait pas d'un régime d'apartheid, c'est-à-dire d'une discrimination institutionnalisée. Il s'agissait d'une discrimination de fait, d'une politique de non-respect des droits culturels des minorités qui est générale dans les Balkans entre les deux guerres, et que l'on observe notamment en Albanie" (208). For a contrasting view, see Malcolm, Kosovo, 267-68.

24 In the words of Vasa Ćubrilović, "...za većinu političkih ljudi u Srbiji sve do 1912. ne postavlja se praktično pitanje o ujedinjenju ni svih Srba, a kamoli Jugoslovena." Ćubrilović, Istorija političke misli, 331.

25 By examining the school textbooks used before unification by Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Charles Jelavich has demonstrated that none of these peoples were educated for a Yugoslav state. The special value of Jelavich's work on elementary and secondary school textbooks is that it enables him to go beyond the study of intellectual elites. He concludes: "An analysis of the textbooks makes one point very clear: none of the books - Serbian, Croatian, or Slovenian - even remotely conveyed the type of information and enthusiasm about South Slav unity or Yugoslavia that was being expounded by intellectuals, university students, and a few politicians in the decade before the war." Charles Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms - Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990), 272.


27 Cited (with italics as marked) in Bosnian Serb historian Vladimir Ćorović's Velika Srbija - ujedinjenje (Belgrade: Kultura, 1990), 87. In the original: "ovoj velikoj borbi...da Srbiju stvorimo Velkom, te da obuhvati sve Srbe i Jugoslovene, do da učinimo silnom i moćnom Jugoslavijom...". Ćorović's book, originally published in 1924, is itself a striking example of Great Serbian-Yugoslav conflation, presenting 1918 as the culmination of the quest for Great Serbia.

28 Cf. Stevan Pavlowitch: "The problem was that Pašić, and many with him in Serbia, did not really understand the difference between Serbia and Yugoslavia" (Pavlowitch, Serbia, 109).
Andrew Wachtel makes the interesting argument that this failure of vision was in large part generational: “Nikola Pašić (born 1845), the leading architect of Serbian policy before, during, and after the war, came of age during the period when Yugoslav cooperation was at a low ebb. Thus, he and his contemporaries gravitated quite naturally to a great-Serbian policy. The twenty-year period preceding World War I had, however, seen a gigantic rise in Yugoslav feeling among younger Serbs, many of whom would and should have become leaders by the 1920s. But precisely this generation was decimated during the war... As a result, Serbian politics remained the province of the older generation.” Andrew Baruch Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 76.

29See Banac, National Question in Yugoslavia.

30For an overview of the politics and ideology of the royal dictatorship (1929-31), see Jelavich, History of the Balkans 2:200-204; and Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije, 1:176-212. For competing conceptions of Yugoslavism in the interwar state, see Nikola Dugandžić, Jugoslavensv (Belgrade: Mladoš, 1985), 44-49, 121-22, 147-50, 157-59, and 181-84. (This useful study is organized thematically rather than chronologically.) Cf. Dušan Ijević, Jugoslovensv i jugoslavenska nacija (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1989), 31-42.

31These figures on the population of the Banovina Hrvatske are taken from Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 191-92. For a map and detailed discussion of the territorial division, see Ljubo Boban, Hrvatske granice od 1918. do 1993. godine (Zagreb: Školska knjiga and HAZU, 1993), Chapter 6.


Dimić notes (pp. 859-60) that while the exact date when the club was founded has not been established, its rules were approved by the Interior Ministry on January 15, 1937, making late 1936 a reasonable assumption.


The quotation in the original is: “da je srpska Otadžbina svugde gde god je Srba, od Subotice do Dalmatinskog Kosova kraj Šibenika, i od Sušaka do Đevdelije. Sve zemlje gde god Srb žive, bez obzira na plemensko-administrativne podele već izvršene ili koje će se izvršiti, srpske su zemlje isto onoliko koliko i hrabra Šumadija i koliko i gordi Lovćen.

Srpske su zemlje i Kordun i Lika i delovi Dalmacije i delovi Slavonije, koji su danas u sastavu Banovine Hrvatske. Srpske su zato što su te zemlje preci današnjih Srba svojom junakom mišicom branili i odbrajali od tuđinskim zavojovačima u toku vekova i svojom plemenitom krviju i svojom natopili.”

38The literature on the Second World War in Yugoslavia is immense. Chapter Seven of Lampe’s Yugoslavia as History provides a balanced introduction and a good selection of references. Other works addressing specific aspects of the war are cited below.

39A good brief introduction to the Ustaša is Chapter Four of Djilas, The Contested Country; see also Jill A. Irvine, The Croat Question: Partisan Politics in the Formation of the Yugoslav Socialist State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), Chapter Three. Lampe states (Yugoslavia as History, 204) that by 1941 Ustaša supporters still made up “less than 10 percent of politically active Croats.”

40The most widely-accepted analyses of Yugoslavia’s wartime losses are two works from the 1980s, one by an emigre Serb and one by a Croat: Bogoljub Kočović, Žrve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (London: Veritas
Srdan Bogosavljević, "Nerasvetljeni genocid," in Nebojša Popov, ed., Srpska strana rata, 159-70, summarizes some of Kočović's and Žerjavić's main findings as well as considering some other studies. The figures cited here are taken from Bogosavljević.

41 In Lenard Cohen's summary: "Reverting to the situation before 1912 and during a good part of World War I, the Serb and Montenegrin inhabitants of the region once again became second-class citizens, while Albanians assumed a position not without similarities to the status they had enjoyed under Ottoman rule." Cohen, cited here are taken from Bogosavljević.

For overviews of the war in Kosovo, see Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom, 13-17; Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, Chapter 7; Malcolm, Kosovo, Chapter 15.

Vučković and Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova, 103-05, present the differing estimates for Kosovo's wartime mortality of Bogoljub Kočović and Vladimir Žerjavić. (As noted above, these two authors have produced the most-respected analyses of Yugoslavia's wartime losses.) Vučković and Nikolić themselves estimate 12,000 war deaths among Albanians and 10,000 among Serbs and Montenegrins. The issue of the number of expellees is discussed below.

43 See Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom, 16; Malcolm, Kosovo, 311-12; Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 141-43; and Branko Petranović, Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu, 1939-1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992), 701-04. The figure of 39,000 Partisan fighters is given in Petranović, Srbija, 702.

44 For the colonists, see Petranović, Srbija, 703-04 and Vučković and Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova, 99-100.

45 Some sense of how diverse the various claims can be derived from Stevan Pavlovitch's note that "Estimates of the number of Serbs who left by 1944 vary between 70,000 and 200,000; and of Albanian newcomers to Kosovo between 15,000 and 300,000. The upper limits are incompatible with Yugoslav census figures..." (Pavlovitch, Serbia, 147 note 5.)

46 In addressing these questions, this report relies mainly on two works: a 1992 study by Michel Roux, Les Albanais en Yougoslavie, and a 1996 work by Milan Vučković and Goran Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova u razdoblju od 1918. do 1991. godine. While not in exact agreement with each other (owing to somewhat different interpretations of ambiguities in the available data), both make reasoned use of the information available. Taken together they provide a basis for evaluating the wildly varying claims that have been put forward with regard to both issues, particularly Albanian immigration.


47 The results of the 1939 census (which was not one of the regular all-Yugoslav censuses but covered the territory of "Old Serbia" including Kosovo) are set out in Vučković and Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova, 78-80, and are also discussed in Roux, Les Albanais, 218-24. Unlike earlier and later censuses this one did not classify inhabitants by native language. Rather, the 1939 census divided the inhabitants into "Slavs," "Non-Slavs" (considered to include all Muslims), and interwar immigrants. The numbers of Albanians, Serbs, and Montenegrins (and of course others as well) are therefore open to some interpretation, using projections based on the 1931 and 1948 censuses. Roux (218) estimates 370,000-380,000 Albanians in 1939 (58% of the population); Vučković and Nikolić estimate 350,946 (54.4%). Roux estimates 222,000 Orthodox inhabitants in 1939 (Table 15, p. 224), while Vučković and Nikolić estimate 213,746 Serbs and Montenegrins.

The post-war censuses are set out in Table 13 (108) of Vučković and Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova. The 1948 census showed 498,242 Albanians, 171,911 Serbs, and 28,050 Montenegrins (for a combined Serb-Montenegrin total of 199,961).

48 Roux, Les Albanais, 225. The German official's estimate is cited in Malcolm, Kosovo, 305. Vučković and Nikolić decline to speculate on the number of expellees, but note that estimates range from 30,000 to 100,000. Vučković and Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova, 96.


With regard to wartime immigration from Albania, Vučković and Nikolić say that estimates range from some thousands to 100,000. They emphasize the lack of direct information (particularly given that no frontiers
were involved, since most of Kosovo had been joined to Italian-controlled Albania). Citing an Italian plan to resettle about 100,000 Albanians from Sicily and Albania to Kosovo, they say: "It is completely certain that this plan was not even approximately realized." [Sasvim je izvesno da taj plan ni približno nije ostven.] Vučković and Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova, 102.

In discussing Albanian immigration through the post-war period (137-40), Vučković and Nikolić note (and dismiss as unfounded) claims that 300,000 or even 350,000 Albanians had immigrated in the postwar period, which appeared in the Belgrade press in the late 1980s (Politika 4 October 1988 and 15 September 1988, cited in Vučković and Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova, 137). Such claims were frequently put forward to justify demands for the expulsion of these putative immigrants and their descendants ("Albanci preko Prokletija"). Shkelzen Maliqui and Hivzi Islami both discuss this phenomenon in a roundtable discussion printed in Slavko Gaber and Tonči Kuzmanić, Kosovo – Srbija – Jugoslavija (Ljubljana: 1989), 26 and 132.

50 See Irvine, The Croat Question, for an excellent discussion of the Partisans' state-building strategy during the war.

51 For the origins of the Chetnik name, see Karchmar, Draža Mihailović, 1: 108-09.
52 There is a large and growing literature on the Chetnik movement. Mile Bjelajac, "Istoriografija o građanskom ratu u Jugoslaviji 1941-145," Istorija XX veka 15/1 (1997), 129-144, offers a very useful review of major works.

In English, Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975) is still the most comprehensive treatment. Tomasevich gives most attention to the Mihailović movement per se and to Chetnik relations with the Germans and the Western Allies. Two other useful monographs are Lucien Karchmar, Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Četnik movement, 1941-1942 (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1987), 2 vols.; and Matteo Milazzo The Chetnik movement & the Yugoslav resistance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). Karchmar offers excellent regional history, emphasizing the differences among various Chetnik groups. Milazzo is particularly strong on Chetnik relations with the Italians and the activities of local Chetnik groups in the Independent State of Croatia. These works cite the Yugoslav studies available at the time, of which the works of Belgrade historian Jovan Marjanović are the most important. Among more recent works from former Yugoslavia, see especially Branko Petranović, Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu, 1939-1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992), and Kosta Nikolić's 3-volume monograph, Istorija Ravnogorskog Pokreta 1941-1945 (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 1999). Nikolić's work, while visibly shaped by the author's sympathy for the Chetnik movement (see, e.g., 2: 384) is a scholarly treatment that incorporates much valuable archival material. From an opposing perspective, a useful (Partisan) participant account is Miloš Minić, Oslobodilački ili građanski rat (Novi Sad: Mir, 1993).

53 See Tomasevich, The Chetniks, 125 and Karchmar, Draža Mihailović, 1: 81-82.

54 In Western languages, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 256-261, for a general appraisal of Chetnik terror and Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: denial of a nation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), Chapter 5, for Serb-Muslim relations during the war. Wolfgang Höpken, "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten und die bosnischen Muslime," in Andreas Kappeler et. al., eds., Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien (Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1989), 188-194, offers a useful analysis of the reasons for Serb-Muslim conflict. For Eastern Bosnia, site of some of the worst massacres, see also Karchmar, Draža Mihailović, 1: 457-508.

In the former Yugoslav languages, see Vladimir Dedijer and Antun Miletić, Genocid nad Musliminama, 1941-1945: zbirkon dokumenata in svjedočenja (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990) and Enver Redžić, Bosna in Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu (Sarajevo: Oko, 1998), 209-96.
55 For the elements of Chetnik ideology, see Karchmar, Draža Mihailović, 2: 569-610 and Nikolić, Istorija Ravnogorskog pokreta, 2: 333-446 (particularly 425-436, on the program set forth at the Svetosavski Congress in January of 1944). See also the documents in Petranović and Žetević, Jugoslovenski federalizam 1: 675-93. As Karchmar and others emphasize, ideologies and conceptions competed within the movement. The brief account given in the present text is necessarily oversimplified.

56 For continuities with the Serbian Cultural Club see Nikolić, Istorija Ravnogorskog pokreta 3: 327-45 (on Dragiša Vasić). See also Karchmar, Draža Mihailović, 2: 571-4, and Petranović and Žetević, Jugoslovenski federalizam: ideje i stvarnost 1: 678.
57 The document is reprinted in Dedijer and Miletic, Genocid nad Muslimanima, 8-16. For the quotation ("teška stradanja koja Srbima nanose njihovi susedi čim se pruži prilika"), see p. 10.

Nikolić points out that this document – titled "O našoj drtavi, o njenim granicama" – was written before Moljević joined Mihailović, and was never formally adopted by the Chetniks. Nevertheless, he says, it sets out much of what became the Chetnik national program (Nikolić, Istorija Ravnogorskog pokreta 2: 385-86). In particular, the idea of population exchanges was actively discussed within the Central National Committee (Nikolić, Istorija Ravnogorskog pokreta, 2: 444.) For more on Moljević, see Karchmar, Draža Mihailović, 2: 580-82.

58 For the Partisan-Chetnik balance in Serbia, see Branko Petranović, Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu, 1939-1945, passim. Most important, Petranović concludes (p. 750) that the Communist Party had little support in the Serbian countryside. For the roles of Serbs and Serbians in the Partisan movement, cf. Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 109-110.

59 For the "return" motif, see Tito's first speech in liberated Belgrade, 27 October 1944, in Josip Broz Tito, Govori i članci, Volumes 1-21 (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1959-1972), 1:244-48, as well as his speech of 10 November 1944 (Govori i članci 1:249-51). For the Šumadija, see his speech of 18 June 1945, in Govori i članci 1:326.

60 For some interesting comparisons between the Soviet and Yugoslav constitutions at this time, see F.W. Hondius, The Yugoslav Community of Nations (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968), Chapter Four.

61 See Tito's speeches of 4 October 1953 (Govori i članci 8:268), and 18 September 1962 (Govori i članci 17:309).

62 Tito's speech in Glina (the site of a notorious Ustasha massacre), 27 July 1952 (Govori i članci 7:145).

63 Speech to the Slovene Academy, 6 November 1948 (Govori i članci 4:43). (In the same passage, Tito contrasts this unity with the false unity of the interwar state.) Similarly, in a speech of 6 June 1945, Tito said, "In drawing our borders, we have united ourselves spiritually." (Govori i članci 1:313).

64 For a general discussion of the military, including some figures on the national composition of the Partisans, see James Gow, Legitimacy and the military: the Yugoslav crisis (London: Pinter, 1992), 54-56. For the composition of the officer corps at various times, see Lenard J. Cohen, The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia (Oakville, Ontario, 1989), Table 2.11 (p. 128), Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), Table 6.5 (p. 182), and Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 337.

65 See Cohen, Socialist Pyramid, Chapter 7 for a detailed and nuanced discussion of these patterns, as well as Chapter 8 for Kosovo. Cohen summarizes his findings as follows: "Serbs [in 1971] were overrepresented in the Croatian political elite, enjoyed a numerical majority in all of Vojvodina's elite sectors, had a plurality lead in the Bosnian elite, and were in an exceptionally strong position along with Montenegrins in Kosovo's political, economic and scientific-technical elites. This pattern leaves aside Serbian control of their own republic (the largest in the country) and the important role of Serbs in the affairs of the federal party, mass organizations and governmental apparatus centered in Belgrade." But in spite of these patterns, Cohen concludes, "Serbian proportional overrepresentation in the regional and total elite structures of the country was far less extreme than the role of the Serbs in the interwar state (except perhaps within Croatia) and was set within a far different type of constitutional system and ideological framework....Politics in Yugoslavia since the late 1960's, especially at the federal level, has been far more poli-centric and confederal than the data discussed above would suggest, even during the years of resurgent centralization. Thus, a good case can also be made for a gradual erosion of Serbian political influence in the decision-making processes at both the regional and federal levels." Cohen, Socialist Pyramid, 307.

66 For the phenomenon of Cominformism (i.e. post-1948 support for Stalin), see Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), especially Chapter 4 for the prevalence of Serbs and Montenegrins among the Cominformists.

67 As Veljko Vujčić has put it: "In sharp contrast to the official sponsorship of "Soviet-Russian nationalism," in Communist Yugoslavia "Serbo-Yugoslavism" was not to be, and no toasts were ever raised to the special historic role played by the "leading Serbian nation." Vujčić, "Historical legacies," 781.

68 The citation is "protiv sovhističkih i hegemonističkih tendencija i to uglavnom velikosrpskih." Osnivački kongres KP Srbije (8-12 maj 1943), ed. Milan Borković and Venceslav Glišić (Belgrade: Institut za istoriju radničkog pokreta Srbije, 1972), 226.


This discussion of the regime's national policy in the early 1950s draws mainly on Shoup, Communism, 184-91. I would note, however, that Shoup is mistaken in asserting (p. 203) that it was not until 1957 (in Kardelj's Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprašanja) that the term "Yugoslavism" (in Shoup, "Yugoslavianism") was used to describe the Yugoslav loyalty the regime was trying to promote. The term appeared much earlier: see, for instance, Ćosić's November 1952 article on "socialist Yugoslavism" and the 1956 Mišić-Šega polemic on the same subject (both discussed in Chapter 1 of Budding, "Serb Intellectuals and the National Question.")

For the early 1950s, see also Djilas, Contested Country, 174-80; and the (brief) discussion of the SKJ's Sixth Congress in 1952, in Desanka Pešić, "'Yugoslovensko' u kongresnim dokumentima KPJ/SKJ," Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis 22/3, (1987), 103.

The Kardelj quotation (from his O osnovama društvenog i političkog uređenja FNRJ, 1953, 51-52), is cited and translated by Shoup, Communism, 186.


In this census, as opposed to later ones, the Yugoslav category retained a South Slav ethnic connotation. Census-takers were instructed to record as "Yugoslavs" all those who failed to declare a traditional national identity and belonged by origin to the Yugoslav (i.e., non-Bulgarian South Slav) peoples. The term thus served as a convenient catch-all not only for self-declared Yugoslavs, but also for the children of mixed marriages, for those who stated a regional in place of a national identity and, most important, for the Slavic Muslims, who would not achieve official recognition as a Yugoslav "nation" until the 1960s. For the 1953 census figures, see Shoup, Communism, Appendix A, Table 1. For the shifting use of the Yugoslav category in post-war censuses, see Dušan Ičević, Jugoslovensko i jugoslovenska nacija (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1989), 123-32 and Dušan Đošić, "'Jugosloveni' u popisu 1981.,” Naše teme 28 (1984), 1983-86.

Roughly speaking, iekavian forms are used in most of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro; and ekavian ones in most of Serbia. For the distribution of ekavian and iekavian, see Banac, National Question in Yugoslavia, 47-49. See also the very useful tables in Robert D. Greenberg, "The Politics of Dialects Among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in the Former Yugoslavia," East European Politics and Societies 10/3 (1996), 400-401.


For example, in an appeal "For the Yugoslavism of National Cultures" published in the organ of the Communist Party of Croatia in November of 1952, Dobrica Ćosić called for wider use of the Latin alphabet.