which is based on the principle of national self-determination, on equal terms with the other peoples of Yugoslavia."199

In retrospect, the 1970s appear above all as wasted years. Responding to the national mobilizations and social discontent which had threatened its stability in the 1960s, the regime reimposed socialist orthodoxy at the same time that it confirmed and extended decentralization (justified on a national basis, though implemented on a territorial basis). It thus strengthened the idea that only nationally-based political cleavages were legitimate. It is tempting to wonder what would have happened in the extremely unlikely event that Tito had used the last decade of his life to carry out a controlled democratization of Yugoslav politics. It is at least possible that some alternate forms of political competition could have emerged, prepared to challenge nationally-defined politics after Tito and after Communism. Instead, of course, the national model entrenched itself more firmly, ideologically and institutionally.

V. Crisis and Collapse, 1980-91
V. A. After Tito, Crisis

It is hard to say whether the beginning of Yugoslavia's protracted "crisis" should be dated to 1979, when the economy began its eventually catastrophic decline; to 1980, when Tito died; or to 1981, when Albanians seeking republican status demonstrated in Kosovo. All of these events were crucial. Taken together, they ushered in an era of economic hardship and political instability, when Yugoslavia's political leaders fought increasingly acrimonious battles over the spoils of a foundering economy.200 In early 1982, Yugoslav sociologists meeting in Ljubljana became the first to assert publicly that the country's difficulties amounted to a "crisis."201 Yugoslav politicians at first repudiated the term, referring instead to the temporary "difficulties" of a fundamentally sound system. But in the face of economic failure and political stalemate, their assertions that self-managing socialism offered the best of all possible worlds rang increasingly hollow. One observer aptly described the growing gap between rhetoric and reality as Yugoslavia's "Dorian Gray syndrome."202 By early 1983, the term crisis was accepted even by then-LCY President Mitja Ribičič.203
Yugoslavia's economic decline was precipitated by external events, including oil price shock, world recession, and a tightening of Western bank loans just as Yugoslav foreign debt approached the twenty-billion-dollar mark. But internal factors - including distortions in the price of capital and of foreign exchange, political intervention in economic decisions at every level, and the difficulty of implementing any policy at the national level - were no less important. Most specialists have emphasized the internal roots of the Yugoslav economic crisis, seeing external events more as catalysts than as fundamental causes.204 As the crisis deepened, inflation and unemployment both rose, real wages fell dramatically, and the consumer goods to which Yugoslavs had long been accustomed disappeared from store shelves. Government austerity measures meant the end of food subsidies, and dramatic price increases for such staples as fuel and heating oil. Barter, kinship networks, and the black market all gained importance as people struggled to bridge the gap between declining wages and a rising cost of living.205 The effect on individuals was catastrophic. A Western scholar writing in 1989 observed: "The decline in the standard of living has been so great that it is difficult to think of any other country that would not have responded with major political changes, or even revolution."206 Within the next few years, of course, Yugoslavia did experience "major political changes," ending in the country's dissolution.

Linked with the economic crisis was a political one. Though Tito's death at the age of eighty-eight could hardly be considered premature, it found Yugoslavia fundamentally unprepared. True, the central mechanisms of succession - the collective Party and state presidencies - were in place, with the post of president of each presidency rotating on an annual basis. But none of Tito's successors wielded his authority. Most important, no other politician could impose agreement when Yugoslavia's system of political consensus reached deadlock. With the simplistic slogan, "After Tito - Tito," Tito's successors attempted to find shelter under the mantle of his legitimacy. If Yugoslavia had faced only business as usual in the years after Tito's death, this approach might have worked. Instead, however, it faced the hardest possible type of political decisions: those involved in attempts to divide an ever-shrinking economic pie.

The third element of the Yugoslav crisis - the demonstrations of Albanians in Kosovo in the spring of 1981 - might at first glance seem local and even trivial when compared with the other two. In fact, however, events in Kosovo were crucial in shaping Yugoslavia's future. The emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo (discussed below) became the main Serbian
national grievance of the 1980s. Only toward the decade's end did mobilization over other national issues, such as the position of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, reach a comparable intensity. And because provincial autonomy was enshrined in the federal constitution, the Kosovo conflict could not be confined to Serbia. Rather, it helped to precipitate a protracted interrepublican battle over the Constitution of 1974. It was through this mechanism that Kosovo became the catalyst of Yugoslavia's dissolution. 207

The term crisis (derived from the Greek verb krinein, to separate) implies a decision-point, a metaphorical parting of the ways that enforces the necessity of choosing one path or another. However badly this concept may fit a "crisis" of more than ten years' duration, it remains essential to understanding the significance of the national programs that emerged in Yugoslavia's last years. The programs put forward by Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and others were not simply responses to particular nationally-defined grievances. They were also the respective elites' bids to rescue their own peoples from the crisis that had engulfed Yugoslavia. Any analysis of political and national events in post-Tito Yugoslavia must constantly consider their economic context: growing hardship for most Yugoslavs, and insecurity for all. Competition between the various nationally-framed programs that emerged in response to the crisis occurred in a context where the status quo was considered unendurable, and action - in one direction or another - essential. This point is emphasized because it challenges the point of view that considers Yugoslavia's dissolution as a more-or-less inevitable consequence of its peoples' incompatible national ideologies. 208 Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene nation-state ideologies were always incompatible with a multinational Yugoslav state - but it was system failure that catapulted these ideologies from relatively marginal status to political prominence.

V.B. Serbian Proposals of the Early 1980s

For many Serbs Yugoslavia's economic crisis fed into the pre-existing critique of the 1974 Constitution, resulting in a widely-held conviction that the crisis could be solved only if the federation was restructured. Beginning in 1981, high-level members of the Serbian Party put forward several proposals intended to roll back decentralization at both the Serbian and the federal levels. 209 The first of these proposals, adopted by the Serbian Central Committee in December of 1981, was modest. It called for strengthening the unity of Serbia and the provinces, but without changing the constitution. Over the next few years, Serbian Party leaders made
increasingly pointed attacks on the functioning of the 1974 Constitution, and especially the practice of consensus. Finally, in November of 1984 the Serbian leadership put forward a multifaceted reform proposal. It called for giving more power to larger work organizations (and so less power to the Basic Organizations of Associated Labor), allowing longer mandates for some office-holders, and reducing the autonomy of the provinces. In themselves, these measures were still relatively modest. Yet they touched on all the fundamentals of the Yugoslav political system: the 1976 Law on Associated Labor, the delegate system, and the 1974 Constitution. Moreover, the Serbian leadership revived an earlier idea: that members of the LCY Central Committee should be elected by Yugoslav Party congresses in multi-candidate elections, instead of being delegated by their home parties. This measure would have reversed the trends which ever since 1964 had made Party leaders increasingly responsible to their home republics and provinces, rather than to the center or the Party as a whole.

In putting forward these proposals, the Serbian Party was casting off the constraints which had governed it since Ranković's fall in 1966, and asserting itself as the main supporter of some degree of recentralization. This self-assertion began quite soon after Tito's death: in December of 1981, at the Eighteenth Session of the Serbian Central Committee, Dragoslav Marković proclaimed that Serbian communists could not continue to submit to pressure based on "a priori" accusations of Serbian hegemonism. Slobodan Milošević struck the same note in November of 1984, with his assertion that "We [Serbian Communists] must free ourselves of the complex of unitarism." The conviction that solving the Yugoslav crisis required amending (if not scrapping) the constitution of 1974 was not, of course, limited to the Serbian Party leadership. It was extremely widespread among Serbs in the early 1980s, providing common ground for a national mobilization that would include both the regime and erstwhile opposition intellectuals. The other piece of that common ground was Kosovo.

V.C. Kosovo in the 1980s

The period after the 1981 Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo saw a definite worsening of relations between the Slavic and Albanian communities in the province. In the aftermath of the demonstrations, many Albanians - overwhelmingly young people - were convicted of political crimes such as promoting the slogan "Kosovo - republic." At the same time, the
demonstrations opened the door to public discussion of a formerly taboo subject: the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. As seen above, this emigration had been the subject of quickly-suppressed political controversy in the late 1960s. The ideological atmosphere of the 1970s had not allowed for frank and fact-based discussion of inter-ethnic tensions in Kosovo (or anywhere else).

Unfortunately, the atmosphere after the demonstrations of 1981 proved just as hostile to reasoned discussion. In the early 1980s, groups of Kosovo Serbs organized to press their case in Belgrade. By the mid-1980s they were pushing the boundaries of allowable action in a one-Party system with mass petitions and marches on the Serbian and federal Parliaments. The Serbian leadership reacted with hostility, but many prominent intellectuals embraced the Kosovo Serbs' grievances. To many Serbs in Belgrade and elsewhere, it became an article of faith that their co-nationals were being driven from their homes in Kosovo as part of a deliberate campaign of terror by Kosovo Albanians determined to create an "ethnically pure" Kosovo.

This view was elaborated in a petition sent to the Yugoslav and Serbian Parliaments in January 1986, and signed by two hundred and twelve Belgrade intellectuals. In the past twenty years, the petition asserted, about 200,000 people (i.e., Serbs and Montenegrins) had emigrated from Kosovo and Metohija. As a result of emigration, the province was becoming "ethnically pure." Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo were the victims of "genocide." The expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo had been going on for three centuries, supported first by the Ottomans, then by the Habsburgs, then by fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and finally by the Albanian state and the Kosovo government. The methods used to force Serbs to emigrate, the petition continued, included rape, attacks on churches and graveyards, and other forms of violence. The whole province was a prey to lawlessness, and criminals were protected by the authorities. For five years, the provincial leadership had failed to correct this situation. Instead, it had used "Draconian" penalties against young Albanians to camouflage its inaction against the real criminals. (By "young Albanians," the petition means those convicted of merely verbal crimes such as calling for a republic.) The "genocide" in Kosovo, the petition asserted, could not be stopped without "deep social and political changes in the entire country," and especially in the relations between Serbia and the provinces on the one hand and Yugoslavia on the other: "If Kosovo remains only a Serbian problem, it will become the Serbian people's greatest disappointment in the Yugoslav community." The petition closed with the assertion that its
signatories were not seeking a privileged position for Serbs over Albanians, but rather wanted equal rights for all citizens and the rule of law. (In passing, it condemned "all injustices that have ever been committed against the Albanian people" by Serbs.)

This petition is cited at length here because it is representative of mid-1980s Serbian beliefs about the reasons for Slavic emigration from Kosovo. These were the grievances that set Serbian responses to the Yugoslav crisis into a national pattern. It is therefore important to consider how far they were rooted in reality. A full treatment of that subject would require a monograph in itself, and would need far more empirical data than has ever been collected. Nevertheless, some general conclusions are possible.

First, from the late 1960s on Slavic emigration from Kosovo was significant. The petition exaggerates the numbers involved, which for the entire period from 1941 up to 1986 were on the order of one hundred and thirty thousand. This was still a very large number, given the small size of the population involved. In 1981, there were 209,498 Serbs in Kosovo (making up 2.5 percent of Yugoslavia's Serbs). After hovering around 27% in the first three post-war censuses of 1948, 1953, and 1961, Kosovo's Serb and Montenegrin population fell to 20.9% in 1971, and 14.9% in 1981. This was the result of both differential birth-rates and differential rates of emigration. The province's Slavic and non-Slavic populations both entered the post-war era with the high birth rates to be expected of an undeveloped agricultural region. As the province underwent limited modernization and urbanization, however, the birthrate among Slavs declined significantly (though remaining higher than it was among the same groups elsewhere in Yugoslavia). Meanwhile, the birthrate among Kosovo's Albanians, a more rural population and one where women were less likely to be employed, remained high.

In the Serbian national discourse of the 1980s, the higher Albanian birthrate was often presented as evidence of a sinister plan, rather than the result of demographic and cultural differences. Similarly, Slavic emigration from Kosovo was often interpreted as the result of intimidation and violence only. A more objective view would acknowledge that Slavic emigration from Kosovo was a complex process, motivated in part by economic factors. In the 1980s, in spite of infusions of investment capital made in varying amounts since 1956, Kosovo remained by far the poorest region of Yugoslavia. In fact, its relative position within Yugoslavia had worsened in the post-war era. The reasons for this failure included inappropriately
capital-intensive investment projects, and the high birth rates which meant that absolute increases in the province's income still translated into per capita declines.\textsuperscript{226} With an unemployment rate of 27.5\% in 1981, Kosovo presented the classic picture of a poor, overpopulated, and predominantly agricultural region from which high emigration would be expected.\textsuperscript{227} Indeed, to understand emigration from Kosovo in the 1960s-1980s one must ask not only why Serbs and Montenegrins emigrated to other parts of Yugoslavia, but also why Albanians (usually) did not. The 1981 census showed more Albanians living abroad as guest-workers than relocating between Yugoslav republics, and of those Albanians who did relocate within republics, more moved into Kosovo than out of it. Among the factors limiting Albanian mobility within Yugoslavia were language barriers, and the prevalence in some Albanian communities of a traditional way of life centered around the extended family.\textsuperscript{228}

Yet if it is one-sided to ignore economic factors in discussing Slavic emigration from Kosovo, it is also inaccurate to present them as the only reason for emigration. In 1985-86, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences conducted a survey of 500 families (comprising 3,418 individuals) who had emigrated from Kosovo to Serbia, asking a number of questions about their living conditions in Kosovo and their reasons for leaving. The authors of the study concluded that economic reasons were the primary motive for emigration in only fifteen to twenty-five percent of the cases, while other factors—primarily inter-ethnic tensions of one sort or another—played the determining role in the majority.\textsuperscript{229} This study must be treated with some caution, not only because the Serbian Academy was at the forefront of national mobilization at the time, but also because of the survey's timing.\textsuperscript{230} For some respondents, emigration was many years in the past by the time of the survey: about two-fifths of the families had emigrated before 1975. Given this time lag, and the heightened Serb-Albanian tensions at the time the survey was conducted, there may well have been some retrospective bias among the respondents. Nevertheless, a review of the SANU survey and a consideration of other more anecdotal evidence suggests that inter-ethnic tensions—and in some cases acts of intimidation or violence—played a role in many emigration decisions.\textsuperscript{231} Apart from the direct testimony of Slavs who left Kosovo, statistical analysis of emigration patterns reveals that Slavic inhabitants became more likely to leave a community as their proportion in its population fell—a pattern more likely to be due to interethnic tensions than to purely economic migration. (Of course, statistical
analysis cannot in itself distinguish between cases where Slavs emigrated because of issues associated with the loss of their former privileged status – for instance, a new need to use the Albanian language in work or public life – and cases where they were the victims of intimidation.232

V. D. The SANU Memorandum

As even this brief discussion reveals, Slavic emigration from Kosovo was a complex phenomenon. Appreciation of its complexity, however, was notably absent from the Serbian national discourse of the mid-1980s. For instance, the January 1986 petition cited above claimed that Albanians had been driving Serbs out of Kosovo for "three centuries" – completely ignoring the fact that Kosovo's long cycle of status reversal had put Serbs on top for much of the twentieth century. Like many other documents of its time, the petition represented a one-sided response – with an exclusive emphasis on Serbian victimization – to the real difficulties encountered by some Serbs in Kosovo.

Such Serbian reactions to Kosovo's complex problems did not bode well for the future of Serb-Albanian relations there. Even more important was the way that these interpretations of the Kosovo issue shaped Serbs' reactions to the Yugoslav crisis as a whole. The perception of Kosovo Serbs' plight as the plight of all Serbs joined with frustration at Yugoslavia's deepening crisis to foster the idea that the existing Yugoslav state (based on the 1974 constitution) was unendurable. Looking through the Kosovo prism, leading Serbian intellectuals and – at a later stage – politicians presented Yugoslavia's largest nation to itself as a threatened minority. The power of the "imagined community" (as Benedict Anderson has famously called the nation) could hardly receive a more forceful demonstration: after all, fewer than three percent of Yugoslavia's Serbs lived in Kosovo. Moreover, the opinion-leaders who most forcefully promoted the vision of Serbs as a victimized minority in Kosovo ignored the probable effects of Serbian national mobilization on all the nations that were minorities within Yugoslavia. Nowhere was this dynamic more evident than in the 1986 "Memorandum of the Serbian Academy."

The Memorandum is by far the best-known document of the contemporary Serbian national movement, and parts of its history are by now well-established.233 In May of 1985, at the annual convention of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU in its Serbian
abbreviation) several speakers urged the Academy to become more involved in the search for solutions to the Yugoslav crisis. One, economist Ivan Maksimović, made a specific proposal: that SANU should address "the most current...political, economic, social, scientific, and cultural problems in the form of a Memorandum, and that this Memorandum should be sent to all of those who are responsible for the conduct of public affairs in Serbia and in Yugoslavia." Soon after the convention, the SANU Presidency named a sixteen-member Commission to prepare a "Memorandum on Current Social Questions." The Commission in its turn appointed eight of its members to a Working Group charged with producing a draft.

By late September of 1986, the Working Group had produced the draft document that became known as the Memorandum, and the Commission as a whole began its review of the draft. At this point, however, the Commission's work came to a halt. A Belgrade newspaper published a two-part article revealing the Memorandum's existence, and quoting some passages. (The full text of the Memorandum was not published in Yugoslavia until 1989.) These revelations set off a political firestorm: the Memorandum was denounced throughout Serbia and Yugoslavia. In the furor that followed the September revelations, the Academy based its defense mainly on the fact that the document was a draft and had never actually been approved by the Committee.

The Memorandum is a rambling and repetitive document: clearly a draft, and the work of multiple authors. It consists of two parts, each about twenty-five pages long: "The Crisis of the Yugoslav Economy and Society," and "The Position of Serbia and the Serbian People." The first part opens with a warning that the Yugoslav crisis has become so serious that it could lead to the collapse of the state -- a prediction that, in 1986, still seemed apocalyptic. It goes on to analyze the Yugoslav economy's low productivity, seen as the underlying cause of all Yugoslavia's economic woes. Some of the factors cited (e.g., a blind adherence to the labor theory of value) suggest a critique of Marxist economic principles in general. The central argument, however, is that the disintegration of the Yugoslav economy ultimately reflects the transformation of the Yugoslav federation founded by the Partisans in 1943 into the confederation embodied in the 1974 Constitution. That Constitution, particularly its requirement that all major decisions be made by consensus, has made the Yugoslav political system "a textbook case of inefficiency." In politics and in economics, the Memorandum sees the seeds of disaster in the 1960s. It was in the 1960s that the process of democratization ended,
to be replaced by “bureaucratic decentralization.” Now, democratization is essential to resolve the crisis. (Here the Memorandum comes very close to endorsing multiparty democracy, and it does explicitly call for multi-candidate elections.) To find its way out of the crisis, the Memorandum continues, Yugoslavia must abandon the political and economic system based on the 1974 Constitution for one based on "the four great principles of modern society": sovereignty of the people, self-determination of the nation, human rights, and “rationality” (which, according to the Memorandum, requires that a modern state function as a unified whole).

The Memorandum’s second half, "The Position of Serbia and the Serbian People," begins with the assertion that Serbs, besides facing the same problems as everyone else in Yugoslavia, confront three additional ones: "the economic backwardness of Serbia, its unresolved state-legal relations with Yugoslavia and with the provinces, and the genocide in Kosovo." As this list suggests, this section actually devotes much more attention to "the position of Serbia," including the provinces, than to "the Serbian people" elsewhere in Yugoslavia. (In this respect, it is typical of Serbian national discourse in the mid-1980s.) Serbia’s "economic subordination," the Memorandum claims, reflects its "politically inferior position" within Yugoslavia, which Slovenia and Croatia have tailored to suit themselves. It is this section that includes the Memorandum’s best-known assertions: that the Serb population in Kosovo is the victim of "physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide" carried out by Albanian nationalists determined to create an "ethnically pure" Kosovo; and that the very survival of Serbs in Croatia is threatened by assimilation. ("Except during the existence of the [Second World War] Independent State of Croatia, Serbs in Croatia were never as endangered in the past as they are today.")

In its conclusion, the Memorandum makes explicit the assumption that unites its two halves: Yugoslavia's decentralization lies at the root of both the Yugoslav crisis, and the problems of the Serbian nation. "By insisting on a federal [as opposed to confederal] order," it contends, "Serbia would contribute not only to the equality of all nations in Yugoslavia, but also to the solving of the political and economic crisis." The Serbian people must be allowed to realize its "historic and democratic right" to establish its "full national and cultural integrity...regardless of which republic or province it is in." To this vague demand the Memorandum adds two specific proposals: at least one chamber of the federal legislature should be elected according to the one-man, one-vote principle, rather than republican parity; and the
autonomy of Serbia's provinces should be reduced to a level that does not "destroy the integrity of the Republic." With the current level of provincial autonomy, the Memorandum asserts, "the Serbian people has no state, as all the other Yugoslav peoples do."250

Through this point - that is, until its last two pages - the Memorandum is a plea for a transformed Yugoslavia. Then, almost in passing, it recurs to the possibility hinted at in its very first paragraph: the collapse of the Yugoslav state. Others in Yugoslavia, it says, are considering alternatives to the Yugoslav state, and so must Serbia. Serbia supports "AVNOJ Yugoslavia" (that is, a relatively centralized federation like the one the Partisans set up in 1943), but others may not. "Therefore, [Serbia] faces the task of looking clearly at its economic and national interests so as not to be surprised by events."251 This statement is as far as the Memorandum goes in envisioning a post-Yugoslav future. It obviously does not call for Yugoslavia's dissolution. In fact, compared to much of the anti-Yugoslav rhetoric rife in Serbia a few years later, the Memorandum's critique appears mild. Nevertheless, contemporaries (as well as later observers) were right to see in the Memorandum a turn toward "Serbian nationalism of the separatist type."252 A more centralized Yugoslavia might be the Memorandum's first choice, but its second choice appears to be some form of Serbian state - not the highly-decentralized, consensus-dependent Yugoslavia that existed in 1986.

It was the hint that Yugoslavia might be expendable, rather than its specific complaints about the position of Serbs and Serbia, that made the Memorandum a turning-point.253 After all - though the Memorandum's rhetoric was dramatic - very little of its substance was new. Its critique of Yugoslavia's and Serbia's decentralization echoed, inter alia, Belgrade Law Faculty professors' objections to the constitutional amendments of 1971, the rhetoric of the Srpska književna zadruga during Dobrica Ćosić's 1969-1971 presidency, and the 1977 Blue Book. Moreover, in certain specifics the Memorandum's diagnosis of Serbia's situation paralleled that of the mid-1980s Serbian party establishment under Ivan Stambolić. As noted above, by the time that the Memorandum appeared the Serbian leadership had spent several years seeking some degree of recentralization for Serbia and, to a lesser degree, Yugoslavia. The Memorandum argued that Serbia, itself relatively backward, was unfairly burdened by contributions to the Federal Fund for the Less Developed. Stambolić had made essentially the same argument as early as 1979.254 Similarly, the Serbian leadership was actively seeking a
reduction of the provinces' autonomy, and its assessment of the situation in Kosovo was hardly less grave than the Memorandum's.\textsuperscript{255}

The Memorandum's contents have been discussed at some length here because, in the tragic years since 1986, the document has acquired a near-mythic status. It has been described by some as a "blueprint" for the Milošević movement and the post-Yugoslav wars.\textsuperscript{256} My own opinion is that the Memorandum is most important as an indicator: as evidence that by 1986 the assertions it set out were accepted by influential figures within Serbia's intellectual elite. To put it as clearly as possible, it was the existence of the belief system set out in the Memorandum, far more than the Memorandum itself, that influenced the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution.

The Memorandum became an inflammatory element in the Yugoslav debate not because it set out an explicit post-Yugoslav Serbian national program - it did not - but rather because of the contrast between its detailed and exaggerated complaints about Serbia's and Serbs' positions within the existing Yugoslav state, and its vague and elliptical references to a possible post-Yugoslav future (the assertion that Serbia must "look clearly at its economic and national interests so as not to be surprised by events."). It suggested that national alternatives to the multinational Yugoslav state might be desirable without acknowledging the destruction inevitably involved in creating them. The idea that the Yugoslav state might be expendable - which gained prominence as the 1980s wore on - represented a fundamental shift in Serbian national thought. The scope of this idea should not be exaggerated. Throughout the period of Yugoslavia's disintegration, Serbian nationalism in the radically anti-Yugoslav form that rejected any Yugoslav state remained a marginal phenomenon, with little political significance.\textsuperscript{257} What became decisive in Serbian politics was the strain of thought that held that the existing Yugoslav state (based on the 1974 constitution) was unendurable. Not only the Memorandum's authors, but also many other members of Serbia's intellectual elite, fostered the emergence of a Serbian national consensus that was at the same time vehemently opposed to the existing Yugoslav state (and so ready to endorse a brinkmanship that risked Yugoslavia's destruction in seeking its "reform"), and fundamentally unprepared to grapple with the issues necessarily raised by Yugoslavia's dissolution.

\textit{V. E. The Role of Slobodan Milošević}
The Memorandum was significant not only as a harbinger of this shift in Serbian national thought, but also as a catalyst for hidden divisions among the Serbian leaders (who reportedly learned of its existence from the newspapers). While Serbian state president Ivan Stambolić and Belgrade Party leader Dragiša Pavlović condemned the Memorandum in the strongest terms, Serbian Party president Slobodan Milošević was conspicuous for his silence about it on most public occasions. Thus, eight months before his famous speech in Kosovo Polje and a full year before the Eighth Session of the Serbian Central Committee, Milošević's response to the Memorandum offered the first clue to his future role. (Nevertheless, Milošević did criticize the Memorandum on a few occasions, using stronger language in less public settings). Over the next few years, some of the individuals involved in the Memorandum claimed prominent roles in the Milošević movement. Mihailo Marković and Antonije Isaković were important in his Socialist Party of Serbia, while Kosta Mihailović became one of his closest advisers.

The difference between the Memorandum and previous critiques of Yugoslavia paralleled the difference between Milošević and the previous Serbian leaders. The Memorandum catalogued preexisting grievances, but broke new ground with its implication that Serbs might be able to do without Yugoslavia. Likewise, Milošević (at first) raised many of the same problems that previous Serbian leaders had. He differed from them mainly in his willingness to push for his conception of a Yugoslavia that would suit Serbian interests even at the cost of alienating others from the existing Yugoslav state. The Serbian party's critique of aspects of the 1974 Constitution, and particularly of the position of the autonomous provinces, can be traced back at least to the "Blue Book" of 1977, and in some respects to the debates around the constitutional amendments of 1968 and 1971. In pursuing these goals, however, the pre-Milošević Serbian leaders had constantly emphasized the need to consider the interests of other Yugoslav peoples, to work within the confines of the existing, consensual, political system, and to accept that change would come about only gradually - not with the "easily promised speed" demanded in Serbian national discourse. It was precisely these constraints - the rules of the Yugoslav political game - that Milošević jettisoned early in his populist revolution.

The basic facts of Milošević's biography are by now well known. Born in 1941, Milošević positioned himself for a political career early. He joined the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia at the age of eighteen, and took on his first Party positions during his studies at the Law Faculty of the University of Belgrade. While at the University, Milošević gained a friend and mentor in Ivan Stambolić. Over the next twenty-plus years, Stambolić promoted Milošević's rise through Serbia's intertwined managerial and political elites. In the spring of 1984 Milošević became the head of the City Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade (succeeding Stambolić, who had become LCS President.) In May of 1986, he became President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia - again succeeding Stambolić, who had become President of the Presidency of the Serbian republic. Throughout this period, Milošević was known primarily as a supporter of some degree of market-oriented reform. His speeches and actions offered few hints of his future political course. In retrospect, Milošević's November 1984 appeal to Serbian Communists to free themselves from the "complex of unitarism" and support a stronger Yugoslavia appears significant, but he was certainly not alone in putting forth such proposals.²⁶²

Milošević's transformation from apparatchik to national leader began when he addressed Serb and Montenegrin protestors in Kosovo Polje on the famous night of April 24, 1987.²⁶³ Before this occasion, Milošević had shown little sympathy for the grievances of Kosovo's Serbs, and had condemned their attempts to go outside the system through petitions and protest marches. In Kosovo Polje, he confronted just such an attempt. A crowd of about fifteen thousand Serbs and Montenegrins tried to bypass their Party-approved delegates and speak with him in person, but was beaten back by the (mostly-Albanian) police. A visibly shaken Milošević unexpectedly ranged himself on the side of the demonstrators, saying: "No one has the right to beat you!". He talked with members of the crowd through the night, hearing complaints and promising redress.

Although Milošević thus endorsed the grievances of Kosovo's Serbs, the speech he delivered at Kosovo Polje was not strikingly national. He used mostly conventional Communist rhetoric, promising the support of the Party and all "progressive people," including Albanians. When he urged his audience not to give up and leave Kosovo, however, he appealed to national pride and the heroic tradition, using the militant rhetoric that became his trademark: "It has never been characteristic of the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin people to give way to obstacles, to demobilize when it needs to fight...". The most striking passage of Milošević's speech was its
defiant conclusion: "All of Yugoslavia is with you!...Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give up Kosovo!".264

In his speech at Kosovo Polje and for some time to come, Milošević presented himself primarily as a champion of greater Yugoslav unity, rather than Serbian interests. However, in changing the Serbian party's approach to Kosovo Milošević had fundamentally altered the dynamic of the Yugoslav crisis. The Yugoslav Constitution, which made Serbia's provinces "constituent parts of the federation" with representatives on every federal body, ensured that Kosovo was not simply an internal Serbian matter. To meet his pledge to reassert Serbian control over the provinces, Milošević had to restructure Yugoslavia. But his attempt to do so aroused the determined resistance of other republics, above all Slovenia and Croatia, and so contributed to the process of state dissolution.

The sequence of events leading to the dissolution of the Yugoslav state has been the subject of many accounts by participants, journalists, and scholars.265 This report does not attempt to offer a chronological account of these events, which would far exceed the available space. Neither does it set out a comprehensive analysis of the causes of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Rather, it seeks to explain how the actions and attitudes of Serbia's leaders, particularly Slobodan Milošević, shaped the process of dissolution. This focus, which follows from the subject matter of the report, is not intended to imply that Serbia's leaders bore exclusive responsibility for Yugoslavia's collapse. Independently of Serbian actions, forces in favor of independence existed in both Slovenia and Croatia. But Milošević's policies and rhetoric - especially once they began to operate in the context of post-Communist electoral competition - helped these forces move from marginal to dominant political positions.

On a more general level, it should be noted at the outset that the transition from communism would have challenged the continuation of the Yugoslav state on its existing basis irrespective of who was in power in what republic.266 Throughout their forty-five years in power, the Yugoslav Communists had justified the Yugoslav state as a means to the end of socialism. As Serbian constitutional law expert Jovan Đorđević succinctly expressed it during the debate over the 1971 amendments, "the socialist project is not only the goal but also the cohesive force of this federalism."267 It follows that the collapse of one-party socialist rule, in Yugoslavia and across Eastern Europe, confronted Yugoslavia with a need to redefine its
"cohesive force." Many Yugoslavs, notably Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković, took up the challenge on these terms, but their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful.

In September of 1987, Milošević routed his rivals within the Serbian Party, who had resisted his aggressive stance on Kosovo and had protested against the media's newly inflammatory portrayal of the Albanian population. This led in December to Stambolić's ouster as Serbia's president. In the summer of 1988, the organized mass meetings of the so-called "anti-bureaucratic revolution" began. These meetings toppled the leaderships of Vojvodina (in October of 1988) and Montenegro (in January of 1989), replacing them with Milošević allies. The next step came in the spring of 1989, when amendments to the Serbian Constitution greatly reduced the autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The Kosovo assembly passed the amendments under duress, sparking violence in Kosovo and inaugurating an era of spiraling human rights abuses against the Kosovar Albanian population. Regardless, the day of the constitutional amendments was proclaimed a Serbian state holiday, and Milošević reached the pinnacle of his popularity in Serbia.

With the assertion of Serbian control over Kosovo, Milošević and his allies now controlled the leaderships of four federal units. The remainder of 1989 was marked above all by escalating Serb-Slovene conflict. Part of the conflict took the form of competing programs for constitutional reform of the Yugoslav federation. Milošević's proposal called for strengthening the federation through a variety of measures, including reducing the number of issues requiring consensus of the federal units. It also called for a bicameral legislature, in which one chamber would be elected on the one-man one-vote principle. Meanwhile, the Slovene leadership was putting forward a diametrically opposed vision, which would maintain the 1974 Constitution's provisions for consensual decision-making and equality of the federal units, and even increase the federal units' autonomy through the concept of "asymmetric federation." In September of 1989, the Slovene assembly went a step further, passing amendments that (among other provisions) declared the republic's right to secede and specified that the federal government could not impose emergency measures in Slovenia without the explicit consent of the Slovene assembly. (Slovene leaders asserted, both at the time and later, that the amendments were defensive in nature, adopted in response to the Serb push for a new and more centralized Yugoslavia, and especially to Serbian actions in Kosovo.) A new low point in Serb-Slovene relations arrived at the end of 1989, when the Slovenes refused to allow a mass "meeting
of truth" (about Kosovo) to be held in Ljubljana. Serbia retaliated by cutting many economic ties; Slovenia cut its contribution to the federal budget.274

It was Serb-Slovene conflict that precipitated the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January of 1990, at the LCY's Fourteenth Extraordinary Congress. By the time this Congress was held, of course, the Revolutions of 1989 had toppled Communist regimes across Eastern Europe. Recognizing the new realities, the party leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia had called for the introduction of a multiparty system. (The Serbian party and leadership gave a more guarded endorsement of pluralism, warning against "anti-socialist" organizations.)275 At the Congress itself, following a Serbian proposal, voting was by delegate (one-man, one-vote) rather than by delegations. Slovene proposals — including one to end Serbia's economic measures against Slovenia and others to increase the autonomy of the republican parties, institute measures protecting human rights in Kosovo and elsewhere, and separate Party from state throughout Yugoslavia — were consistently outvoted. This fate, of course, was exactly what the Slovenes feared in a Yugoslavia structured on the majority-vote principle. The Slovene delegates responded by walking out.276 The LCY no longer existed: the disintegration of Yugoslavia had entered its final stages.

Up through the collapse of the LCY, Milošević presented himself primarily as the proponent of a stronger Yugoslavia (and a reunited Serbia), not as the protector of Serbs throughout Yugoslavia.277 His most important speeches as head of the Belgrade League of Communists had been calls for Yugoslav unity, including his November 1984 appeal to Serbian Communists to free themselves from the "complex of unitarism" and support a stronger Yugoslavia. It is striking, moreover, that Milošević's early (1987) speeches on Kosovo call on Yugoslavia, more than Serbia, to assert its power over the province. The conclusion to his April 1987 Kosovo Polje speech, "All of Yugoslavia is with you...Yugoslavia disintegrates without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give up Kosovo!" is one example. A few months later, urging the 10th Session of the CC LCY to enforce the rule of law in Kosovo, he said, "Yugoslavia is not defunct as a state, so it must perform all its functions."278 Milošević reached the height of his "Yugoslav" rhetoric at the immense "Brotherhood and Unity" meeting held in November of 1988 in Belgrade, saying:

Tito's Yugoslavia was built in a great revolution by Yugoslav Communists, the Yugoslav working class and the Yugoslav peoples. It will not breathe its last at the conference