institutional as well as ideological. With Partisan victory, its major institutional supports were destroyed (the monarchy and the "bourgeois" political parties), drastically weakened (the Serbian Orthodox Church), or forced into new political molds (the Serbian cultural and literary associations). At the same time, the symbols of traditional Serbian identity were compromised by their association with the Chetniks.

IV. Serbs in Titoist Yugoslavia

IV A. Patterns of Serbian National Thought

The next two sections – the bulk of this report – will focus on Serbs' attempts to define themselves and their national position within the new context of a socialist and federal Yugoslavia. Section IV covers the period up to Tito's death in 1980. Section V deals with Yugoslavia's post-Tito crisis, and the phenomenon usually called "the rise of Serbian nationalism." As it traces Serbian national thought through the forty-six years of socialist Yugoslavia's existence, the report will seek to explain the emergence of a national "mind-set" – a set of beliefs that by the late 1980s were widespread (though not universal) among Serbs.

The report will give special attention to Serbs' reactions to Yugoslavia's progressive political and constitutional decentralization. These reactions, as we shall see, foreshadow Serbs' responses to the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. Given that for most of the period under discussion Yugoslav politics were subject to the constraints of a one-party system, the report will trace Serbian national thought in the cultural sphere (which in Yugoslavia as in many other communist systems served as a substitute for forbidden politics) as well as in the political sphere. Over the thirty years preceding Yugoslavia's collapse, the report will argue, every decline in (cultural or political) Yugoslav unity evoked a mobilization for the (cultural or political) unity of all Serbs. More specifically, the weakening of Yugoslav unity immediately and dramatically focused the attention of nationally-minded Serbs within Serbia on the position of Serbs outside Serbia. These patterns are particularly evident in Serbian responses to the decentralization of the late 1960s and early 1970s. They echo the Serbian Cultural Club's responses to the Sporazum of 1939, and also prefigure the patterns of Serbian response to the collapse of the Yugoslav state twenty years later.
IV. B. 1918 and 1945: Continuities and Contrasts

In the factors that defined Serbs' relation to the socialist Yugoslav state, there are significant continuities with the first Yugoslavia, but equally important differences. Structurally, one might say that the Serbian position was unchanged: the Yugoslav state continued to exist within similar borders, and Serbs were still the largest single national group. Moreover, Serbs could feel that (through their participation in the Partisan movement) they had played a leading role in creating the second Yugoslavia, as well as the first. These factors offered a basis for a continuing attachment to the Yugoslav state as the state that united all Serbs, and a special sense of Serbian guardianship over the state.

Nevertheless, other factors combined to make the Serbian relation to the socialist Yugoslav state very different from their relation to the interwar state. In the first place, while national and multinational conceptions of Yugoslavia had competed within the interwar state, socialist Yugoslavia was from its inception an explicitly multinational state with a federal organization. After 1945, the Partisans' assertion that they had solved Yugoslavia's national problems by creating the federal state became a key part of their claim to legitimacy. In the early post-war years, Yugoslav federalism served mainly propaganda purposes. (The Yugoslav state at first followed its Soviet model - formally federal, but effectively centralized by Party control.60) Partisan speeches hammered home the contrast between their "brotherhood and unity," based on national equality expressed through a federal system, and the false, forced, unity of the interwar state. Tito himself returned to this theme many times in the early post-war period and beyond. The Versailles process, he said, had produced an "artificial creation," a Yugoslavia that existed "on paper" but not in the hearts of the citizens.61 This oppressive state had sown hatred between the Yugoslav peoples, and so was responsible for the catastrophe of 1941.62 Real Yugoslav unity had been achieved only in 1945: "We have divided ourselves formally [by creating the federal units], so that we could better unite ourselves in reality."63

Second, while Serbs had certainly enjoyed political predominance in the first Yugoslavia, their situation in the second state was far more ambiguous. On the one hand, Serbs and (even more) Montenegrins were overrepresented in certain institutions. Most important, in the post-war period the participation of Serbs and Montenegrins in the officer corps of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) varied between sixty and seventy percent, while their combined share in
the population was approximately forty percent. This overrepresentation resulted from a combination of factors, including the traditions of the former military frontier regions, Serbs' role in the Partisan movement, and a relative lack of interest in military careers among some other groups (notably Slovenes). In the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and political elites more generally, regional patterns of ethnic representation were particularly significant. Serbs were overrepresented in the parties and the political structures of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Vojvodina and (most dramatically) Kosovo.

On the other hand, Serbs qua Serbs enjoyed no special privileges in Tito's Yugoslavia. Political affiliations trumped national ones every time. (After the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, this principle was dramatically illustrated by Draconian purges of real and alleged Stalin supporters in the Serbian and Montenegrin parties.) And as Yugoslavia decentralized and most federal institutions - e.g., the state and Party presidencies, and the federal legislature - came to be organized on a basis of republican parity, Yugoslavia's more populous republics, including Serbia, were in a sense underrepresented at the federal level. (This point is discussed further below in connection with the constitutional changes of the late 1960s and early 1970s.) On this basis, one could argue (and many Serbs did) that socialist Yugoslavia's institutions discriminated against Serbs as the most numerous people, and Serbia as the largest republic.

Finally, socialist Yugoslavia's ideology gave no "leading role" to the Serbian nation. (A Yugoslav equivalent to the Soviet anthem's tribute to "great Rus" would have been inconceivable.) As was noted above, although Partisan victory was the victory of a movement in which Serbs had played a leading role, it was also a crushing defeat for Serbian nationalism. Indeed, LCY leaders (and particularly those in the League of Communists of Serbia, following the Yugoslav dictate that communists should fight nationalism "in their own house") often stressed that Serbian nationalism posed special dangers. It was associated with the Serbian bourgeoisie blamed for the failings of the interwar state, and, of course, with the Chetniks in the Second World War. Thus, the Resolution adopted at the Founding Congress of the Communist Party of Serbia in May of 1945 called on the CPS to fight "against chauvinistic and hegemonistic tendencies, mainly Great-Serbian ones." This discourse remained dominant within the Communist Party (later League of Communists) of Serbia through the Titoist period and beyond.
One way of summing up the differences between Serbs' "ideological" position in the first and the second Yugoslav states is this. In 1918, Serbs had faced one dilemma: they had achieved their goal of uniting almost all Serbs in one state, but (in most cases) had not really come to terms with that state's multinational character. Some subscribed to the ultimately untenable idea of a Yugoslav nation; others saw Yugoslavia as no more than Serbia writ large. Both of these ideas were supported by elements within the regime. In 1945, they faced another dilemma. Once more, Serbs had been united in a Yugoslav state. But this time - through the combined experience of the interwar state, the Second World War, and the change of regime - nationally-conceived Yugoslavism and traditional Serbian nationalism had both been deeply compromised; neither had significant support within the regime. In the new political context, Serbs who promoted Yugoslav unity faced a psychological and political need to distance themselves from "unitarist" Yugoslavism, while those who promoted Serbian unity had to distinguish themselves from the defeated and discredited Chetniks.70

IV. C. Serbs and "Socialist Yugoslavism"

Serbian national thought, of course, evolved within a changing political and ideological framework, and can only be understood in that context. The first major post-war change in the framework came when the Yugoslav regime added the concept of "socialist Yugoslavism" to the less problematic wartime slogan of "brotherhood and unity." This shift was motivated in part by the regime's need to address the consequences of the 1948 split between Tito and Stalin. The direct consequences of 1948 - the Soviet bloc's hostility, which almost amounted to a state of undeclared war - made it imperative for the Yugoslav leaders to promote loyalty to Yugoslavia, or "socialist patriotism," over loyalty to international communism.71 The indirect consequences of 1948 - the economic and political de-Stalinization that began as an improvised reaction to excommunication and became "Yugoslav self-managing socialism" - proved even more important in shaping Yugoslav policy on the national question.72 Economic decentralization welded new economic grievances to old national and regional rivalries, and political liberalization gave the resultant conflicts more freedom to express themselves. The result was an increase in the expression of national antagonisms, even among Communist cadres - an embarrassing development for a regime that, as noted above, based its legitimacy in large part on its claim to have solved Yugoslavia's national problems during the war.
The outlines of the regime's theoretical response - a specifically Yugoslav refinement of the general Marxist premise that class takes priority over nation - emerged in 1952-53. It held that Yugoslav socialism would counter traditional nationalisms not by replacing or suppressing pre-existing national identities, but by making the new, socialist, identity primary. According to Edvard Kardelj, the leading Slovene Communist and the Yugoslav leadership's main theoretician, self-managing socialism (specifically, the new type of property relations it entailed) would create "a socialist community of a new type in which language and national culture become a secondary factor." This concept of commonality was sometimes called "socialist Yugoslavism," a formulation meant to emphasize the distinction between this Yugoslavism - based on a common commitment to socialism - and the nationally-conceived Yugoslavism of the interwar state. Socialist Yugoslavism, in fact, can be considered an attempt to create a civic nationalism, if civic nationalism is understood in Anthony Smith's terms as "an overarching unifying symbolism and ideology" that allows individuals to "feel equally at home with two concentric circles of loyalty and identification." Thus, the Program adopted in 1958 at the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) defined socialist Yugoslavism in carefully non-national terms, as:

a socialist Yugoslav consciousness, a Yugoslav socialist patriotism, which is not the opposite of but rather a necessary internationalist supplement to democratic national consciousness in the conditions of a socialist community of nations. It is not a question of creating some new "Yugoslav nation" instead of the existing nations...

Several measures introduced in the early-to-mid-1950s reflected the regime's increased emphasis on Yugoslav unity. The 1953 Constitutional Law (a constitution in all but name) decreased the republics' formal rights, particularly their role in the federal legislature. The 1953 census (which was the second since the war, the first having taken place in 1948), introduced a new category: "Yugoslav - [nationally] undetermined (Jugosloveni neopredeljeni)."

In 1954, the Novi Sad Agreement (signed by leading Serb, Croat, and Montenegrin linguists) asserted that "Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian" was one literary language with two equally valid alphabets, Latin and Cyrillic; and two dialects, ijkavian and ekavian. This represented an important departure from the principles incorporated in the 1946 Constitution,
which had referred to Serbian and Croatian as separate languages. Finally, an organized campaign for greater cultural cooperation between the republics began in 1955-56.

Given the restrictive political climate of the time, it is difficult to gauge the depth or breadth of popular acceptance of the concept of socialist Yugoslavism. The concept's attraction appears to have depended on several factors: revulsion against the intercommunal atrocities of the Second World War, pride in Yugoslavia's standing as an exemplar of non-bloc socialism and a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (which held its first conference in Belgrade in 1961), and a more general belief that national identities were increasingly irrelevant in the modern world.

Formulated in this way, socialist Yugoslavism could appeal to all of Yugoslavia's citizens. For non-Serbs, however, its attraction was always potentially (and often actually) countered by the fear that this "Yugoslavism" was really a mask for the nationalism of the largest nation - the Serbs. Serbs, in contrast, had no need to fear that Yugoslavism would mean assimilation by a larger nation, though some did suspect it meant a loss of their own identity. In fact, some Serb proponents of socialist Yugoslavism associated it with at least a partial renunciation of the Serbian national heritage, such as the Cyrillic alphabet. Moreover, socialist Yugoslavism appeared to offer a solution to the Serbian national problem in its post-1945 form: the need for Serbs to distance themselves from both "unitarist" Yugoslavism and traditional Serbian nationalism, while still justifying the existence of the Yugoslav state.

In these circumstances, it was scarcely surprising that socialist Yugoslavism found many of its most enthusiastic supporters among Serb intellectuals. It was equally predictable that the concept would find its most vociferous critics among Slovenes, notwithstanding the fact that its intellectual godfather, Kardelj, was himself a Slovene. The same factors that made the Serbs structurally inclined to support Yugoslavism worked in reverse for the Slovenes, with their small population and nationally homogeneous republic. Serb-Slovene debates over the interpretation of socialist Yugoslavism began in the mid-1950s and culminated in a famous 1961 polemic between Serbian novelist (later president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) Dobrica Ćosić, and Slovene literary critic Dušan Pirjevec. Both men were prominent Party intellectuals, and in their polemic they appear to have functioned as proxies for republican party leaders, whose disagreements were still largely hidden from the public. While the polemic's ostensible subject was the proper interpretation of socialist Yugoslavism, its subtext - obliquely expressed
within the confines of Titoist discourse—was the relation between the Yugoslav state and the republics. Republican rights, Pirjevec asserted, were sacrosanct: the republics were "clearly formed national organisms...untouchable like every organism." Čosić (though not disputing Yugoslavia's federal form) accused the republican leaders of promoting "national bureaucratism," and insisted that only the Yugoslav state could uphold the internationalist ideal. 85

Throughout their exchange, Pirjevec maintained his equation of national and republican rights, apparently blind to the difficulties of applying this equation to a multinational state where national and political borders rarely coincided. Čosić, in his turn, was just as blind to the flaws in his assumption that the Yugoslav state, in which Serbs were by far the largest nation, was self-evidently the guardian of "internationalism." Their polemic thus represented the early stages of a Serb-Slovene dialogue of the deaf over the respective rights of Yugoslavia's nations and its republics, reflecting positions that would persist throughout socialist Yugoslavia's existence and ultimately shape its dissolution. The polemic also demonstrated the difficulties of formulating a concept of "Yugoslavism" acceptable to all of Yugoslavia's peoples, and so hints at the fragility of the "socialist Yugoslav" solution to the Serbian national dilemma.

IV. D. Decentralization and National Mobilizations

This section of the report will summarize the process of state and Party decentralization in the late 1960s, briefly discuss the era's national movements, and then analyze Serbian reactions to these events. In so doing, it will emphasize two elements of Serbian national thought that came to the fore in this period and also proved crucial twenty years later. One was a passionate resentment of Serbs' divisions among different political units, often coupled with a complete disregard for the fact that some other national groups were also divided (though admittedly not to the same extent). Another (related) one was a pronounced emphasis on national unity over territorial unity, a stance which among other things meant ignoring historical differences among the various communities of Serbs.

In 1961-62, when Čosić and Pirjevec were engaged in their polemic, divisions over the question of further decentralization (often aligned on a Serb-Slovene axis) were becoming explicit within the top leadership. At an expanded meeting of the CC LCY's Executive
Committee held in March of 1962, the debate over decentralization took on an unprecedented sharpness. That meeting (the substance of which remained secret for many years) ended in a stalemate, but soon thereafter Tito threw his deciding vote on the side of at least some decentralization. 86

A more dramatic victory for the proponents of decentralization came in July of 1966, with the fall of Vice-President Aleksandar Ranković. As the Party's Organizational Secretary (and the long-time head of the much-feared state security service), Ranković was the Party's highest-ranking Serb. He was also a conservative Communist, deeply suspicious of democratization and of decentralization. 87 At the Fourth Plenum of the LCY Central Committee (known as the Brioni Plenum for the island where it was held), Ranković was accused of having abused his power over internal security to carry out a range of illegal activities, including surveillance of Tito. How far these accusations were justified remains unclear. 88 For present purposes, however, the reasons for Ranković's fall matter less than its effects.

Beginning with the Sixth Plenum of the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS), held in September of 1966, allegations of nationalism (variously defined as "Great-Serbian chauvinism" and "unitarism, nationalism, and centralism") figured more prominently than Stalinism in the Party's denunciation of Ranković. 89 National questions had received only glancing attention at Brioni, but took center stage at the LCS Plenum. (Reserving the accusations of Serbian nationalism for a Serbian party forum was, of course, in keeping with the principle that each party should fight nationalism "in its own house." 90) The bridge between accusations of Stalinism and accusations of nationalism was provided by police illegalities in Kosovo, which had not been mentioned at Brioni but were a major focus of discussion at the Sixth Plenum. The Yugoslav regime's suspicions of Albanian disloyalty - based primarily on the Second World War experience - had made possible widespread abuses (for instance, in connection with the notorious "gathering of weapons" in 1955-56). Ranković's fall marked the beginning of a new era.

The Party's post-Brioni attacks on police abuses and on centralism signaled the beginnings of a (temporary) democratization of political life and a (permanent) decentralization of the Yugoslav Party and state. The next five years were the most tumultuous in Communist Yugoslavia's political history until the late 1980s. Between 1967 and 1971, three sets of constitutional amendments were passed. Taken together, they inaugurated a new and far more decentralized constitutional order. The first two amendment packages (Amendments 1-6, passed
on April 18, 1967; and 7-19, passed on December 26, 1968) greatly restricted federal powers of taxation, and restructured the federal parliament to give the republics and provinces effective control over the legislative process. In the most important of the legislative changes, a restructured Chamber of Nationalities (made up of twenty delegates from each republic, and ten from each province), became the federal parliament's dominant chamber. Its approval was required on all federal legislation, and its deputies were explicitly bound to represent the wishes of the republican assemblies who sent them.

The constitutional amendments of 1968-71 changed the positions of Serbia's Autonomous Provinces in vital ways. The amendments gave Kosovo and Vojvodina great independence of Serbia, and increased powers in decision-making on the federal level. The first important changes came with the package of constitutional amendments passed in December of 1968. Kosovo's name was changed from the Autonomous Province of Kosovo-Metohija to the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. Eliminating "Metohija" (derived from the Greek for monastic property) from the region's name downplayed the Slavic and Orthodox elements in its history. Adding "Socialist" confirmed that the provinces were now considered to be autonomous agents in pursuit of the dream of "socialist self-management." Organizational changes in the Party paralleled those in the state. In November of 1968, what had been sections of the League of Communists of Serbia for Vojvodina and for Kosovo became the independent Leagues of Vojvodina and of Kosovo. Kosovo's new status was set out in a Constitutional Law of 1969. Among its most important provisions were the following: the province's borders could not be changed without the concurrence of the provincial assembly; the provincial assembly could make laws (as opposed to issuing decrees based on federal or republican laws); and the province would have its own supreme court.

The amendments of 1967 and 1968 had altered the balance between the federation and its units, as well as that between the republics and the provinces. The more radical package of 1971 (Amendments 20-42, passed on June 30, 1971) fundamentally changed the way in which Yugoslavia was governed. These amendments granted primary sovereignty and all residual powers to the republics. They also established a twenty-three member collective state presidency, consisting of three representatives from each republic and two from each province, as well as Tito. (This large body proved inefficient, and the 1974 Constitution reduced it to nine
members - one from each republic and province, plus Tito. Finally, the amendments institutionalized a requirement (already implemented in practice) that most federal decisions involving economic matters be reached through consensus of the republics and provinces. This introduction of what amounted to a republican and provincial veto was the most radical measure of 1971. Though the provinces still had fewer representatives than the republics on most federal bodies, this discrepancy lost its practical importance as more decisions became subject to consensus.

In Yugoslavia's one-party system, state decentralization would have been meaningless without a corresponding decentralization of the League of Communists. This process, inaugurated at the LCY's Eighth Congress in 1964, gathered momentum after the fall of Ranković. The decentralizing measures introduced over the next few years were formally endorsed, and extended, at the Ninth Congress in 1969. Among the most important changes in Party organization was one affecting the composition of most LCY organs: equal representation of every republic and province replaced the prior system of proportional representation based on the number of members in each republican and provincial party. Taken in combination, the changes made the Party's central organizations dependent on republican and provincial ones - or would have done so, were it not that Tito remained supreme in the Party as in the state.

With one set of constitutional amendments following another, Yugoslavia's political life was in constant turmoil throughout the late 1960s. The same might be said for its economic and social life, although here the disturbances resulted from long-term trends rather than the day-to-day processes of politics. Yugoslavia was struggling to come to terms with the fruits of its economic success. In the space of twenty-five years, it had metamorphosed from a poor and predominantly agricultural country, to one that was middle-income (by world, not European, standards) and substantially urbanized. By 1971, per capita annual income had reached eight hundred dollars, and the agricultural population had declined to 38.2% (some of these only part-time agriculturalists), from 67.2% in 1948. Albeit on a modest scale, Yugoslavia had become a consumer society - as witnessed by small but growing numbers of cars and television sets, and a steady decline in the share of consumer spending going to food.

This impressive rate of modernization came at a price of social dislocation. Urbanization was both massive and extremely rapid. During each year of a period spanning more than two
decades, about one percent of the population left the countryside for the cities. The impossibility of achieving a cultural transformation ("civilization" in its most literal sense) rapid enough to match the purely physical process of urbanization was a widely-discussed problem. In the late 1960s, these side-effects of economic success were compounded by more conventional economic problems. The initial results of the market-oriented economic reform of 1965 were disappointing. It seemed to have introduced the market's negative effects - particularly growing income disparities - without its positive ones. Growth in the late 1960s was slow or stagnant: from an average 9.7% for 1961-4, it declined to an average 3% for 1965-67. Rising unemployment - only partially mitigated by emigration - was a reality particularly hard to reconcile with the socialist promise.

To sum up, then, several factors converged in the late 1960s. The Party's post-Ranković campaign against centralism gave a clear signal that the proponents of decentralization had won their battle within the top leadership. The constitutional amendments of 1967-71 made political leaders dependent on pleasing republican constituencies, rather than central ones. And the social results first of rapid economic growth and then of its slowdown contributed to a widespread sense of insecurity. Operating together, these factors produced a climate that allowed unprecedented national self-assertion. In these years, Croats rallied behind a movement that shook Yugoslavia to its political foundations; Slovenes asserted their republic's prerogatives against the federal government; Macedonians achieved the final perquisite of Orthodox nationhood, an autocephalous church; the Slavic Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina officially gained the status of a nation (narod); Serbophile and Serbophobe contingents battled for the Montenegrin soul; and the Albanians of Serbia's Kosovo province asserted themselves against Serbs and Serbia. The report will summarize each of these developments very briefly before moving on to discuss Serbian reactions.

Croats

By far the most significant of the national movements was the Croatian one, known variously as the "Croatian Spring" and (in Yugoslav political parlance) as the Maspok, short for masovni pokret, or mass movement. The single most important motor of the Croatian national movement was resentment focused on Croatia's economic position. Specifically
Croatian grievances – for example, those connected with the allocation of foreign currency earnings derived from tourism on the Adriatic coast – exacerbated general disappointment with the results of the economic reforms of 1965. The Croatian economic platform proposed to remedy these ills by leaving each republic in control of its own foreign currency earnings, and by instituting "čisti računi" ("clear accounts") to let each republic see exactly what it contributed to the federal exchequer, and what it received in return.

Second only to economic issues were linguistic ones. The event that has come to symbolize the Croatian linguistic rebellion, the "Declaration on the Name and Position of the Croatian Literary Language" published on March 17, 1967, demanded that Croatian be officially recognized as a separate literary language, and that only this language be used in official contacts with the Croatian population (including usage by civil servants, teachers, and the media). Obviously, this constituted a rejection of the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement's assertion that "Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian" was one literary language.

Between the 10th Session of the Croatian Central Committee in January of 1970 (when the Croatian Party leadership in effect placed itself at the head of the burgeoning national movement by declaring that unitarism posed a greater danger than Croatian nationalism), and the student demonstrations of November 1971 (which called for a Croatian seat in the U.N. General Assembly, a radical resolution of the foreign currency issue, and other measures clearly unacceptable to the Yugoslav government), the movement broadened, radicalized, and escaped from the Party's control. At the end of 1971 Tito (who had earlier given the movement his support) quashed it, forcing the resignations of the Croatian party leaders. Their resignations were followed by purges and prison sentences for many of the intellectuals involved in the Maspok, and then by the "Croatian silence," which would last until the end of the 1980s.

Slovenes

Meanwhile, in Slovenia, the leadership pursued a program that combined democratization and a limited pluralism within their own republic with attempts to extend the republics' prerogatives on the federal level. In the well-known "roads affair" of 1969, Slovene officials publicly disputed a federal decision over the apportionment of a World Bank loan. In addition to seeking greater control over their economic affairs, the Slovene leaders sought increased autonomy in international relations, a right for conscripts to perform their military service in
their home republic, and a more even-handed linguistic policy within the Yugoslav Army.\textsuperscript{108} The Slovene movement, while important in shaping the Yugoslav political constellation, had little impact on Serbian national thought; hence its very brief treatment here.

\textit{Macedonians}

Like other Yugoslav peoples, the Macedonians experienced a national mobilization in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, the period marked less of a watershed for them than for some others (notably the Albanians). From the time they took power, the Yugoslav Communists had exerted themselves to promote a Macedonian national feeling, and so solve the long-vexing Macedonian question in a way that excluded both Bulgarian and Serbian claims.\textsuperscript{109} Initially, however, official encouragement of Macedonian identity did not extend to granting an autocephalous church (i.e., one independent of the Serbian Orthodox Church).\textsuperscript{110} Conflict over the status of the church in Macedonia continued through the 1950s. A compromise settlement (through which the Serbian Church recognized the internal self-government of the Macedonian Church, while the Macedonians agreed to remain in canonical union with the Serbian Church through the person of the Patriarch) was reached in 1959, but relations continued to be strained. Finally, through a series of actions beginning in the fall of 1966 and culminating in a formal ceremony on July 19, 1967, the Macedonian Church unilaterally declared itself autocephalous. The Communist Party - particularly the League of Communists of Macedonia - gave its full support to the Macedonians, and the final ceremony was attended by high officials of both the republic and the federation. In the official press, autocephaly was hailed more in political than in religious terms, as the final triumph of Macedonian sovereignty.\textsuperscript{111}

\textit{Muslims}

Like the Macedonians, Yugoslavia's Slavic Muslims (known since 1993 as Bosniaks) were first granted national status under the Communists. For the Muslims, however, national recognition was not one event, but rather a drawn-out and sometimes tortuous process. The act most often identified as the official endorsement of Muslim nationhood - the 1968 declaration by the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina that "the
Muslims are a separate nation" – represented the logical conclusion of a trend, rather than a sudden change of policy.\textsuperscript{112}

The Communists' approach to the Muslim question had been ambivalent and often contradictory. In the early post-war years, the Party promoted the view that Muslims were still an anational group. In the dominant interpretation, this meant that they could be expected to assimilate into one of the groups around them: i.e., to become either Serbs or Croats. (A competing view, also based on the premise that Muslims were as yet anational, held that they were therefore uniquely "Yugoslav."\textsuperscript{113}) Muslim Party members were put under pressure to fulfill the prophecy of assimilation by declaring themselves Serbs or Croats. Based on the available data, it seems that the Serb option was much the most popular.\textsuperscript{114} It was a practical choice, for at this time Serbs were the most numerous people in Bosnia-Herzegovina - just over forty-four percent of the population in the censuses of 1948 and 1953 – and were also substantially overrepresented in its political establishment.

The bulk of the Muslim population, however, gave no signs of assimilating. In the 1948 census, where their only options were Serb-Muslim, Croat-Muslim, or "Muslim - nationally undetermined (\textit{muslimani nacionalno neopredijeni})," the great majority chose the last option.\textsuperscript{115} By the end of the 1950s, the political balance was shifting toward recognition of the Muslims as a distinct group, though not yet a full-fledged nation. In its new position as a founder and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (inaugurated in 1956 when Tito, Nasser and Nehru met on Brioni, and launched with full ceremony at the Belgrade Conference of 1961), Yugoslavia was finding that Muslim cadres made exceptionally useful diplomats.\textsuperscript{116} This consideration may have helped to overcome the reluctance of official atheists to recognize a nation originally defined by religion. Moreover, the Yugoslav regime was beginning to acknowledge openly that its original premise had been mistaken: very few Muslims were ready to identify themselves as Serbs or Croats.\textsuperscript{117} In the early 1960s, a number of signs showed that the climate had changed. On the census of 1961, the category "Muslim-ethnic affiliation" appeared for the first time; and the preamble to the Bosnian Constitution of 1963 listed "Serbs, Muslims, and Croats" as parallel and presumably equal groups.\textsuperscript{118} Meanwhile, Muslim academics began producing works justifying a separate identity.\textsuperscript{119}
By the time that the Bosnian Party formally proclaimed Muslim nationhood in 1968, then, it was in some respects approving a *fait accompli*. A more controversial question was the political identity of the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the census of 1971 showed Muslims to be the republic's most numerous group, some Muslim intellectuals argued that Muslims should be given special recognition in the Bosnian constitution (as Croats were in Croatia, Serbs in Serbia, etc.) Others urged that a "Bosnian" identity ought to be primary for all Bosnia's peoples. Official opinion, however, firmly rejected both options. Bosnia-Herzegovina remained the only republic without a titular nationality, and its inhabitants remained Muslims, Serbs, and Croats.

*Montenegrins*

As was the case with Macedonians and Muslims, national self-assertion among Montenegrins required that they define their identity in relation to the Serbs. The dynamic of national mobilization among Montenegrins was unique, however, in that strong elements among the Montenegrins themselves supported the view that Montenegrins were part of the Serb nation. The Party leadership, however, generally opposed this view. In a 1945 article, Milovan Djilas - who as the highest-ranking Montenegrin Communist was the new regime's logical spokesman on the Montenegrin question - maintained that Serbs and Montenegrins had sprung from one people (*narod*), but had developed during the modern era, under the influence of capitalism, into separate nations (*nacije*). The process of nation-formation had begun later in Montenegro than in Serbia, and was not yet finished. Nevertheless, Djilas argued, the Montenegrins constituted a fully developed political nation. Djilas took special pains to justify the separate Montenegrin republic as the logical expression of Montenegrin nationhood, and to assert that for Montenegrins as well as other Yugoslav peoples, the Partisan movement had been both a national and a social revolution.

In the first Yugoslavia, the "Montenegrin question" had been essentially political, centering on the terms of unification between Serbia and Montenegro. With the establishment of the republic of Montenegro, *this* Montenegrin question was shelved (to reemerge, dramatically, in the 1990s). However, the old Montenegrin question was replaced by a new one, centering on cultural identity. As Montenegro joined in the national ferment of the 1960s, the "ownership" of