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1. . Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, "The Need to Respond to War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 28 December 1992, pp. 923-24.
2. . For example, while officials claimed that Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard (Srpska dobrovoljacka garda -- SDG) would be demobilized, since it had accomplished its mission, there were hints that the need for plausible denial might mean its maintenance in some form for future requirements. According to Borislav Pelevic, Vice-President of Arkan's Serbian Unity Party (Stranka srpskog jedinstva) and Deputy Commander of their paramilitary agent, "The SDG will pull out of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina along with the Army, but it will not be demobilized; rather, it will help the Serbian people wherever it is threatened." A.R.P., "Garda odlazi s vojskom" [The Guard Will Pull Out Along with the Army], Evropske Novosti (Frankfurt), 16 November 1995, p. 5. Evropske Novosti is the foreign edition of the pro-Milosevic Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti. Elsewhere, Pelevic has noted that in the future more attention would be paid to the Hungarians in Voyvodina, the Muslims in the Sanjak, and to Kosovo, where "the documents of all 500,000 [Albanian] immigrants (sic) [should] be checked." Interview with Borislav Pelevic by Vojislav Tufegdzic, "Ne priznajem kapitulaciju" [I Do Not Recognize Capitulation], Intervju (Belgrade), 13 October 1995, p. 60. Borislav Pelevic also promised, "If, God forbid, fighting breaks out in Kosovo, we will set up the guard again and place it in the service of the Serbian people." D. P., "Demobilization of 'Tigers' at the Beginning of April," Nasa Borba (Belgrade), 25 January 1996, p. 2, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Eastern Europe (EEU)-96-018, 26 January 1996, p. 70. The official government news agency Tanjug, in fact, noted in early 1996 that Arkan was turning his attention to Kosovo and repeated, in part perhaps to intimidate the Albanian population there, Arkan's new threat to "solve" the problem of "Albanian separatism" by "emigration." Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 13 February 1996, FBIS-EEU-96-032, 15 February 1996, p. 71. By late March, Arkan himself claimed that the SDG's demobilization was already underway. "The Serbian Voluntary Guard Is Being Disbanded," Nasa Borba, 27 March 1996, FBIS-EEU-96-061, 28 March 1996, p. 56.
3. . The Serbian leadership engaged in blanket denials of any responsibility. Slobodan Milosevic, for example, told the BBC that, "There is no one who can believe what is mentioned as an organized genocide, even organized from Belgrade, even organized by me! It is really out of consideration!" Speaking in 1995 on the "Gates of Hell" episode from the BBC's "Death of Yugoslavia" series 1995.
4. The need to establish individual responsibility in order to avoid conclusions of collective guilt has been highlighted by both the United Nations Secretary-General and the Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. See Press Statement by the Prosecutor, Justice Richard Goldstone, 25 July 1995.
4. . Press Statement by the Prosecutor, Justice Richard Goldstone, 25 July 1995.
5. . Article 11 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993, p. 13 [hereinafter Statute of the Tribunal].
6. . Articles 1 and 8 of the Statute of the Tribunal, pp. 5 and 11.
7. . Indictment of Dragan Nikolic for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, and Crimes Against Humanity, Tribunal Document IT-94-2-I, 7 November 1994 [hereinafter Indictment of Dragan Nikolic]; Indictment of Zeljko Meakic for Genocide, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, and Crimes Against Humanity, No Tribunal Document number available, 13 February 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Zeljko Meakic]; Indictment of Miroslav Kvocka, Dragoljub Prcac, Mladen Radic, Momcilo Gruban for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, and Crimes Against Humanity, No Tribunal Document number available, 13 February 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Miroslav Kvocka, Dragoljub Prcac, Mladen Radic, Momcilo Gruban]; Indictment of Slobodan Miljkovic, Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Stevan Todorovic, and Simo Zaric for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, and Crimes Against Humanity, Tribunal Document IT-95-9-I, 29 June 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Slobodan Miljkovic, Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Stevan Todorovic, and Simo Zaric]; Indictment of Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cesic for Genocide, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, and Crimes Against Humanity, Tribunal Document IT-95-10 I, 30 June 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cesic]; Indictment of Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Fustar, and Dragan Kulundzija for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, and Crimes Against Humanity, Tribunal Document IT-95-8-I, 19 July 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Fustar, and Dragan Kulundzija]; Indictment of Milan Martic for Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, Tribunal Document IT-95-11-I, 24 July 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Milan Martic]; Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and Violations of the Law or Customs of War, Tribunal Document IT-95-5-I, 25 July 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #1]. Indictment of Ivica Rajic for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and Violations of the Law or Customs of War, Tribunal Document IT-95-12-I, 23 August 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Ivica Rajic]; Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski, Tribunal Document IT-95-14-I, 2 November 1995. [hereinafter Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski]; Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, and Crimes Against Humanity, Tribunal Document IT-95-13-I, 7 November 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin]; Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and Violations of the Law or Customs of War, Tribunal Document IT-95-18-I, 14 November 1995 [hereinafter Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2]. Indictment of Djordje Djukic for Crimes Against Humanit and a Violation of the Laws and Customs of War, Tribunal Document IT-96-20-I, 29 February 1996 [hereinafter Indictment of Djordje Djukic]; and Indictment of Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Tribunal Document IT-95-21-I, 20 March 1996 [hereinafter Indictment of Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic].
9. . On Slobodan Milosevic's rise to and consolidation of power, see Slavoljub Djukic, Izmedju slave i anateme [Between Glory and Anathema], Belgrade: Filip Visnjic 1994; Ivan Stambolic, Put u bespuce [Path into the Uncharted], Belgrade: Radio B92 1995; Nebojsa Popov, Srpski populizam; Od marginalne do dominante pojave [Serbian Populism; From a Marginal to a Dominant Phenomenon], special insert to Vreme (Belgrade), 24 May 1993; and Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, London: Verso 1993.
10. . Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 1994, pp. 223-24.
11. . A United Nations report described the transparent transition of the JNA into the Bosnian Serb Army:
From late May 1992, when the JNA ostensibly had left BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] territory as far as its members originating from outside BiH were concerned [officially on 4 May 1992], the remaining Serbian military in the region of Banja Luka (as well as in other regions) officially converted the remaining JNA into the Army of the SRBiH [Bosnian Serb Republic-Herzegovina].... The transformation essentially was characterized by a change of name and insignia. The Army SRBiH was to be commanded by General Ratko Mladic. When he was appointed to his new duty in he first half of May 1992, General Ratko Mladic was still commander of the [JNA's] Knin Corps (based in the Croatian Krajina).... The overall command structure, the lion's share of the military personnel, the weaponry and the ammunition of the JNA, remained in place with the Army of SRBiH. In Banja Luka, the 5th Corps of the JNA thence became the 1st [Bosnian] Krajina Corps. The commander was Major General Momir Talic (who had previously been the deputy commander of the 5th Corps).... When the SRBiH changed its name on 12 August 1992 to the Republic of Srpska, the Army [of] SRBiH changed its name and acronym to VRS (Vojska Republike Srpske, the Army of the Republic of Srpska).
Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Annex V; The Prijedor Report, para 187.
12. . The Republic of Serbia Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova) has been headed since 1991 by Zoran Sokolovic. The Ministry includes the Department (Resor) -- formerly Service (Sluzba) -- of Public Security, which is headed by Radovan Stojcic Badza, who is at the same time Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs; and the State Security Service (Sluzba drzavne bezbednosti -- SDB -- the secret police), headed by Jovica Stanisic.
14. See S. Jovicic, "Personalna unija politike i ekonomske moci" [Personal Union of Political and Economic Power], Nasa Borba, 9 April 1996, internet at URL: http://www.yurope.com/zines/nasa-borba. Companies owned by the Republic of Serbia, such as Jugopetrol and JAT, are used frequently to channel funds in order to foster a non-official image for such purposes as media campaigns abroad. This overlapping system of Republic of Serbia state ownership and control is illustrated by the status of the airports (including even the ones in Montenegro), which are owned by the state airline JAT, which is in turn owned by the Republic of Serbia. The JAT was made a public company owned by the Republic of Serbia by a law enacted by the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia in February 1992 and signed by Slobodan Milosevic. A subsequent decree in December 1995 reconfirmed that all assets for common use -- such as roads -- as well as all assets which carry out public services are the property of the Serbian state. As part of the consolidation of state control, JAT personnel have been purged and replaced by politically reliable individuals. See Branka Plamenac, "Ciji ce biti aerodromi Podgorica i Tivat" [Whose Are the Airports in Podgorica and Tivat Going to Be?], Monitor (Podgorica, Montenegro), 23 February 1996, pp. 8-9.
13. . Determining a precise number of those who participated in the paramilitary agents is difficult in the absence of access to official documents, and various paramilitary leaders have given self-serving claims of the numbers who served under their command. Milika Ceko Dacevic, founder of the Serbian Guard paramilitary agent, affiliated with Vuk Draskovic's SPO, for example, claimed that, "I was the commander of all volunteer units in Bosnia, that is some 11,000 personnel were under my command." Interview with Milika Ceko Dacevic by B.A. and B.B., "Zivot za gusle" [A Life for Fiddles], NIN (Belgrade), 21 April 1995, p. 12. Elsewhere, According to the Serbian Guard's field commander, in 1991 about 7000 personnel were in training, although not all may have deployed. Aleksandar Knezevic and Vojislav Tufegdzic, Kriminal koji je izmenio Srbiju [Crime Which Changed Serbia], Belgrade: Radio B92, 2nd edition 1995, p. 28. Earlier, the commander of the Serbian Guard, Djordje Bozovic, had boasted that 40,000 volunteers had already shown up. Interview with Djordje Bozovic by Slavica Lazic, "Bicemo vojska moderne i humane Srbije" [We Will Be the Army of a Modern and Humane Serbia], Srpska rec, 5 August 1991, p. 15. Vojislav Seselj, for his part, claimed, "We sent tens of thousands of volunteers to many fronts." Interview with Vojislav Seselj by Zeljka Godec, "Svim Srbima iz Hrvatske porucio bih da se isele" [I Would Suggest to All Serbs from Croatia to Leave], Globus (Zagreb), 12 May 1995, p. 51. The Yugoslav Army, on the other hand, estimated that, in 1993, Seselj had 8000 armed personnel. Milos Vasic and Filip Svarm, "Cetnicki Votergejt" [Chetnik Watergate], Vreme, 15 November 1993, p. 25. Paramilitary agent leader Captain Dragan, for his part, had claimed 1200 in his force in 1991. Interview with Captain Dragan by Aleksandar I. Popovic, "Nisam Buntovnik" [I Am Not a Rebel], Pogledi (Kragujevac, Serbia), 29 November 1991, p. 29.
14. . For example, judging from photographs published in the press of the ceremonies in 1995 marking the fifth anniversary of its establishment, the SDG has some light armor, as well as an extensive motorized capability. One source also attributed tanks and heavy artillery to Arkan's order of battle. Radovan Pavlovic, "Mnogo vojske pod jednom komandom" [Many Armies under One Command], Politika (Belgrade), 11 November 1993, p. 9. All in all, it is a large-scale operation requiring significant logistic support (fuel, food, ammunition, and spare parts), as well as funding. Politika is a state-owned daily.
15. . Milosevic has downplayed the impact of the paramilitary agents. This is perhaps due, however, to a desire to diminish his personal responsibility for the paramilitary agents' activities. At the same time, he has denied any involvement with them. Asked, for example, in mid-1995 about the paramilitary agents, Milosevic was quick to insist, "You know, all those kinds of paramilitary formations were totally marginal in the war.... There were never more than a couple of thousand all together ... never more than a couple of thousand." Interview with Slobodan Milosevic by James R. Gaines, Karsten Prager, Massimo Calabresi, and Marguerite Michaels, "I Am Just an Ordinary Man," Time, 17 July 1995, p. 29. Serbia's Parliament earlier had gone on record by claiming that reports of any armed groups from Serbia at all operating in Bosnia had "no basis in fact." As reported by Belgrade TV News, 4 November 1992.
16. . Arkan's SDG has been especially important for its size and its considerable equipment in comparison to most of the other paramilitary agents. The discipline and relative capability of the SDG suggests that at least some, if not most, of the cadre and rank-and-file of the SDG may actually be police or Army personnel seconded to the paramilitary agent. Although reliable numbers are often difficult to come by, there have been reports of 3000 men under arms at any one time. B. Trivic, "Diskont zivota" [Discount on Lives], Stav (Novi Sad, Yugoslavia), 7 February 1992, p. 29. More recently, one of Arkan's top officials gave a figure of 2000 as the size of the force in 1995. Interview with Mihajlo Ulemek, a colonel in the SDG, and Arkan's deputy in Western Bosnia, by Gordana Jovanovic, "Srbin sam, tim se dicim" [I Am a Serb and Proud of It], Intervju, 3 November 1995, p. 20. Borislav Pelevic, Arkan's deputy and director for training, claimed that, by early 1994, 10,000 had undergone training at Arkan's base. Quoted in Radovan Pavlovic, "Zasto su Arkanovi 'tigrovi' uvukli kandze" [Why Arkan's "Tigers" Pulled in Their Claws], Politika, 30 March 1994, p. 12. Borislav Pelevic elsewhere gave a figure of over 10,000 for late 1995, although that number also included former Krajina Army personnel and forcibly mobilized refugees. Interview "I Do Not Recognize Capitulation," 13 October 1995, p. 58.
19. While several political leaders -- including Vuk Draskovic, Mirko Jovic, and Milan Paroski -- along with Vojislav Seselj also claim to be "Chetnik" and the political heirs of the World War II Chetnik Serbian nationalist movement, Seselj appropriated the name for his paramilitary forces formally and preempted the others. Originally, Seselj's party was called the Serbian Chetnik Movement (Srpski cetnicki pokret), but then was renamed the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka -- SRS).
17. . This paramilitary agent is also known as the Serbian National Guard (Srpska nacionalna garda). Mirko Jovic's party is the Serbian National Reform (Srpska narodna obnova -- SNO). The White Eagles' first combat commander was Dragoslav Bokan.
18. . Vuk Draskovic and his wife Danica set up the Serbian Reform Movement (Srpski pokret obnove -- SPO) as their political party. Seselj, Draskovic, and Jovic had all been members of a single organization -- the SNO -- but quickly split to form separate parties and paramilitary agents.
19. . Virtually all of the larger paramilitary agents, as noted, were affiliated to a political party, and some of their leaders -- such as Seselj, Arkan, Draskovic, and Paroski -- sat as deputies in Serbia's Parliament or at least ran for office, as was the case with Captain Dragan. The political parties often used their paramilitary agents as "enforcers" during political campaigns. Captain Dragan (real name Daniel Sneden), for example, had "supervised the voting" for Vuk Draskovic's SPO during the 1990 elections, according to Dejan Lucic, a senior SPO official. Quoted in Vojislav Tufegdzic, "Elita u podzemlju" [Elite in the Underworld], Intervju, 25 November 1994, p. 61. On the criminal background of the leadership of the SPO's Serbian Guard, see Knezevic and Tufegdzic, Kriminal koji je izmenio Srbiju, pp. 5-52.
20. . Serbian authorities seemed nervous about the prospects and reportedly refused to extend Seselj's passport, M. M. "Seselj Denied Passport," Nasa Borba, 17 January 1996, p. 9; FBIS-EEU-96-012, 18 January 1996, p. 103.
21. . One of Seselj's lieutenants, for example, noted that he has documents showing cooperation between Serbia's police and their paramilitary agent. Some of the documents, he said, "I gave to Seselj, if needed at the Hague." Interview with Branislav Vakic by Predrag Popovic, "Branislav Vakic: Kako smo Frenki i ja osvajali Srebrenicu" [Branislav Vakic: How Frenki and I Conquered Srebrenica], Svet, 13 November 1995, p. 8. Vakic was a paramilitary agent commander under Seselj, holds the rank of "warlord" (vojvoda), and is now a deputy in the Serbian Parliament. The lawyers for the indicted commander of the "Igor Markovic" units, better known as the Yellow Wasps paramilitary agent, Vojin Vuckovic Zuca, who claimed he had acted as an operative of the Serbian police and threatened to call specific police officials as witnesses, warned that the court "does not have enough valid proof, and, if it does offer sufficient valid proof, it will find itself in a situation in which they will reveal more than is desired." Srboljub Bogdanovic, "Repic i repovi" [Repic and the Tails], NIN, 2 December 1994, p. 23. Likewise, Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin and other Yugoslav Army officers, after being indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal, threatened to reveal documents that were in their possession and that would implicate Slobodan Milosevic if they were extradited to the Hague. Interview with Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin by Kresimir Meler, "Naredjenje je stiglo sa Dedinja" [The Order Came from Dedinje], Svijet (Ljubljana), 25 April 1996, p. 20.
22. . For a comprehensive review of the precedents set by the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, as well as other instances of prosecution of suspected war criminals. See Colby, "War Crimes," 23 Michigan Law Review 482 (1924); Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 465 International Conciliation (1950); Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (1970); Falk, Kolko & Lifton eds., Crimes of War (1971); Howard, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes," 21 Journal of Public Law 7 (1972); Friedman ed., The Law of War: A Documentary History (1972); Parks, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes," 62 Military Law Review 1 (1973); Note, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes," 82 Yale Law Journal 1274 (1973); Campbell, Jr., Military Command Liability for Grave Breaches of National and International Law: Absolute or Limited? (1974); Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial - Allied War Crimes Operations in the East 1945-49 (1979); and Weston D. Burnett, "Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra," 107 Military Law Review 71 (1985).
23. . See Statute of the Tribunal, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (February 1994 -- most recent updated version 18 January 1996) [hereinafter Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
24. . Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal, p. 5. The new military code, the Yugoslav Federal Defense Law, adopted in 1993, reaffirmed a commitment for the Yugoslav Army to be bound by international legal norms, "All citizens who in whatever capacity participate in armed combat would be bound to respect the rules of international military law" (Chapter I, Article 3).
25. . Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal, p. 7.
26. . Article 4 of the Statute of the Tribunal, p. 7. See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (entered into force on 12 January 1951).
27. . Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal, p. 9.
28. . Article 7, para 1 of the Statute of the Tribunal, p. 9.
29. . It appears that all persons, except for Zejnil Delalic and Zdravko Mucic, indicted by the Tribunal have been indicted in part on the basis of direct responsibility. See Indictment of Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic.
30. Article 7, para 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal, p. 9; and Report of the Secretary General issued pursuant to para 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, paras 53-57, pp. 213-14 (1993).
31. 4. See Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #1; Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2; Indictment of Milan Martic; Indictment of Ivica Rajic; Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin; Indictment of Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Fustar, and Dragan Kulundzija; Indictment of Zeljko Meakic; Indictment of Miroslav Kvocka, Dragoljub Prcac, Mladen Radic, and Momcilo Gruban; Indictment of Dragan Nikolic; Indictment of Blagoje Simic; Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski; and Indictment of Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic.
32. 55. Article 4, para 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal, p. 7.
33. 66. See Indictment of Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cesic, para 17, p. 3; Indictment of Zeljko Meakic, para 18, p. 5; Indictment of Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Fustar, and Dragan Kulundzija, para 12, p. 4; Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #1, para 33, p.12; and Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, para 51, p. 11.
34. 77. Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #1, para 41, p.16.37.22.
35. 88. Article 18, para 4 of the Statute of the Tribunal, pp. 17-19.
36. 99. Rule 47 (A) of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, p. 26. See also Review of the Indictment of Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic, by Judge Claude Jorda, March 1996 p. 2 [hereinafter Review of the Indictment of Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic]. After submission by the Prosecutor, a Judge of the Trial Chamber reviews the indictment, and if he determines that a prima facie case has been established by the Prosecutor, he confirms the indictment. Article 19 of the Statute of the Tribunal, p.19.
37. 00. Rule 89 (C) & (D) of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, p. 51.
38. 1. Rule 89 (A)) of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, p. 51.
39. 22. See infra, section IV.
40. 3. The individual had the authority to issue orders to them not to commit illegal acts and the authority to see that offenders were punished.
41. 4. Actual notice occurs when the accused individual sees the commission of the war crimes or is informed of their commission on a timely basis thereafter. Actual knowledge may be demonstrated either by direct or circumstantial evidence.
42. 55. Constructive notice occurs where the number of crimes is of such a great number that a reasonable person could come to no other conclusion than that the accused individual must have known of the offenses or of the existence of an understood and acknowledged routine for their commission.
43. 66. Imputed notice occurs when the accused individual should have known of the commission of the crime but displayed such serious personal dereliction as to constitute willful and wanton disregard of the possible consequences of his reckless behavior.
44. 77. See e.g., Review of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and Violations of the Law or Customs of War, Tribunal Document IT-95-18-I, by Judge Fouad Riad, p. 3 (16 November 1995) [hereinafter Review of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2], citing the involvement of JNA forces and Serbian paramilitary agents in the massacre at Srebrenica. See also Indictment of Slobodan Miljkovic, Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Stevan Todorovic, and Simo Zaric paras 6, 21-26, pp. 2, 4-6, charging Slobodan Miljkovic, the commander of the Gray Wolves paramilitary unit from Serbia, with numerous counts of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, and crimes against humanity.
45. 88. Among the main reports chronicling war crimes are: United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Document S/1994/674, especially Annex III. A; Special Forces, and Annex IV; The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing, 28 December 1994, internet edition at URL: gopher://gopher.rgc.apc.org7030/11/annexes; and the summary version, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Security Council document S/1994/674, 27 May 1994; Reports by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur for the United Nations, internet edition at URL: http://www.emse. fr/~maillot/HTML/PERSO/E/YUGO/MAZOWIECKI.CN4_1992-S-1-9html; United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina; A Staff Report, Washington, DC: GPO, August 1992; U.S. Department of State, Report on War Crimes in Former Yugoslavia. Supplemental United States Submission of Information to UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992) (eight reports); Human Rights Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in the Croatian Conflict, New York: Vol. 3, No. 14, September 1991; War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina: Bosanski Samac, New York: Vol. 6, No. 5, April 1994; Bosnia-Hercegovina; Sarajevo, New York: Vol. 6, No. 15, October 1994; Bosnia-Hercegovina; "Ethnic Cleansing" Continues in Northern Bosnia, New York: Vol. 6, No. 16, November 1994; Former Yugoslavia: War Crimes Trials in the Former Yugoslavia, New York, vol. 7, No. 10, June 1995; Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, vol. I, New York: August 1992, vol. II, New York: April 1993; Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: "You Have No Place Here": Abuses in Bosnian Serb-Controlled Areas, London: 1994; Bosnia-Herzegovina: Living for the Day: Forcible Expulsions from Bijeljina and Janja, London: 1994; U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Practices annual reports for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, and Croatia; and Tilman Zülch, ed., "Ethnische Säuberung" -- Völkermord für "Großserbien"; Ein Dokumentation ["Ethnic Cleansing" -- Genocide for "Greater Serbia"; Documentation], Zurich: Luchterhand Literaturverlag 1993.
46. 99. This symbiotic relationship calls to mind the operational procedure the Nazis used in occupied areas of Eastern Europe. In a studied division of labor, the Einsatzgruppen, the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei), and locally raised and often unruly light auxiliary forces such as the Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz in Poland, normally went into action once the more heavily-armed Wehrmacht combat forces had secured an area, thereby enabling the lighter forces to operate. Yitzhak Arad, Shmuel Krakowski, and Shmuel Spector, eds., The Einsatzgruppen Reports, New York: Holocaust Library 1989; Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men; Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, New York: Harper Perennial 1993; and Christian Jansen and Arno Weckbecker, Der "Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz" in Polen 1939/40, Munich: R. Oldenbourg 1992.
47. 00. Dobrila Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska; Iz kabineta ministra vojnoga [The Serbian Army; From the Minister of Defense's Office], Cacak: Marica i Tomo Spasojevic 1992, p. 144. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic was the administrative assistant to General Tomislav Simovic, the Serbian Minister of Defense, and published minutes of meetings held during her tenure. Serbia's Ministry of Defense was a headquarters organization, with no standing troops as such, but cooperated with Serbia's Territorial Defense in fielding and equipping reserve forces. This agency was abolished when Slobodan Milosevic established effective control over the regular Army.
48. 1. Ibid., p. 155.
49. 22. On the JNA's initial actions in Bosnia and the continuing links between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb Army, see Ed Vulliamy, "Serbian Lies World Chose to Believe," The Guardian (London), 29 February 1996, p. 12. See also Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Annex V; The Prijedor Report, para 187.
50. 3. For example, Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, who later became the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, has stated that, "after the withdrawal of the JNA, I stayed behind for a month and a half longer ... until the [Serb] Herzegovinians could be trained on the equipment which remained behind." Interview with Colonel General Perisic by Dada Vujasinovic, "Komandant zivota i smrti" [Commander of Life and Death], Duga (Belgrade), reprinted in Vesti (Frankfurt), 11 August 1993, p. 18.
51. 4. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, para 26, p. 9.
52. 55. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, paras 1-14, pp. 1-8. See also Blaine Harden, "Serbs Accused of '91 Croatia Massacre; U.S. Doctors Believe 200 Wounded Men Were Taken from Hospital and Shot," Washington Post, 26 January 1993, p. A-13. JNA sources gave the number of those who surrendered at Vukovar as 300 Croatian military personnel, 2000 "unarmed Croatian military," and 5000 civilians. Colonel Nebojsa Pavkovic, Narodna armija, 30 December 1991, p. 19. Other JNA sources have also mentioned 300 individuals from Croatia's Albanian community (whom the JNA labeled "Albanian mercenaries") taken in Vukovar's hospital who were not seen again. Nikola Ostojic, "Vukovar -- slobodan grad" [Vukovar -- A Free City], Narodna armija, 23 November 1991, p. 15.
53. 66. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, para 26, pp. 9-10.
54. 77. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, paras 15 and 17, p. 8.
55. 88. Confirmation of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, pp. 3-4; and Michael Dobbs and R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Gives Investigators New Evidence of Bosnian Serb War Crimes," Washington Post, 29 October 1995, p. A36.
56. 99. Confirmation of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, pp. 3-4. See also David Rohde, "Bosnia Muslims Were Killed by the Truckload," Christian Science Monitor, 2 October 1995, pp. 1, 6-7; and Angelo Ascoli, "Il mondo grida: Fermate il genocidio della Bosnia" [The World Cries: Stop the Genocide in Bosnia], Oggi (Milan), 26 July 1995, pp. 12-15. For the testimony of two of the perpetrators on the Serb side, see Renaud Girard, "Bosnie: la confession de Drazen, criminel de guerre" [Bosnia: Confession by Drazen, War Criminal], Le Figaro (Paris), 8 March 1996, pp. 1, 4, 26.
57. 00. Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Tribunal Document CC/PIO/026-E (16 November 1995).
58. 1. Confirmation of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, p. 2.
59. 22. Confirmation of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, p. 2.
60. 3. Confirmation of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, p. 2.
61. 4. Confirmation of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, p. 3.
62. 55. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Annex V; The Prijedor Report, para 276.
63. 66. Disgruntled veterans of this operation spoke about it after their return to Serbia. Milovan Brkic, "'Oluja' oduvala 'Pauka'" [The "Storm" Slammed into the "Spider"], Srpska rec, 11 September 1995, pp. 46-47.
64. 77. "Eindeutiger Beweis," [Unambiguous Proof], Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 23 October 1995, pp. 170-71.
65. 88. Quoted in M. M., "Bekstvo u mir," [Flight to Peace], Evropske Novosti, 3 August 1995, p. 5.
66. 99. Ed Vulliamy, "Serbs Run 'Secret Camps,'" The Guardian (London), 17 January 1996, p. 2. Refugees from Zepa who subsequently came to the United States complained that they had been beaten by prison guards while they were held in camps in Serbia. Joe Wyatt, "New Home, Hope," Amarillo Sunday News-Globe (Amarillo, Texas), 4 February 1996, pp. 11A and 17A.
67. 00. See Human Rights Watch -- Helsinki, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina: Bosanski Samac, pp. 9-10.
68. 1. Interview with Vojislav Seselj by C[vijetin] M[ilivojevic], "Spreman cekam hapsenje" [I Am Ready, Awaiting Arrest], Spona, 18 December 1993, p. 15.
69. 22. "Seselj: Ne plasim se Haga" [I Am Not Afraid of the Hague], Politika, 12 September 1993, p. 8.
70. 3. Seselj speaking in 1995 on the "Gates of Hell" episode from the BBC's "Death of Yugoslavia" series, 1995.
71. 4. Interview with Vakic, "Branislav Vakic: How Frenki and I Conquered Srebrenica," p. 8. Vakic, fulsome in his praise of the operational-level cooperation, stated, "I can say that those MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] fellows performed like heroes in combat, like true Chetniks. Our wish is that in case of war we again have such cooperation with the Army and police." Interview with Branislav Vakic by Srboljub Bogdanovic, "Odlozeni nokaut" [Postponed Knock-out], NIN, 10 March 1995, p. 15.
72. 55. For example, Ljubisa Petkovic, Seselj's principal commander on the ground early in the war, noted, "Frenki, as is probably true of the majority of MUP personnel, took part in combat operations along with our fighters and with the JNA." Quoted in Vasic and Svarm, "Chetnik Watergate," 15 November 1993, p. 24. Note that, "Simatovic" is sometimes found as "Stamatovic" in the Serbian press.
73. 66. See also Interview with Ulemek, "I Am a Serb and Proud of It," p. 20. There is other confirmation of the presence in Bosnia of forces from the Republic of Serbia, who directed operations of Arkan's forces, according to one of Arkan's staff officers, also present in the Banja Luka area at the time was a Colonel Filip, allegedly a member of the Republic of Serbia's Special Forces. Gordana Igric, "Arkan u Sajgonu" [Arkan in Saigon], NIN, 29 September 1995, p. 13. There were also reports of special police units from the Republic of Serbia's Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were deployed from Pec and Pristina to Banja Luka, and included Franko Simatovic, Deputy of Serbia's State Security. D. Petrovic and N. Todorovic, "Serb Republic Cannot Exist if People Leave," Nasa Borba, 20 October 1995, p. 3, in FBIS-EEU-95-204, 23 October 1995, pp. 33-34.
74. 77. D. Petrovic, "Badza u prvom 'izvlacenju' dobio najvisi moguci cin" [Badza on His First Try Achieved the Highest Possible Rank], Nasa Borba, 1 April 1996. Slobodan Miljkovic, who has been indicted for war crimes by the Tribunal, noted that he had been an SRS volunteer who belonged to a special unit operating in Eastern Croatia and that the "Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem Staff (Stab)," with Badza in charge, ordered them to transfer from the JNA to the local police after the January 1992 United Nations-brokered ceasefire, one of whose provisions was that only Serbian police, not the Army, would be allowed in the United Nations-protected zones. Interview with Slobodan Miljkovic by Dragan Alempijevic, "Ziv ne idem u Hag!" [I Will Not Go to the Hague Alive!], Telegraf, 27 September 1995, p. 10.
75. 88. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 298.
76. 99. Srpska vojska, p. 126. The staff of Serbia's Ministry of Defense had drafted the public appeal by which the Krajina's president, Goran Hadzic, requested help from "the Serbian people in Serbia." Srpska vojska, p. 61.
77. 00. For example, General Ratko Mladic, the chief of the Bosnian Serb Army's General Staff, concluded, "There is no need to set up paramilitary agents such as we had in 1992 and in part of 1993. Most consisted of 'great patriots' who never absented themselves from TV screens, as well as 'liberators' who were able to 'do it all.' However, their groups and paramilitary agents in general hovered around gold shops, banks, and well-stocked self-service stores, and there is not a single hill which they held or liberated. All they did was plunder well." Interview with General Mladic by [Colonel] Milovan Milutinovic, "Narodu ne treba pricati ono sto zeli cuti, vec mu treba reci istinu" [The People Must Not Be Told What They Want to Hear, But Rather the Truth], Srpska Vojska (Sarajevo, Serbian area), 25 June 1995, p. 11. Srpska Vojska is the Bosnian Serb Army's official organ. Again, Vojska, the Yugoslav Army's official organ, reported that, "In Foca, there are units which could be called paramilitary agents. Despite all their services, it is sad that some units do their duty only when they feel like it, and they most feel like it when they are near 'war booty.'" M. Petrovic, "Opasna primirja" [Dangerous Truces], Vojska (Belgrade), 7 October 1993, p. 12.
78. 1. Serbian paramilitary agent units were often attached directly to regular Army units for this specific purpose. For example, one Chetnik unit had been under the operational control of a battalion of the Bosnian Serb Army since 1992. The paramilitary agent unit's commander understood his mission thus: "We take care of relations with the Muslims. We only have one Muslim family left which does not want to leave.... Of course, we permitted those Muslims who lived in my area of responsibility and who expressed a desire to cross over to Alija [Izetbegovic] to do so." He was able to report that "this area is [now] ethnically clean." Chetnik Major Slavko Aleksic quoted in Javnost (Pale), reprinted in "Ljudi i vreme" [People and Time], Vreme, 31 May 1993, p. 54.
79. 22. Indictment of Slobodan Miljkovic, Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Stevan Todorovic, and Simo Zaric, para 5, p. 1. See also Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2.
80. 3. Indictment of Slobodan Miljkovic, Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Stevan Todorovic, and Simo Zaric, para 6, p. 2.
81. 4. For instance, while Vojislav Seselj blamed Arkan for the looting of Bijeljina, he sought credit for himself rather than Arkan for the takeover of the town. Interview with Vojislav Seselj by Robert Coban, "Vise me ne optuzuju za ratne zlocine" [They No Longer Accuse Me of War Crimes], Svet, 28 April 1995, p. 6. Vojislav Seselj, likewise, claimed that it was the White Eagles who were responsible for attacks on refugees for which Seselj's Chetniks had been blamed. Cited in Milos Vasic, "Noc kratkih nozeva" [Night of the Short Knives], Vreme, 8 November 1993, p. 9. Seselj also accused Arkan of looting in Slavonia in 1991. Interview with Vojislav Seselj by Radmila Dubljevic, "Izvinjenja nece biti" [There Will Be No Apology], Evropske Novosti, 29 December 1993, p. 7. Evropske Novosti is the European edition of the pro-government Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti. In 1993, Arkan sued Seselj for defamation of character in relation to such accusations. Perhaps feeling his case to be weak, Arkan subsequently directed his lawyer to withdraw his libel suit against Seselj, although he gave as his motive the need for unity and a sense of patriotism. S. S., "Arkan tuzio Seselja" [Arkan Sues Seselj], Evropske Novosti, 5 January 1994, p. 9; and Interview with Arkan's lawyer, Toma Fila, by Predrag Popovic, "Bez pardona" [Without Pardon], Svet, 18 March 1996, p. 13.
82. 55. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Add. 2 (Vol. I), Annex IV; The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing, paras 1-6.
83. 66. Ibid. Arkan (real name Zeljko Raznatovic) is a Serb from Montenegro. Born in Slovenia in 1952, he was the son of a Yugoslav Air Force officer. After a record of juvenile delinquency at home, he emigrated abroad, where he made a career of crime. There are outstanding warrants for his arrest for armed bank robbery, murder, car theft, and house robbery in several West European countries. Alleged also to have targeted dissidents abroad, he claimed to have acted at the behest of Yugoslavia's security services. Once back in Yugoslavia, he continued his violent behavior, but also established a significant business empire. He also organized the "Bullies," a hooligan fan club in support of the Belgrade "Red Flag" soccer team, The club served later as the nucleus for the SDG. U[ros] K[omlenovic], "Arkanzas" [Arkansas], NIN, 1 May 1992, p. 29. In 1990, while scouting areas in Croatia, he was arrested by the Croatian police for carrying arms, held in prison for some six months, and then released as either a good-will gesture or as part of some deal.
84. 77. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1019 (1995) on Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most, UN Security Council document S/1995/988, 27 November 1995, para 35.
85. 88. See Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Living for the Day: Forcible Expulsions from Bijeljina and Janja, London: 1994. Indicative of the type of operations which the SDG often undertook was the fact that, according to Arkan, in five months in 1991 the SDG had engaged in 87 combat actions in Croatia, but had suffered only five killed. This suggested that most of these were actions against civilians, although they might be masked as "combat" for public consumption. Milosevic, "The Cobra's Bite," p. 3. Typically, one of Arkan's lieutenants described the takeover of the town Bijeljina, in which Arkan's paramilitary agent took part, thus: "Bijeljina is a short, sweet, story. The job there was done in eight hours, with only two of ours wounded." Interview with Ulemek, "I Am a Serb and Proud of It," p. 19. This was not unusual. Captain Dragan, for example, had claimed that out of his paramilitary agent force of 1200, there had been only four killed in action. Interview "I Am Not a Rebel," p. 29. On the other hand, when there was significant fighting, the paramilitary agents often fared poorly, as was the case with the SPO's Serbian Guard on the Gospic front in Croatia. When they suffered a few killed, they beat a hasty retreat, much to the dismay of local Serb paramilitary agents. Simo Dubajic, "Manjak od trideset dugih cevi" [A Shortage of Thirty Rifle Barrels], Duga, 1-14 February 1992, p. 54. Simo Dubajic was a hardline leader of the initial Serb movement in Croatia and later became Chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Guard.
86. 99. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Vol. I, Annex III. A, Special Forces; para 105.
87. 00. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Vol. I, Annex III. A, Special Forces; para 74.
88. 1. One of the Russian mercenaries in Arkan's SDG, for example, recalled of his training prior to deployment, "The philosophy of brutality drummed into the heads of the fighters -- 'a Serbian patriot is merciless toward the enemy; he does not have the right to spare their children, women, or the aged' -- startled our [Russian] gunmen." Reported in Vostrukhov, "To Die in Yugoslavia," p. 3.
89. 22. According to Arkan, "My discipline is fifty times better than in the JNA.... That is one of the reasons for our success. This war is to be won through discipline." Interview with Arkan "Vec imam kucu na Dedinju" [I Already Have a House on Dedinje Hill], NIN, 13 December 1991, p. 12.
90. 3. According to Major Djurkovic, "After a time, the [Bosnian Serb] people's deputies Milan Teslic and Vojo Kupresanin expanded the Commission in the name of the [Bosnian Serb Parliament] Deputies' Club, and later the Commission was approved also by the Parliament of the Serbian Republic [of Bosnia]." Interview with Vojkan Djurkovic by Pero Simic, "Ja sam humanista" [I Am a Humanitarian], Intervju, 25 November 1994, p. 25. Djurkovic has denied that his activities constitute ethnic cleansing, "In effect, what is going on is a classic population migration or, in effect, respect for the population's freedom of movement. If an individual has exchanged his property, if he takes with him the members of his family, and if he goes to where he wants, then in no way is this ethnic cleansing." Ibid., p. 28. Djurkovic has insisted that, instead, he should be praised for allowing some people to depart for free if they could not pay the mandatory fee. He stated, "Travel costs an average of 100 dinars per person. Let me add, however, that our Commission had social-humanitarian feelings and transferred for free many who did not have the money. For example, the Gypsy community from Janja, which we moved for free." Ibid., p. 29. Reconfirming Arkan's command relationship over Major Djurkovic, Arkan promoted Djurkovic to Lieutenant Colonel of the SDG in October 1995, Gordana Lazarevic, "Karadzici, Pravoslavni seici od Bosne" [The Karadzices: Orthodox Sheikhs from Bosnia], Intervju, 3 November 1995, p. 6. See also Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Living for the Day: Forcible Expulsions from Bijeljina and Janja; and Bosnia-Hercegovina; "Ethnic Cleansing" Continues in Northern Bosnia, New York: Vol. 6, No. 16, November 1994, pp. 33-34.
91. 4. Reported by Nicholas Burns, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, 20 October 1995. According to a UN Security Council report, Arkan's men allegedly were active in Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and other towns during a campaign lasting several months; much of this was confirmed in Report to the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1019 (1995), paras 44, 49-53, 69-73. According to this document, "The presence of paramilitary forces, in particular units of Arkan and, to a lesser degree, of Seselj, was observed in the whole area during the period described." It accused Arkan's forces of "harassment, killing, and rape, and provoking mass expulsions;" para 73.
92. 55. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Vol. I, Annex III. A, Special Forces, paras 53 and 54. See also paras 34-36, 42, 53-54, 57-58, 108, 130, and 133. One of Seselj's men recounts how they implemented ethnic cleansing in the Sarajevo area. Nebojsa Jevric, "Krivci iz plavo-crveno-sivog rukava" [The Culprits with the Blue-Red-Gray Sleeves], Duga, 25 June-8 July 1994, pp. 25-26. See also Human Rights Watch -- Helsinki, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina: Bosanski Samac, pp. 7-8.
93. 66. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Vol. I, Annex III. A, Special Forces, paras 10 and 11. See also paras 34, 35, and 133. The White Eagles were also known for executing prisoners. As their combat commander, Dragoslav Bokan, noted, "I feel sorry for the young Ustase [Croatians] when we take them away to be executed." p. 46. Interview with Dragoslav Bokan by Dada Vujasinovic, "Firer mekog srca" [Fuhrer with a Soft Heart], Duga, 29 March-11 April 1992, p. 46.
94. 77. From the minutes of a session of the SPO, "'Osma sednica' Srpskog pokreta obnove; Pokusaj samoubistva" [The "Eighth Session" of the Serbian Renewal Movement; An Attempt at Suicide], Srpska rec, 10 May 1993, p. 21. As she amplified at the session, "There are no Ustase knives there [in Gacko]. There was no battle there, no Serbs had been massacred.... You have not presented a single comparable example of a similar massacre of the Serbs as has occurred [to the Muslims] in Nevesinje, Trebinje, or Foca."
95. 88. On July 25 1995, Milan Martic was indicted by the Tribunal for ordering the launch of Orkan rockets into three Croatian cities, including Zagreb. See Indictment of Milan Martic.
96. 99. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Annex V; The Prijedor Report; para 305.
97. 000. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Annex V; The Prijedor Report; paras 159, 197, 276, and 305. See also Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, vol. II, pp. 80-81. They were also active in the Derventa area of Bosnia, R. Vujatovic, "Probijaju obruc" [They Are Breaking Through the Encirclement], Politika Ekspres (Belgrade), 19 June 1992, p. 7.
98. 01. U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Practices 1993, internet edition at URL: gopher:// dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/OF-1%3A6197%3ABosnia %20%26%20Herzegovina.
99. 202. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Annex VI; Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo, especially para 13.
100. 03. Testimony in a briefing "Ethnic Cleansing and Atrocities in Bosnia" to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate foreign relations Committee, 9 August 1995; at internet URL: http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/bosnia_handout.html. The public report on the internet included samples of satellite imagery highlighting the potential of this type of compelling evidence as part of an all-source information package for such cases.
101. 04. U.S. Department of State, Croatia Human Rights Practices 1993, Washington, DC, 31 January 1994, internet edition at URL: gopher://dosfan.lib. uic.edu:70/OF-1%3A6197%3ACroatia.
102. 505. Given the complexity of the relationship between direct responsibility and command responsibility, there is some confusion in international law whether the "effective control" over forces responsible for the commission of war crimes imputes liability under the approach of direct responsibility or command responsibility. The limited confusion between direct responsibility and command responsibility of an accused for war crimes committed by those under his effective control is not significant to the outcomes of this study, since the question is more of a technical legal concern of whether this responsibility is derived from article 7(1) or 7(3) of the statute. Consistent with what it believes is the current practice of the Tribunal, this study has chosen to place the issue of such responsibility under article 7(1). See Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski.
103. 606. Milan Martic was indicted both under article 7(1) for directly ordering an unlawful attack against the civilian population of Zagreb, (for which the Tribunal has specific evidence), and separately under article 7(3) on the basis of command responsibility for knowing or having reason to know that a subordinate was about to commit and did commit a war crime. Although the primary weight of the case against Milan Martic rests on the evidence of his ordering the unlawful attack, it is notable that the Tribunal additionally charged him with command responsibility. Indictment of Milan Martic, paras 15-18, pp. 2-3. See also Indictment of Ivica Rajic.
104. 707. Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski, charges at paras 23, p. 6, and counts at para 35, p. 10.
105. 808. Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski, charges at paras 24-25, p. 6, and counts at para 36, p. 11.
106. 909. Specifically, Judge Fouad Riad of the Court stated:
Considering it appears from the relevant parts of the record that the soldiers who carried out this operation were under the authority of Captain Miroslav Radic, Major Veselin Sljivancanin and Colonel Mile Mrksic, all of whom were members of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). By virtue of their position of authority, these three individuals allegedly ordered, permitted, or participated in the above described acts.
Confirmation the Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, by Judge Fouad Riad, p. 1 (7 November 1995) [hereinafter Confirmation the Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin]. See also Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, paras 23 and 24, p. 9, wherein the indictment alleges that Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin are criminally responsible both on the basis of individual responsibility as provided in Article 7(1) of the Tribunal Statute, and on the basis of command responsibility provided in Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute. In the preliminary facts section of the indictment, it appears that specific evidence of direct orders to commit war crimes is available only for Veselin Sljivancanin, and that the indictment infers the ordering, planning, instigation, or aiding and abetting of war crimes by Mile Mrksic and Miroslav Radic on the basis of their positions of authority. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, para 9, p. 2, and paras 15 and 17, p. 8.
107. 010. Indictment of Djordje Djukic, paras 2-3, pp. 2-3.
108. 11. Review of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, p. 3.
109. 212. Review of the Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, p. 3. See also the indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic on the basis of both direct responsibility and command responsibility for crimes against humanity. Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #1, para 33, p. 12.
110. 13. Borisav Jovic, Poslednji dani SFRJ [The Last Days of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], Belgrade: Politika 1995, pp. 349, 370-71, 387, 389, 394, 420.
111. 14. Jovic, Poslednji dani SFRJ, p. 349.
112. 515. Interview with Colonel Sljivancanin, "The Order Came from Dedinje," p. 20.
113. 616. Ibid., p. 21. Sljivancanin estimates that about 1600 prisoners were executed over a three-day period at Vukovar. Earlier, Sljivancanin had claimed that he had registered and ensured that all prisoners had returned safely home and claimed that perhaps it was the Croatian government which killed them when they arrived home. Interview with then-Lieutenant Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin by S. Djokic, "Pothranjivanje mrznje" [Stirring Up Hate], Vojska, 14 October 1993, p. 9.
114. 717. Seselj speaking in 1995 on the "Gates of Hell" episode from the BBC's "Death of Yugoslavia" series, 1995.
115. 818. Interview with Colonel Sljivancanin, "The Order Came from Dedinje," p. 20.
116. 919. Djordje Djukic was indicted for the direct commission of war crimes in Bosnia on the basis of his membership on the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army, which was responsible for the planning, preparation, and execution of the Bosnian Serb Army operations in Bosnia. Djordje Djukic's responsibilities specifically related to the Bosnian Serb Army's logistical operations, including regulating the requirements for logistic supplies, proposing appointments of personnel, issuing orders regarding the supply of material and regulating its transfer, and making decisions on the removal of material and technical equipment from the stocks of the Bosnian Serb Army. Indictment of Djordje Djukic, paras 2-3, pp. 2-3.
117. 020. Milenko Vucetic, "Prolog i epilog" [Prologue and Epilogue], Srpska rec, 24 May 1993, p. 8.
118. 21. Interview with Radmilo Bogdanovic by Nenad Stefanovic, "Logistika sluzbe za volju naroda" [The Logistics of Service for the People's Will], Duga, 7-20 January 1995, p. 23.
119. 222. Interview with General Tomislav Simovic by Bogoljub Pejcic, "Bogohulno je cekati na prisilnu mobilizaciju" [It Is Blasphemy to Wait for Compulsory Mobilization], Srpska rec, 25 November 1991, p. 18.
120. 23. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 60. In case of high-priority information from the front, General Simovic would also contact Slobodan Milosevic directly, even when he was abroad, in one case at a conference in the Hague. Srpska vojska, p. 110.
121. 24. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 61.
122. 525. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, pp. 98-99.
123. 626. According to an unnamed U.S. Department of Defense official, "We have unequivocal intelligence that Milosevic has his hand in the cookie jar.... It's as good as what we had on the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis." Karsten Prager, "Message from Serbia," Time, 17 July 1995, p. 26.
124. 727. Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski, paras 16 and 30, pp. 4 and 7-8.
125. 828. These positions included the municipal president of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the municipality of Busovaca, and an ex officio position on the Presidency of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski, paras 8-9, p. 3.
126. 929. Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski paras 10 and 16, p. 3-4.
127. 030. Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski para 14 p. 4.
128. 31. Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, para 34, pp. 7-8. As President of the party he was the most powerful official in the party, with responsibility for representing the party, coordinating its work, and ensuring the realization of its tasks and goals. Ibid.
129. 232. Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, paras 35-36, p. 8.
130. 33. Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski paras 11 and 17, p. 3-4.
131. 34. Indictment of Radovan Karadzic Ratko Mladic #2, para 38, p. 8. See also Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #1, para 7, p.2.
132. 535. The population ratio is itself indicative of the relationship: in 1991, Serbia (including Kosovo and Voyvodina) had 9.8 million people, while Montenegro had only 615,000. Indicative of the control that Serbia can exercise over its partner in the Federation, in 1995, the head of Montenegro's secret service, Bosko Bojovic, and two of his top aides simply transferred to the Republic of Serbia secret service, despite causing a public stir and embarrassing the Montenegrin leadership. Marko Lopusina, "Dva oka u neocesljanoj glavi" [Two Eyes in an Uncombed Head], Intervju, 4 August 1995, p. 25.
133. 636. According to Borisav Jovic, "Maintaining the continuity of Yugoslavia gives Serbia and Montenegro great advantages in their future functioning as states within the international community." If Serbia were independent and wanted recognition, he added, "this would lead it to a very unenviable international situation," in which Serbia would be "blackmailed and humiliated in a manner which would act destructively against the unity and survival of its present territory." In particular, according to Borisav Jovic, if Serbia sought accreditation as a new state the international community would have sought the same rights for the Albanians and Hungarians in Serbia as for the Serbs in Croatia. Interview with Borisav Jovic by Teodor Andjelic and Ivica Dacic, "Samo smeloscu i uspesnoscu protiv corsokaka opozicije" [Only with Daring and Success against the Dead-End of the Opposition], Epoha (Belgrade), 25 February 1992, p. 12. Ivica Dacic, who later became the official spokesman and also a Vice-President of the SPS, reinforced these points, "The reasons for the creation of a third Yugoslavia also lie in the possibility that if Serbia established itself as a state it would be subjected to strong international pressure to split up in practice its territory into even more parts than the three former ones [Serbia, Kosovo, and Voyvodina] through the granting of special status to the ethnic minorities." Ivica Dacic, "Prvi Ustav trece Jugoslavije" [The First Constitution of the Third Yugoslavia], Epoha, 7 April 1992, p. 13.
134. 737. Dacic, "The First Constitution of the Third Yugoslavia," p. 11.
135. 838. Interview with Milo Djukanovic by L[uka] M[icetic], "Farsa od savezne vlade" [A Farce of a Federal Government], NIN, 18 August 1995, p. 21. Significantly, Premier Djukanovic had to deal directly with Slobodan Milosevic to resolve some contentious issues with the Federal government, not with Federal President Zoran Lilic. Ibid., p. 22.
136. 939. As one well-informed source assessed it, "Everything remains -- Yugoslavia, the federal agencies, [the federal] Parliament, [the federal] government, the President of the Republic [of Yugoslavia] -- but only on one condition, that it be known that it is Slobodan Milosevic who is the boss in the house." Djukic, "Between Glory and Anathema," p. 254.
137. 040. According to a former employee of the Security Service and an expert on Yugoslav security matters, Andreja Savic. Interview by Marko Lopusina and Momir Ilic, "Savezna policija je uhodila Srbiju" [The Federal Police Spied on Serbia], Intervju, 28 November 1994, p. 29.
138. 41. The Republic of Serbia's police, with 40,000 personnel at the time, was far larger than the federal police, with 2,000 personnel in Serbia. Blaine Harden, "Serbian Police Seize Ministry in Belgrade Power Struggle," Washington Post, 20 October 1993, pp. A27 and A31. It was Mihalj Kertes who, as the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, transformed the federal police (SSUP) into Serbia's MUP and who republicanized the federal secret service. Marko Lopusina, "'Junaci epohe;' Dosije Mihalj Kertes" ["The Heroes of Our Time"; The Mihalj Kertes Dossier], Intervju, 19 August 1994, pp. 18 and 21. Vukasin Jokanovic, the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs, described the process of republicanization of the Federal security apparatus, "The situation necessitated that the ministries of internal affairs in the member republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, after the secession and war on part of the former Yugoslav territory, in accordance with the republic laws adopted, take over the largest share of security matters on their territories." Interview with Vukasin Jokanovic by Jelica Rocenovic, "Kosovo -- Samo u Srbiji" [Kosovo -- Only in Serbia], Intervju, 1 March 1996, p. 7.
139. 242. Interview with Milo Djukanovic by Luka Miceta, "Crnogorski model" [Montenegrin Model], NIN, 15 September 1995, p. 23.
140. 43. Quoted in "Kljuc drze republike" [The Republics Hold the Key], Vesti, 2 July 1993, p. 7.
141. 44. Interview with Vukasin Jokanovic by Ljiljana Habjanovic-Djurovic, "Imena su kod nadleznih organa" [The Authorities with Jurisdiction Have the Names], Duga, 4-17 February 1995, p. 13. No doubt, a lack of desire to bring everything to light in the murky financing of paramilitary agents was also a factor limiting the probe.
142. 645. Jovic, Poslednji dani SFRJ, p. 453. Branko Kostic, the Federation vice-president, felt compelled to counter the widespread (and reasonable) perception within the JNA's ranks that Milosevic was behind the mass retirements, but he only ended up reconfirming that Slobodan Milosevic did have a hand, after all, as a member of the Supreme Defense Council. According to the Army press, Kostic wanted to "deny stories according to which the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, and General Vuk Obradovic, supposedly, were behind these personnel changes. In Kostic's words, such "'interpretations' are completely arbitrary.... The decision on the retirements was taken by the Presidency of the SFRY, in agreement with the Supreme Military Council, of which both Slobodan Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic, as Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro, are members." "Penzionisanje generala ne treba dramatizovati" [One Should Not Overdramatize the Retirement of the Generals], Narodna armija, 14 May 1992, p. 4. Gajic-Glisic, however, notes that Slobodan Milosevic had already discussed with General Tomislav Simovic, at least by January 1991, the need to retire certain JNA generals. Srpska vojska, p. 302. Additional officers have been retired subsequently to ensure a more loyal Yugoslav Army.
146. In fact, Serbia's Parliament made public calls for reservists in Serbia to report to the JNA during the war with Croatia.
143. 747. For example, the Yugoslav Army's spokesman, Colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, who had criticized in public the condition of the Yugoslav Army, was ousted at the request of Slobodan Milosevic, who telephoned the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, with that order while Colonel Stojadinovic was in the office. According to Colonel Stojadinovic, all General Perisic responded during the conversation was "Yes, yes, yes." Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, Film koji je zapalio Jugoslaviju [The Movie Which Set Yugoslavia on Fire], Belgrade: Studio Design, 1995, p. 184.
144. 848. Speech by Zoran Lilic, "Vojska za mir i bezbednost zemlje" [An Army for Peace and for the Country's Security], Vojska, 30 June 1994, p. 7. As of mid-1994, twelve sessions of the Supreme Defense Council had been held. Ibid., p. 6. The Council, exercising its oversight function, has recorded explicitly its satisfaction that "the Army of Yugoslavia is successfully implementing the decisions of the Supreme Defense Council." "Za mirno resenje sukoba u BiH" [For a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina], Vojska, 18 August 1994, p. 3.
145. 949. A partial list of confirmed sessions of the Supreme Defense Council which Slobodan Milosevic attended in person includes: 12 and 14 June 1993, "Podmladjivanje generalskog kadra" [Making The General Officer Corps Younger], Vojska, 22 July 1993, p. 4; 23 and 25 August 1993, "Penzionisana 42 generala" [42 Generals Retired], Vojska, 2 September 1993, p. 4; 11 June 1993, "Vojska stednjom doprinosi stabilizaciji" [The Army through Savings Contributes to Stabilization], Vojska, 14 July 1994, p. 3; 9 August 1994, "Za mirno resenje sukoba u BiH" [For a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina], Vojska, 18 August 1994, p. 3; 2 November 1994, "Borbena gotovost primerena potrebama zemlje" [Combat Readiness Suitable to the Country's Needs], Vojska, 10 November 1994, p. 4; undated, "Vojni budzet" [Military Budget], Vojska, 15 December 1994, p. 4; undated January 1995, "Priprema se zakon o amnestiji" [The Amnesty Law Is Being Prepared], Vojska, 25 January 1995, p. 4; 15 February 1995, "Razmatrana vojnopoliticka situacija" [The Political-Military Situation Is Examined], Vojska, 23 February 1995, p. 4; 13 June 1995, "Postavljenja i unapredjenja" [Postings and Promotions], Vojska, 15 June 1995, p. 4; undated March 1996, "SRJ dosledna u realizovanju obaveza" [The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is Consistent in Fulfilling its Obligations], Vojska, 28 March 1996, p. 4; and 23 April 1996, Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 23 April 1996, FBIS-EEU-96-080, 26 April 1996, p. 53.
146. 050. Lj. Bascarevic, "Predsenik Republike Srbije posetio Kasarnu 'Zvecan'" [The President of the Republic of Serbia Visited the Zvecan Barracks], Vojska, 27 July 1995, p. 4.
147. 51. Slobodan Milosevic "had the power" (p. 244); "he had full power" and "great power" (p. 123); Serbia is "a country where Slobodan Milosevic is the sole institution" (p. 280). Milosevic has also ensured that potential competitors for power within the system have been removed (p. 304). Djukic, "Between Glory and Anathema."
148. 252. Cited in an interview with Slobodan Milosevic's biographer, Slavoljub Djukic, by Sava Dautovic, "Slobodan Milosevic: I pocaga i noz" [Slobodan Milosevic: Both Loaf of Bread and Knife], NIN, 14 October 1994, p. 30. Given his hold on power, the focus of decision-making within the system will follow Slobodan Milosevic personally. Thus, if Slobodan Milosevic were to decide to become President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia one day, since he is restricted by the Constitution to only two terms as President of Serbia (Article 86), power would simply move to the federal level to accommodate his new position.
149. 53. As Slobodan Milosevic's wife, Mira Markovic, noted of her husband's original selection of Milan Panic as Premier and impending removal, "Milan Panic's nomination and selection to be Premier of the Yugoslav government was motivated by the hope that by his personality or his activity he could help lift the sanctions.... If his personality and activity do not get the sanctions lifted for us, then I do not see any motive for his presence on the Yugoslav political scene." Interview with Mira Markovic by Aleksandar Jankovic, "Ja cu uvek biti na levoj strani" [I Will Always Be on the Left], Student (Belgrade), October 1992, reprinted in Mira Markovic, Odgovor, [Reply], Belgrade: BMG, 1993, p. 203. As one of Dobrica Cosic's advisers, Svetozar Stojanovic, noted, it was Slobodan Milosevic and his top officials who insisted that Dobrica Cosic become Federal President. Autoritet bez vlasti [Authority without Power], Belgrade: Filip Visnjic, 1993, p. 6. As it was, Slobodan Milosevic was able to impose his candidate, Vladislav Jovanovic, as Federal Foreign Minister (as well as being the Republic of Serbia's Foreign Minister) over Milan Panic's objections. Ibid., p. 9.
150. 54. One of the best accounts of the power struggle is found in Djukic, "Between Glory and Anathema," pp. 235-284. Illustrative of the power that Slobodan Milosevic wielded is the fact that he controlled even Dobrica Cosic's official car, driver, and security officers. Ibid., p. 291. The Federal President and Premier were also confirmed by the Milosevic-dominated Parliament.
151. 555. As noted by Slavoljub Djukic "Zoran Lilic had all the honors of the President of the joint state [of Yugoslavia], but it was the Serbian president who governed Yugoslavia." "Between Glory and Anathema," p. 304.
152. 656. Interview with Dobrica Cosic by Milan Nikolic, "Pogled na buducnost" [A Look into the Future], Milan Nikolic, ed., Sta je stvarno rekao Dobrica Cosic [What Dobrica Cosic Really Said], Belgrade: Draganic, 1995, p. 263.
153. 757. Ibid., p. 266.
154. 858. Ibid., p. 266.
155. 959. Interview with Milo Djukanovic, "Milosevic Rules Only Serbia," Vesti (Bad Vilbel, Germany), 9 April 1996, p. 19; FBIS-EEU-96-074, 16 April 1996, p. 71.
156. 060. The flavor of Slobodan Milosevic's long-established central role in decision-making in Belgrade is well illustrated by someone who dealt with him extensively. Former U. S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador; A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, pp. 2-20.
157. 61. "Afirmacija politike mira" [The Establishment of the Policy of Peace], Vojska, 2 November 1995, p. 5.
158. 262. Belgrade Tanjug in English, 19 June 1995, FBIS-EEU-95-118, 20 June 1995, p. 48.
159. 63. The Yugoslav Federal President, Zoran Lilic, has been notably absent from any of these negotiations. The joint document agreed to between the Bosnian Serbs and Slobodan Milosevic in August 1995 recognized Slobodan Milosevic as the head of a delegation that would negotiate a peace for the Bosnian Serbs. Significantly, according to Point 5 of the agreement, Slobodan Milosevic was empowered to determine the structure of the negotiating team representing Yugoslavia. "Pet tacaka" [Five Points], Vreme, 4 September 1995, p. 8.
160. 64. As reported by a Bosnian Serb participant, in Jovan Janjic, "Aparat u kvaru" [The Machine Is Broken], NIN, 27 October 1995, p. 17.
161. 565. Michael Dobbs, "After Marathon Negotiations, An Extra Mile to Reach Peace," Washington Post, 23 November 1995, p. A32.
162. 666. Mihajlo Markovic, in fact, complained in an open letter that Slobodan Milosevic had bypassed the ruling SPS's own Central Council in dismissing the individuals and had not bothered to respect even the formalities of a debate within the party body as Tito had allowed under such circumstances. "Akademik Mihajlo Markovic: Otvoreno pismo Glavnom odboru Socijalisticke partije Srbije" [Academician Mihajlo Markovic: Open Letter to the Central Council of the Socialist Party of Serbia], Telegraf, 19 December 1995, p. 4. As the SPS's leader in Serbia's Parliament noted of Slobodan Milosevic's key personal role, "Up to now, we have won the elections because of the consistent fulfillment of our platform and because of our president's policy." Interview with Gorica Gajevic, "Rano je za izbore" [It Is Too Early for Elections], NIN, 27 October 1995, p. 11.
163. 767. Djukic describes the high degree of control which Slobodan Milosevic enjoys over the SPS, with his elimination of potential rivals. "Between Glory and Anathema," pp. 304-05. This is also confirmed by Stojanovic, Autoritet bez vlasti, p. 18.
164. 868. Interview with Zoran Cicak, "Obnovicemo bratsvo i jedinstvo" [We Will Renew Brotherhood and Unity], Intervju, 2 September 1994, p. 18.
165. 069. As Mrs. Gajic-Glisic assessed, "At every session of the government, either the Minister [General Simovic], or his assistants had to be present, and on everything that was discussed there it was necessary to get the SPS's opinion beforehand." Srpska vojska, p. 127.
170. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 127.
166. 71. Typical of the close ties between the SPS and the SK-PJ is the fact that the SK-PJ and the SPS both share the building -- owned by the SK-PJ -- of the former Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Even a member of the JUL Politburo is at the same time a member of the SPS. Interview with Slobodan Cerovic by Vanja Bulic, "Svi ljudi na istoj ulici" [All the People on the Same Street], Duga, 27 May-9 June 1995, p. 11. A former senior official of the SK-PJ confirmed that Milosevic's wife, Mira Markovic, is the key link in the close SK-PJ relationship with the SPS. Interview with General Stevan Mirkovic (Retired) by Sandra Petrusic, "Mira uzela sve" [Mira Took Everything], Srpska rec, 16-30 August 1993, p. 47.
167. 272. Asked whether he could see any difference between the SK-PJ and JUL, Dragomir Draskovic, the former President of the SK-PJ answered, "Up to now, I too have not detected any difference." Interview with Dragomir Draskovic by Zoran Stanic, "Hteo sam da JUL bude crveno vino, ali su ga oni razblazili vodom!" [I Wanted JUL to Be Red Wine, But They Have Weakened It with Water!], Svet, 25 December 1995, p. 6.
168. 73. As noted in an interview with the President of JUL, Ljubisa Ristic, who is essentially a figurehead, "There is no mystery whatsoever about her [Mira Markovic's] role in JUL. She is JUL's moving spirit. It is she who invented it and who mobilized people to act as a movement." Interview with Ljubisa Ristic by Vladan Dinic, "Ni Milosevic ni Tudjman ne znaju tacno sta se desilo u Krajini i oko nje" [Neither Milosevic nor Tudjman Knows Exactly What Happened in the Krajina and Surrounding It], Telegraf, 23 August 1995, p. 13. Typically, JUL is given extensive access to Serbia's television.
169. 74. Significantly, the SPS tolerates dual membership in JUL for its followers, thereby indicating a close relationship also with the broader front organization. When asked whether some members of the SPS were also members of JUL, the SPS's spokesman noted that since JUL was a coalition of leftist parties, "then, of course, among them are individuals who belong to the SPS, since the SPS is also a party of the Left." Interview with Ivica Dacic by Slobodan Savic, "Pukotine u jedinstvenom nastupu Srba" [Cracks in the Serbs' United Front], Intervju, 21 April 1995, p. 8. When JUL, in 1995, celebrated the anniversary of its founding, Slobodan Milosevic and other officials of the Republic of Serbia government were prominently in attendance at the festivities.
170. 575. Zoran Cicak, then spokesman for JUL, noted that his membership in JUL gave him ready access to information from the police and Army, since many Communists were still serving in the ranks of both forces, "As a politician, I am engaged in collecting, collating, and using information.... As far as the police is concerned, they have a lot of information because of the nature of their work. I can always get the information I need. It is simple; in that service, as well, there are Communists and leftists and it is completely natural for them to help me. Incidentally, that also holds true for the Army." Interview with Zoran Cicak by Nenad Stefanovic, "Tajna crvene ruke" [Secret of the Red Hand], Duga, 4-17 February 1995, p. 17.
171. 676. For instance, Slobodan Milosevic used paramilitary agents to coerce the resignation of more moderate Serb leaders who, as was the case in Croatia, were interested in working out a deal peacefully. Vojislav Vukcelic, one of founders of the Serb nationalist movement in Croatia, claims that, while Radio Belgrade attacked them, Vojislav Seselj and Milan Paroski arrived in Baranja in mid-April 1991 along with Stanko Cvijan, Serbia's Minister for Serbs Outside of Serbia, to threaten the moderates. Interview with Vojislav Vukcelic by Ruzica Ranitovic-Jovic, "Vlak ce proci kroz Knin" [The Train Will Pass through Knin], Srpska rec (Belgrade), 15 August 1994, pp. 26-27. Of course, the paramilitary agents could also be used for more mundane activities with which the Republic of Serbia did not want to be seen as involved officially, such as the fuel deliveries to the Bosnian Serb Army by Arkan's paramilitary agent. This was reported by a Russian mercenary working for Arkan, who escorted such convoys. Evgeniy Vostrukhov, "Umeret' v Yugoslaviy" [To Die in Yugoslavia], Izvestiya (Moscow), 25 November 1992, p. 3.
172. 777. Such a desire to obscure any linkages in itself suggested an implicit acknowledgment on Slobodan Milosevic's part that the paramilitary agents' activities were beyond the pale of international legal norms and something better hidden from view.
173. 878. Arkan and his SDG paramilitary agent offer a case study that is especially illustrative of Slobodan Milosevic's involvement and responsibility in this arena. In many ways, the SDG is what might be described as Slobodan Milosevic's "household paramilitary agent," a semi-official force with direct ties to the Serbian government and good relations, which Arkan has maintained until the present (as of early 1996). Arkan has been anxious from the early days to emphasize that he is not a rogue element, but that his paramilitary agent has been subordinated to the Serbian authorities, and to Slobodan Milosevic in particular. As Arkan stressed, "Let us understand each other. We are not talking about just any paramilitary units. Every member of those units must, first of all, be responsible to the Serbian people and must respect the Parliament and the President of the Republic." Arkan quoted in Slobodan Milosevic (a namesake of President Milosevic), "'Ubod kobre' rusi stara gledanja" [The Cobra's Bite Destroys Old Ways of Looking at Things], Ilustrovana Politika (Belgrade), 4 November 1991, p. 3. Ilustrovana Politika is a state-run magazine.
174. 979. Aleksandar Ciric, "Svi smo mi dobrovoljci" [We Are All Volunteers], Vreme, 31 May 1993, p. 21.
175. 080. Interview with Major General Tomislav Radovanovic, chief of the JNA's legal branch, as quoted in Stanoje Jovanovic, "I dobrovoljci vojna lica" [Volunteers are Part of the Army Too], Narodna armija, 22 December 1991, p. 14.
176. 81. Interview with Jovan Glamocanin by Vesna Bjekic, "Kako dokazati nevinost" [How to Prove One's Innocence], Spona (Frankfurt), 14 October 1993, p. 14.
177. 282. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, para 26, p. 9.
178. 83. Speech by Mihajlo Markovic at the SPS Central Council, 24 August 1995, "Telegraf provalio izvode sa sednice Glavnog Odbora SPS" [Telegraf Got Its Hands on Extracts from a Session of the SPS Central Council], Telegraf, 12 December 1995, p. 5. He compared the Serbian "volunteers" to those which China used during the Korean War.
179. 84. Interview with Seselj, "I Am Ready, Awaiting Arrest," p. 15.
180. 885. Interview with Dragoslav Bokan by Dejan Anastasijevic, "Cerupanje orlova" [Plucking the Eagles' Feathers], Vreme, 22 November 1993, p. 20.
186. It was General Tomislav Simovic's office which put out the call for volunteers to report to the municipality authorities for inclusion in Serbia's Territorial Defense. Some paramilitary agent leaders, however, such as Captain Dragan, refused to accept what they thought were low ranks being offered in the Territorial Defense. Captain Dragan's letter to General Simovic to that effect was published. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 104. Asked about the existence of paramilitary agents, Radmilo Bogdanovic, Serbia's former Minister of the Interior, noted, "Paramilitary formations existed at one time but, later, that was regularized by the Defense Law, so that the personnel were classified as volunteers and were within the Territorial Defense system on the territory of the former Croatia, and also within the organization of the Serbian Republic [of Bosnia] Army. I don't want to talk any further about that!" Interview with Radmilo Bogdanovic by Biljana Sacic, "Milicije nikad nije dovoljno" [There Are Never Enough Policemen], Intervju, 23 December 1994, p. 16.
187. For example, Radovan Stojcic Badza was photographed with Arkan in front of the putative Territorial Defense facility, which a sign designates as the "Center for Special Training of Volunteers from the Serbian Region of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem; Erdut," a Serb-controlled area of Croatia. The photo, taken by Matija Kokovic, was published in Aleksandar Knezevic, "Najbolji policajci, najgora policija" [The Best Policemen, the Worst Police], Intervju, 2 September 1994, p. 12. The photo, however, includes the ultra-nationalist Russian writer Edvard Limonov and probably dates from December 1991, when he visited the area.
188. As noted above in section IV, this form of direct responsibility is more linear than command responsibility, which will be discussed below, as it infers that the Republic of Serbia forces and agencies which aided and abetted the commission of war crimes did so upon the instruction of Slobodan Milosevic.
181. 989. Press Release, General Djukic Indicted, 1 March 1996, p. 1; and Indictment of Djordje Djukic.
182. 090. Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #1, para 41, p. 16.
183. 91. Indictment of Slobodan Miljkovic, Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Stevan Todorovic, and Simo Zaric, para 5, p. 1.
184. 292. It is unlikely that the act of permitting others to commit a war crimes properly falls under command responsibility and not aiding and abetting, since it does not appear that those indicted actually exercised authority and control over the forces and individuals which were permitted to enter the detention sites and commit war crimes. Similarly, it does not properly fall within complicity-based responsibility for genocide as the crime of genocide was not alleged in the Simic indictment.
185. 93. Interview with Ulemek, "I Am a Serb and Proud of It," p. 19. Arkan played a similar role again when he bused in his supporters, in the guise of sports fans, to a soccer match in the Sanjak in 1993 to intimidate the Muslim community there. T. Vukovic, "Poslanik po izboru 'Delija'" [Deputy Chosen by the "Bullies"], Vesti, 20 October 1993, p. 7.
186. 94. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, vol. I, pp. 82-84.
187. 595. Vladan Vasilijevic, "Zlocin po meri vlasti" [Crime According to a Government Yardstick], Vreme, 15 November 1993, p. 29. Vojislav Seselj was also useful at the strategic level to Slobodan Milosevic, who used him to oust Milan Panic and Dobrica Cosic from office. Djukic, "Between Glory and Anathema," pp. 254-55, 266, 277-78.
188. 696. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, vol. I, pp. 82-84. Many paramilitary commanders had been prominent figures in Serbia's underworld, to which a number subsequently returned, as was a significant proportion of the paramilitary agents' rank-and-file. According to a survey conducted in 1991, some twenty per cent of the rank-and-file volunteers had previous police records. Andjelkovic and Bacevic, "Are the Tigers Leaving?", p. 11.
189. 797. See Slobodan Savic, "Nova epidemija vlasti" [New Epidemic of Power], Intervju, 28 September 1994, p. 26. This journalist claims that Voyvodina's police then received instructions from Belgrade to allow Jovic to form a "society," which he later transformed into a political party. Likewise, one of Seselj's erstwhile vice-presidents, Jovan Glamocanin, had also served Slobodan Milosevic earlier in toppling his opponents. As head of the "Solidarity Council," he claimed that he "made a great contribution to the return of Voyvodina and Kosovo-Metohija to Serbia's structure. There was cooperation at that time, and I went for discussions with Slobodan Milosevic three times." Quoted in Milivoje Glisic, "Jogurt i vlast" [Yogurt and Power], NIN, 9 February 1996, p. 23.
190. 898. The party toughs who were the embryo of the future paramilitary agents had already created an atmosphere of violence toward non-Serbs even before the war in Croatia. For example, in October 1990, when Gypsy musicians tried to perform on Belgrade's trendy pedestrian mall, a well-known venue for local artists and musicians, toughs in Chetnik uniforms drove them away, with the justification that there is "no place for Gypsy music here" and that the mall was located on a "Serbian Chetnik street." "Ko to tamo svira" [Who Plays the Tune There?], Borba (Belgrade), 30 October 1990, p. 12. Seselj was personally involved in numerous acts of violence against political opponents throughout 1990. Moreover, it was not only figures like Seselj and Jovic who built up a reputation early for threatening non-Serbs. Vuk Draskovic, likewise, known for his calls to expel the Albanians, stated, "The desire of the Albanian fifth column in Serbia to live in Albania is natural, and the Serbian state does not have the right to force anyone whose fatherland is on the other side of the Prokletija [River] to stay [in Kosovo]." Speech of 2 April 1989 given in Zrenjanin, "Kako voditi i dobiti boj na Kosovu" [How to Conduct and Win the Battle in Kosovo], reprinted in Koekude Srbijo [Quo Vadis, Serbia?], Belgrade: Nova Knjiga, , p. 126. This goal was made an integral part of the SNO's January 1990 political program, which Draskovic drafted: "All those Shiptars [a derogatory Serbian term for Albanians] who desire to do so must of necessity be guaranteed the freedom to emigrate to Albania, or anywhere else outside of Serbia, with all the property they leave behind and all their other expenses to be reimbursed fairly." Ibid., p. 138.
191. 999. Interview with Mirko Jovic, "Novoosnovani, a ne opozicija" [Newly Established, But Not the Opposition], Danas (Zagreb), 19 June 1990, p. 16.
192. 000. Quoted in Mirjana Bobic-Mojsilovic, "Fasista sam, tim se dicim" [I Am a Fascist, and Proud of It], NIN, 10 April 1992, p. 24.
193. 01. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 178.
194. 202. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, para 26, p. 9.
195. 03. Interview with Marko Nicovic by Dragan Bujosevic, "Sportski zivot 'Sive lisice'" [The Sporting Life of the "Gray Fox"], NIN, 12 April 1996, p. 17.
196. 04. Radmilo Bogdanovic later held other senior positions in Serbia's government, including as a Deputy in the Serbian Parliament for the ruling SPS party, President of the Council for the Serbs Outside of Serbia (a Serbian government agency dealing with affairs of Serbs outside of Serbia), a member of the Supreme and Executive Council of the SPS, and President of the Security Council of the Federal Yugoslav Parliament.
197. 505. Interview with Radmilo Bogdanovic by Nenad Stefanovic, "Logistika sluzbe za volju naroda" [The Logistics of Service for the People's Will], Duga, 7-20 January 1995, p. 22. In another example, when one of the paramilitary leaders, Milan Paroski, was having difficulties in dealing with a Serbian official, General Tomislav Simovic matter-of-factly suggested that he go directly to Serbia's new Minister of Internal Affairs, Zoran Sokolovic, to resolve them. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 179.
198. 606. Marko Lopusina, "Kraj ratnog lobija" [The End of the War Lobby], Intervju, 5 August 1994, p. 13.
199. 707. Russian mercenaries, for example, routinely came through Belgrade and encountered no problems with Serbian officials, even though they had no baggage and were clearly on their way to join the war. Several Russian mercenaries who were enrolled in the SDG have given such accounts. See Snezana Aleksendric, "Nikad vise preko Drine" [Never Again Across the Drina], Vesti, 2 July 1993, p. 8; and Vostrukhov, "To Die in Yugoslavia," p. 3. Wounded Russian volunteers were treated in hospitals in Serbia, as was the case with five wounded personnel in the Uzice hospital. "Kozaci krunski svedoci" [The Cossacks: Crown Witnesses], Evropske Novosti, 19 January 1993, p. 10.
200. 808. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 60. On General Simovic's staff, there was a discussion as to how best to portray Arkan if U.N. forces deployed to Croatia, and it was decided that "Arkan cannot be looked upon as a citizen of Serbia in Croatia, but rather as temporary help to the Serbian people in Croatia." Srpska vojska, p. 53. On the other hand, General Simovic's staff was disappointed when General Simovic, who was supposed to appear on television with "volunteers" from the front, was ordered not to do so. Instead, his deputy spoke, but failed to mention the role played by General Simovic's office, "as if we were not the ones who were supporting all the volunteers and party armies which, according to legal rulings, are subordinate to the JNA and the Territorial Defense." As related by Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 60.
201. 909. Interview with Bogdanovic, "The Logistics of Service for the People's Will," p. 21. According to the former Minister of Information in the Krajina, Milan Martic received support directly from several ministers and SPS officials in the government of the Republic of Serbia. Interview with Milena Tanjga by Dragan Radic, "Tudjman me je molio da pitam Milana Babic da li zeli da pregovara, a ovaj je to arogantno odbio!" [Tudjman Requested That I Ask Milan Babic Whether He Wanted to Negotiate, But the Latter Refused Arrogantly!], Svet, 1 September 1995, p. 15. Bosnian Serbs by late 1991 were also visiting General Tomislav Simovic, Serbia's Defense Minister, to seek advice and aid, which he provided. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 258.
202. 010. "Rights & Wrongs" television program hosted by Charlayne Hunter-Gault, 31 May 1995, "Yellow Wasps," part 1, Globalvision.
203. 11. Interview with Captain Dragan by S. K., "Niko ne priznaje greske" [No One Is Admitting His Errors], Intervju, 17 April 1992, p. 48. Elsewhere in relation to Bogdanovic, Captain Dragan added, "I am looking only at operational problems in a detached manner. That is a great success on the part of the [Serbian] police. I cannot tell you too much about that because it is still going on, but Radmilo Bogdanovic contributed a lot so that I could carry out my part of the task." Interview with Captain Dragan, "I Am Not a Rebel," p. 28. Gajic-Glisic notes that Captain Dragan had returned to Yugoslavia at the behest of the State Security Service and that he worked for both Radmilo Bogdanovic and Jovica Stanisic (the Director of Serbia's Secret Service). Srpska vojska, pp. 101-102. The trainers for Captain Dragan's force were all personnel from special units of Serbia's Ministry of Internal Affairs. Srpska vojska, p. 106. Another paramilitary agent leader, Milan Paroski, also coordinated with Radmilo Bogdanovic when he was Minister for Serbs outside of Serbia. Srpska vojska, p. 178.
204. 212. Thus, for the SRS Chetniks, one of Seselj's former lieutenants, Slobodan Jovic, notes that he was tasked with liaison duties for his paramilitary agent with Serbia's police. Interview with Slobodan Jovic by Predrag Popovic, "Sve misteriozne smrti seseljevih saradnika" [All the Mysterious Deaths of Seselj's Collaborators], Svet, 7 July 1995, p. 14.
205. 13. Interview with Branislav Vakic, "Postponed Knock-out," p. 15.
206. 14. According to Tomislav Nikolic, Vice-President of the SRS, after Vojislav Seselj had broken with Slobodan Milosevic as part of a power struggle: "The government's stance toward our volunteers changed drastically in May 1993. That is when significant problems began with medical care for our wounded, with permission for paid leaves of absence [from state-sector jobs], and soon to an end to paying the funeral costs to the families of the fallen." Quoted in Branka Andjelkovic and Batic Bacevic, "Tigrovi odlaze?" [Are the Tigers Leaving?], NIN, 21 April 1995, p. 11.
207. 515. This was the case, for example, with the SDG. Interview with Ulemek, "I Am a Serb and Proud of It," p. 22.
208. 616. For example, as long as Mirko Jovic's White Eagles maintained a working relationship with the Slobodan Milosevic government, he was provided with an entire floor in a building in Belgrade to serve as his paramilitary agent's headquarters. Nenad Stefanovic, Tajni zivot srpske opozicije; Pokrstavanje petokrake [The Secret Life of the Serbian Opposition; The Christianization of the Five-Pointed Star], Belgrade: BIGZ, , p. 210. Ljubisa Petkovic, Vojislav Seselj's liaison with the police, was also given an apartment, a car, and free gasoline by the police. Ibid., p. 69.
209. 717. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, pp. 20, 21-28. Vasiljevic confirms that "we cooperated nicely" with two of Serbia's Ministers of Defense, Rear Admiral Miodrag Jokic (in that post until July 1991) and General Tomislav Simovic. Interview with Jezdimir Vasiljevic by Blagica Stojanovic, "Moj puc nije uspio" [My Coup Did Not Succeed], Srpska rec, 18 July 1994, p. 26. In return, according to Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, Vasiljevic asked that his bank be allowed to function in the same way as state-owned companies and banks operated -- in other words, that he be permitted to buy foreign currency from individuals. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska p. 27. One source claims that Serbia's secret service was involved in deals with these private banks in order to raise funds for the paramilitary agents. Lopusina, "The End of the War Lobby," pp. 13-14.
210. 818. Vanja Bulic, "Legitimisanje Gazda Jezde" [The Legitimization of Sir Jezda], Intervju, 5 August 1994, p. 56. This allegation was reinforced by the fact that the credits taken out for that purpose by Vasiljevic's bank were transferred to another private bank, the Dafiment Bank, when his bank collapsed and he fled the country. Dafina Milanovic's bank, allegedly in return for kick-backs and other services to government officials, was allowed to deal in hard currencies domestically before its collapse amid accusations of shady pyramid schemes in which many ordinary depositors lost their life-savings. According to Gajic-Glisic, Jezdimir Vasiljevic provided enough equipment for 2000 personnel. Srpska vojska, p. 283.
211. 919. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 22; and "Finansijski slomovi" [Financial Collapses], Vreme, 5 April 1993, p. 15.
212. 020. Interview with Dafina Milanovic by Vladan Dinic, "Sitne pare, krupan problem" [Small Amounts of Money, Big Problem], Evropske Novosti, 7 July 1993, p. 7. Gajic-Glisic claims that the Captain Dragan Fund remained under "public" [drustveni, government] control. Srpska vojska, p. 108. The Dafiment Bank also had financial dealings with Arkan, either in the form of contributions or joint investments. Ulemek reported that, for example, Arkan's Erdut-based café-gas station complex is a joint company owned together with Dafina Milanovic. "I Am a Serb and Proud of It," p. 18. According to Arkan's deputy, "There are many firms which help the Guard, but which do not want that to be known." Interview with Pelevic, "I Do Not Recognize Capitulation," p. 59. Arkan gave medals to those who helped his paramilitary agent, including to Dragan Tomic, the President of Serbia's Parliament, because he had provided oil to the SDG. Pavlovic, "Why Arkan's 'Tigers' Pulled in Their Claws," p. 12. See also Vladan Vasiljevic, "Nemocni pridikuju mocnima" [The Powerless Preach to the Powerful], Srpska rec, 11 May 1992, p. 29.
213. 21. For instance, it appears that Italian-British businessman Giovanni Di Stefano, who has commercial interests in Serbia, also is a major contributor to Arkan, with the apparent blessing of the highest levels of the government of the Republic of Serbia. Giovanni Di Stefano acknowledged, for example, that he had contributed $1 million to Arkan's unsuccessful run for Parliament in 1993, as well as even more money to Slobodan Milosevic directly. Indicative of official tolerance, if not support, is the fact that Di Stefano boasts a Yugoslav passport with Slobodan Milosevic's home address listed as his reference. According to Di Stefano, "Well, maybe the president just thinks, for reasons of his own, that I'm worth it." Bella Stumbo, "Slobo and Mira," Vanity Fair, June 1994, p. 171. Part of the funding also comes from Arkan's own shadowy economic enterprises, such as his black and gray market oil import and sales, which have at least official benevolence in order to prosper. Arkan, for example, has sold gasoline -- which had to be smuggled in -- for hard currency. R. Stevic, "Martic ispunio obecanje" [Martic Fulfilled His Promise], Evropske Novosti, 29 March 1994, p. 19; and "Lik i delo; Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan" [Personality and Work; Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan], Vreme, 27 February 1995, p. 40.
214. 222. Interview with Pelevic, "I Do Not Recognize Capitulation," p. 59.
215. 23. The Krajina has relied almost entirely on Belgrade for its financial survival. At times, Serbia's financial support to the Krajina and to the Bosnian Serbs has amounted to one-fourth of Belgrade's total budget, according to Radmilo Bogdanovic. Interview by Vladan Dinic and Slavko Curuvija, "Knin je mogao da se brani barem dva meseca" [Knin Could Have Defended Itself for at Least Two Months], Telegraf (Belgrade), 23 August 1995, p. 8; all references are to the international edition. According to Yugoslav government sources, between 1991 and late 1994, Belgrade had provided $4.73 billion in aid to the Bosnian Serbs and to the Serb-held territories in Croatia. D. Dimitrovska and A. Vasin, "Drugi dinar preko Drine" [A Second Dinar across the Drina], Evropske Novosti, 5 August 1994, p. 5. As Borisav Jovic assessed the Krajina's dependence on Belgrade, "They [the Krajina] are relatively too underdeveloped to maintain on their own such a large state and army." Interview with Borisav Jovic by Milomir Maric, "Nikoga nismo terali da ostane" [We Never Forced Anyone to Stay], Intervju, 19 August 1994, p. 6.
216. 24. Interview with Pelevic, "I Do Not Recognize Capitulation," p. 59.
217. 525. Dobrila Gajic-Glisic, "Meler nije pucista" [Meler Is Not a Coup-Maker], NIN, 5 August 1994, p. 29.
218. 626. Interview with Vojislav Seselj by Blagica Stojanovic, "Ako budete od Negotina do Knina" [If You Want to Stretch from Negotin to Knin], Srpska rec, 17 January 1995, p. 27.
219. 727. Interview with Vojislav Seselj by Mirjana Bobic-Mojsilovic, "Milosevic i ja" [Milosevic and I], Duga, 28 May-10 June 1994, pp. 90 and 93. Another Serb Territorial Defense commander in Croatia also noted that the 300 Chetniks serving under him received their arms from Serbia, "at first from the Territorial Defense in Voyvodina and, later, also from the Sumadija region [of Serbia proper]." Quoted in Srdjan Stanisic, "Drvo za Djilasa" [Lumber for Djilas], Pogledi, 27 March 1992, p. 24.
220. 828. Interview with Seselj "I Am Ready, Awaiting Arrest," p. 15.
221. 929. Interview with Colonel Sljivancanin, "The Order Came from Dedinje," p. 20.
222. 030. Interview with Vakic, "Postponed Knock-out," p. 15. Vakic also noted in another interview that Seselj's paramilitary agent was armed both by the JNA and by the MUP of Serbia. Interview with Vakic by Zorica Miladinovic "General Perisic Gave Us Uniforms, the Army Gave Us Weapons, and Special Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia Trained Us," Telegraf, 28 September 1994, pp. 6-7, in FBIS-EEU-94-195, 7 October 1994, p. 72. Ljubisa Petkovic, a former Vice-President of the SRS, likewise noted that, "We received arms for the Serbian volunteers from the Yugoslav Army, and other forms of help from many [Serbian] government agencies." Interview with Ljubisa Petkovic, "Seselj lazno optuzuje" [Seselj Is Accusing Falsely], Srpska Stvarnost (Santa Monica, California, USA), 20 November 1993, p. 20.
223. 31. Bogdanovic, "Repic and the Tails," p. 23.
224. 232. Interview with Simo Dubajic by Predrag Popovic, "Trebalo je da slusamo Tudjmana" [We Ought to Have Listened to Tudjman], Intervju, 10 March 1995, p. 53.
225. 33. Interview with Seselj "I Would Suggest to All Serbs from Croatia to Leave," p. 51.
226. 34. When businessman Jezdimir Vasiljevic imported military equipment for the paramilitary agent's use, through Serbia's Ministry of Defense, it had to come in through international entry points and, apparently, did so without any obstruction. Gajic-Glisic, "Meler Is Not a Coup-Maker," p. 29.
227. 535. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, para 26, p. 9.
228. 636. Filip Svarm, "Pred strasni sud" [Facing Judgment Day], Vreme, 5 April 1993, p. 32. The negotiations, which led to the uncontested handover of the city and which were intended to guarantee the civilian population's safety, included Velibor Arsic, a Colonel in the JNA. Ibid., p. 31. The JNA role was confirmed by the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Annex V; The Prijedor Report; paras 159, 182, and 183.
229. 737. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts; Annex III. A; Special Forces, para 49.
230. 838. Even the paramilitary commanders recognized their need for support from the conventional Army. As Branislav Lainovic, field commander of the SPO's Serbian Guard, noted, "For us, it is not hard to take a position, but it is hard to hold on to it; in addition to light arms, one also needs heavy artillery in order to defend a position." Branislav Lainovic, "Neko je ginuo, neko setao" [While Some Died Others Strolled], Srpska rec, 30 September 1991, p. 23.
231. 039. Interview with Veselin Sljivancanin by Momcilo Petrovic, "Ko sam, sta sam i sta sam radio u ratu" [Who I am, What I Am, and What I Did During the War], Intervju, 29 March 1996, p. 20. See also Human Rights Watch -- Helsinki, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina: Bosanski Samac, New York: Vol. 6, No. 5, April 1994, p. 6; Human Rights Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in the Croatian Conflict, New York: Vol. 3, No. 14, September 1991, p. 15; and the letter which the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, New York, dated 21 January 1992, sent to Slobodan Milosevic. Likewise, Chetnik warlord Oliver Bareta undertook joint operations with the JNA in Western Herzegovina. Z. V. Lukovic, "Sudbina na pragu" [Fate at the Doorstep], Evropske Novosti, 2 September 1994, p. 9.
240. Interview with General Avramovic "Uspostavlja se moderan sistem komuniciranja armije s javnoscu" [A Modern System of Communications between the Army and the Public Is Being Set Up], Narodna armija (Belgrade), 12 March 1992, p. 7. Narodna armija was the JNA's official organ.
232. 41. It should be noted here that the Tribunal has, in three separate instances, indicted persons on the basis of direct responsibility for plunder and on the basis of command responsibility for plunder by forces under their control. Indictment of Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic, para 37, p. 14; Indictment of Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cesic, para 42, p. 14; and Indictment of Nikolic, para 21, pp. 11-12.
233. 242. Natasa Kandic, the Director of the Human Rights Fund, Belgrade, "Nas tuzilac u Hagu" [Our Prosecutor in the Hague], Intervju, 24 March 1995, p. 9.
234. 43. Human Rights Watch, Former Yugoslavia; War Crimes Trials in the Former Yugoslavia, pp. 39-40.
235. 44. See Blaine Harden, "Serbia's Treacherous Gang of Three," Washington Post, 7 February 1993, p. C4. Seselj accused Arkan of bringing back even a fire engine from Bijeljina to sell. Interview with Vojislav Seselj by Coban, "They No Longer Accuse Me of War Crimes," p. 6. The former director of Belgrade's Museum of Modern Art estimated that Serbian paramilitary agents had brought back as "booty" thousands of works of art, many of which were sold on the Belgrade market, with Arkan being the single biggest culprit. Quoted in Gordana Igric, "Tajna arkanskih depoa" [The Secret of Arkan's Warehouses], NIN, 10 February 1995, p. 29. The "booty" included such highly visible items as yachts taken from the Dubrovnik area and transported by road to Serbia. Uros Komlenovic, "Kralo se kapom i sapkom" [The Theft Was Open-Ended], Vreme, 13 December 1993, p. 41.
236. 545. U.S. Department of State, Eighth Report on War Crimes in Former Yugoslavia. Supplemental United States Submission of Information to UN Security Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992), 16 June 1993. p>237. 646. Interview with Vakic, "How Frenki and I Conquered Srebrenica," p. 7.
238. 747. P. Stanivukovic, "Vukovar pise zalbe" [Vukovar Submits Complaints], Vecernje Novosti (Belgrade), 7 July 1992, p. 26.
239. 848. See Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #1, paras 17-33, pp. 4-12; and Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2, paras 47-51, pp. 10-11.
240. 949. Speech reported by D. Stevanovic, "Jovic: JNA je koriscena za zastitu Srba" [Jovic: The JNA Was Used to Defend the Serbs], Politika, 4 March 1992, p. 1.
241. 050. Interview with Ivica Dacic by Mirjana Bobic-Mojsilovic, "Partija koja seli srca u glavu" [The Party Which Moves Hearts to the Head], Duga, 21 January-3 February 1995, p. 23.
242. 51. Michael Dobbs and R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Gives Investigators New Evidence of Bosnian Serb War Crimes," Washington Post, 29 October 1995, p. A36.
243. 252. Danica Draskovic, a member of the Supreme Council of the SPO, "U Srebrenici je gorela zemlja" [In Srebrenica the Earth Was Ablaze], Srpska rec, 10 May 1993, p. 23. On occasion, even the state-controlled Serbian press also reported some of the operations which the Yugoslav Army conducted directly in Bosnia. "Gori Drina" [The Drina Is Burning], Evropske Novosti, 23 January 1993, p. 4.
244. 53. Karlo Jeger, "Oklopno-mehanizirana brigada Uzickog korpusa napada Gorazde iz Srbije" [A Mechanized Infantry Brigade from the Uzice Corps is Attacking Gorazde from Serbia], Globus, 15 April 1994, pp. 7-8.
245. 54. Prager, "Message from Serbia," pp. 26-27.
246. 555. See Jonathan C. Randal, "Civilian Inspectors to Verify Blockade of Bosnian Serbs," Washington Post, 16 September 1994, p. A35; John Pomfret "Serbia Still Aiding War Effort," Washington Post, 4 July 1995, pp. A1, A18; and Vulliamy, "Serbian Lies World Chose to Believe," 29 February 1996, p. 12. A senior Milosevic official, Dragan Tomic (President of Serbia's Parliament), in fact, assured the public at the time that, "we have not cut back help to the Serbs across the Drina," although he insisted that nothing would be sent which would prolong the war. Interview by Rado Brajovic and Ivan Lovric, "Bracu nismo izdali" [We Have Not Betrayed Our Brothers], Evropske Novosti, 29 November 1994, pp. 2-3.
247. 656. This was reported by the Bosnian Serbs' official representative in Belgrade. Interview with Momcilo Mandic by Vanja Bulic, "Ispali smo iz kengurove torbe" [We Have Fallen Out of the Kangaroo's Pouch], Duga, 12-25 November 1994, p. 87. In early 1995, Bosnian Serb economic specialists advised Slobodan Milosevic that the Bosnian Serbs' economic situation would collapse in two or three months without Serbia's support. Dragan Cicic and Brank Peric, "Drmanje Karadzica" [Karadzic's Shaking], NIN, 10 February 1995, p. 11.
248. 757. John Pomfret, "Serbs Gain New Leverage Over Bosnian Peace Plan," Washington Post, 2 December 1994, p. A39; and John Pomfret, "Serbia Suspected of Aiding Bosnian Allies," Washington Post, 9 December 1994, pp. A37-38.
249. 858. Prager, "Message from Serbia," pp. 26-27. Personnel serving in the Yugoslav Army were pressured to "volunteer" to join the Bosnian Serb Army. See the account of one such soldier, Filip Svarm, "Generalske smijene" [General-Officer Changes], Vreme, 10 May 1993, p. 23. According to General Ratko Mladic, "I participated in some significant decisions at the level of the then [JNA] General Staff, where clear directions were given for all officers (career officers above all) who were born on this territory [Bosnia], and even for those who were not born [here], to place themselves at the defense of their people [in Bosnia]." Interview with General Ratko Mladic, "One Must Not Tell the People What They Want to Hear], p. 11. Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, later to become Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, noted that he had stayed on in Bosnia beyond the announced date for the JNA's withdrawal in early May 1992: "After the withdrawal of the JNA [from Bosnia], I stayed for a month and a half longer until the Herzegovinians trained on the equipment which we left behind." Interview with Colonel General Perisic "Commander of Life and Death," p. 18.
250. 959. Indictment of Djordje Djukic, para 1, p. 1.
251. 060. Prager, "Message from Serbia," p. 29. Notably Bosnian Serb Army officers continued to be paid by Belgrade. Vulliamy, "Serbian Lies World Chose to Believe," p. 12.
252. 61. Interview with Milan Babic by Blagica Stopanovic, "Milosevic trguje Srbima" [Milosevic Is Trading the Serbs], Srpska rec, 16 March 1992, p. 49.
253. 262. Interview with Majors Dragomir Lilic and Jovica Kresovic by Djoko Kesic and Zoran Lukic, "Spremni smo da sacekamo i razbijemo prvi udar hrvatske operacije" [We are Ready to Wait for and Smash the First Strike of the Croatian Operation], Telegraf, 30 August 1995, p. 14.
254. 63. Srdjan Radulovic, "Mile Cetvrti" [Mile the Fourth], NIN, 19 May 1995, p. 13.
255. 64. For a review of the individuals indicted on the basis of command responsibility, see Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #1; Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic #2; Indictment of Milan Martic; Indictment of Ivica Rajic; Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin; Indictment of Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Fustar, and Dragan Kulundzija; Indictment of Zeljko Meakic; Indictment of Miroslav Kvocka, Dragoljub Prcac, Mladen Radic, Momcilo Gruban; Indictment of Dragan Nikolic; Indictment of Blagoje Simic; Indictment of Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aledsovski; and Indictment of Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic.
256. 565. Letter from the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee to Slobodan Milosevic, New York, dated 21 January 1992.
257. 666. Ibid, p. 2.
258. 767. Ibid, pp. 2-11, 13-15.
259. 868. Ibid, pp. 11-15.
260. 969. Ibid, pp. 15-19.
261. 070. In his response, Slobodan Milosevic claimed that "on the territory of Serbia, and even less so on the territory of Croatia, the Serbian government did not set up paramilitary agents. On the contrary, from the very beginning of the armed clashes it opposed the setting up of party and national armies." The response also denied the existence of any concentration camps in Serbia or the killing of the wounded captured in the hospital when Vukovar fell. Reported in D. Glisic, "Unapred doneta presuda" [Verdict Formulated in Advance], Narodna armija, 9 April 1992, p. 8.
262. 71. Milan Paroski gave a short account of a meeting in 1991 in "Ljudi i vreme" [Time and People], Vreme, 13 September 1993, p. 55. Seselj, in his political role, was Slobodan Milosevic's coalition partner for a time and met with him in the latter's office and at his home. Interview with Vojislav Seselj, "Kad Vuka hapse to je demokratija, kad mene hapse to je diktatura" [When They Arrest Vuk, That Is Democracy; When They Arrest Me, That Is Dictatorship], Srpska rec, 15 January 1996, p. 17. Seselj claimed to have met with Milosevic on a monthly basis and also to have sent his deputy, Toma Nikolic, to such meetings; interview with Seselj "Milosevic and I," p. 91. <
263. 272. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin.
264. 73. Moreover, there are indications that there was sufficient sensitivity within official circles about the nature of paramilitary agent activities and about international concern to seek to conceal the paramilitary agents' presence in the field as time went on. Branislav Gavrilovic, a Chetnik commander who had served in Western Slavonia and was then active in the Sarajevo area, for example, compared his unit's situation thus: "Unlike in Slavonia, where it was not hidden that there were Chetniks, here [in Bosnia] this is being hidden because of official policy and international pressure." Quoted in Kolja Besarovic, "Pobedom do mira" [Peace through Victory], Pogledi, 15 May 1992, p. 22. Thus, as Arkan stepped up his activity in northern Bosnia in late 1995, official circles in Belgrade remained adamant that they had no connection with any paramilitary agents. For example, as the editor of the semi-official Politika insisted, "What U.S. officials have to know is that Belgrade is not behind any paramilitary formation." Editorial by Hadzi Dragan Antic, "Shots at Conference," Politika, 23 October 1995, p.2., in FBIS-EEU-95-208, 27 October 1995, p. 44.
265. 74. Reported in Djukic, "Between Glory and Anathema," p. 201. Zoran Lilic, the Federal President, also claimed that, "Party-based and other paramilitary agent formations, groups, and individuals are forbidden in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia according to the Constitution and the law.... We are opposed to paramilitary agents relying on a party or any other basis.... That [disarming and neutralizing paramilitary agents] presumes that the competent organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the Yugoslav Army are to maintain complete control over all border crossings, the strict honoring of procedures at the border, and the prevention of movement by individuals in uniform and with arms who are not part of the Army or of the Internal Affairs forces.... The republic and federal Ministry of Internal Affairs must strengthen that activity." Interview with Zoran Lilic by Colonel Stanoje Jovanovic, Lieutenant-Colonel Milorad Pantelic, and Nikola Ostojic, "Drzava ce uciniti sve za uspesno delovanje Vojske" [The State Will Do Everything for a Successful Functioning of the Army], Vojska, 18 November 1993, p. 8. The Yugoslav Army Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Zivota Panic, too, had denied the existence of any paramilitary agents in Serbia: "Quite simply, the emphasis on the existence of paramilitary agent formations on the Serbian side represented a vulgar forgery and a form of systematic manipulation of the truth." Interview with Colonel General Zivota Panic, "Bili smo u ratu" [We Were at War], Vojska, 15 July 1993, p. 5.
266. 575. Janjic, "The Machine Is Broken," p. 17.
267. 676. Zorana Suvakovic, "Ceo narod -- jedan zeton" [The Entire Nation -- In a Single Basket], Politika, 6 August 1994, p. 2.
268. 777. "Every Serb is not a brother.... All along we knew that some Serbs were burning down Croatian and Muslim houses. They were raping Croatian and Muslim women, and were killing Croatian and Muslim children, were plundering Croatian and Muslim families, and were ceaselessly provoking hate against all Croatians and Muslims, and even against anyone who is not a Serb.... They are, simply put, criminals.... Never in their history had the Serbs committed such abominations.... For the first time they have done so on a massive scale, openly, and without being made to answer. That is why I hope that they will not escape being made to answer, not in some far away future but now, while the criminals are alive." Mira Markovic, "Ko je moj brat" [Who Is My Brother?], Duga, 1-14 October 1994, p. 4. Elsewhere, she expressed indignation with Seselj, "That extremism, that brutality, that cruelty, that is not us.... Seselj does not express the interests of the Serbian nation since he does not belong to it. I am not thinking, of course, in terms of genes or ancestry. I will not go into that, that is whether he is of Croatian or Muslim origin.... But Seselj does not belong to the Serbian nation spiritually.... He is a foreigner, but a primitive, aggressive, and greedy fellow.... [N]othing remains except the dark satisfaction of having caused harm, of having injured and caused evil to others." (emphasis in the original). Mira Markovic, "Proslost kao buducnost, ali, nece" [The Past Like the Present, But No], Duga, 28 May-10 June 1994, p. 9. In an interview first published in Borba, Mira Markovic noted of Seselj that, "He is a person who compromises Serbian national interests and who, in general, compromises policy.... I also am critical of the fact that they [members of the ruling SPS] not only reacted late [to Seselj], but that they entered into any cooperation at all with him.... That vision [Seselj's] is so dangerous and so possible that it should unite all citizens and all political figures in a struggle to ensure that vision is never made real." Interview reprinted in Mira Markovic, Odgovor, pp. 259-260.
269. 878. Vreme published a photocopy of this report, 24 February 1992, p. 13.
270. 979. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 144. "From the Office," part 5, 15 May 1992, p. 53. General Simovic's office was also interested in actively following the paramilitary agents' progress. For example, when Arkan and a group of his men found themselves in an encirclement in Croatia, after a joint operation with the JNA, General Simovic and his staff spent the entire night in direct contact with the Yugoslav Air Force and followed the situation to see if the Air Force could intervene to rescue Arkan. Srpska vojska, p. 58. In public, however, General Simovic denied any knowledge that war crimes were occurring. Asked in an interview whether he had done anything to prevent war crimes, he answered the interviewer cynically, "From that question one can conclude that you know those who committed crimes. As a citizen, according to our laws, you are obligated to report that. Otherwise, you are an accomplice!" Srpska vojska, p. 91.
271. 080. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, pp. 42-43. This included specific reports such as "We know that you [General Simovic] support Arkan, but we must tell you that Arkan does not always behave out there in the field." Srpska vojska, p. 43.
272. 81. Simo Dubajic, "Srpska garda mora da postoji" [The Serbian Guard Must Exist], Srpska rec, 2 March 1992, p. 69.
273. 282. Interview with Colonel Milorad Vucic, conducted by Lieutenant Colonel General Dusan Dozet (Ret.), Lieutenant Colonel Nikola Ostojic, and Pero Damjanov, "Ti divni ljudi, mladi ratnici (2)" [Those Wonderful People, Young Soldiers, Part 2], Narodna armija, 25 December 1991, p. 13.
274. 83. Bokan speaks of "All those talks [that] took place in the Federal Police buildings, in Sarajevo Street [Belgrade], and in the [Republic of Serbia] Police Building, on 29 November Street." Interview with Dragoslav Bokan by Slavica Jovovic, "Hteli su sa zaboravim da sam Srbin" [They Wanted Me to Forget That I Am a Serb], Intervju, 2 September 1994, p. 31. On Draskovic's contacts, see Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 93.
275. 84. Milan Paroski, for example, received personal advice in coordinating his activities. General Simovic "assured him that his people could come as volunteers, and be entered on the rolls of the Territorial Defense and even proposed a meeting with [Krajina rebel leader] Goran Hadzic." General Simovic also advised Paroski to coordinate with Serbia's police chief, Zoran Sokolovic, and not to act independently. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 179. Arkan also came to General Simovic's office, on one occasion fresh from the Vukovar front, Srpska vojska, p. 58. Vuk Draskovic's representative, Bogoljub Pejcic, also visited. Srpska vojska, pp. 92, 96-97.
276. 585. Vasic and Svarm, "Chetnik Watergate," p. 25.
277. 686. In relation to attempts to secure funding from private sources for the paramilitary agents, for example, one source involved in the dealings notes that "All security agencies were informed routinely." Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 22.
278. 787. This was outlined in a report submitted in January 1992 by the Minister's administrative assistant. Gajic-Glisic, "Meler Is Not a Coup-Maker," p. 29. As Mrs. Gajic-Glisic noted elsewhere about dealing with businessman Jezdimir Vasiljevic, "[Voyvodina's representative on the SFRY Presidency Dragutin] Zelenovic and President [Slobodan] Milosevic were informed of Vasiljevic's good will," and "Everything proceeded in a legal manner." In the Minister's office, records were kept by a Colonel Kovacevic of all the contributions that Vasiljevic made. Srpska vojska, pp. 21-22.
279. 888. When Mirko Jovic set up his paramilitary agent, for example, he said that, "We informed all the national organizations in our country and abroad that we had formed our volunteer units." Interview with Mirko Jovic by Aleksandar Popovic, "Osveceni Jasenovac" [Jasenovac Avenged], Pogledi, 29 November 1991, p. 34.
280. 989. Thus, Vuk Draskovic gave wide publicity when he was establishing a paramilitary agent, the Serbian Guard, for his party in the summer of 1991. He noted that, "Lists of members of the Serbian Guard are being compiled in all local, district, and regional councils of the SPO. The future Guardists are already receiving their Guard membership cards.... Over the next few days, the Guard will receive its code of conduct." Vuk Draskovic, "Srpska garda" [The Serbian Guard], Srpska rec, 8 July 1991, p. 13.
281. 090. See Vanja Bulic, "Gisne gliste, sokolovi i crveni dzokeri" [Giska's Earthworms, Falcons, and Red Jokers], Duga, 4-18 January 1992, p. 34.
282. 91. Slobodan Milosevic has denied consistently any knowledge of misdeeds committed by the paramilitary agents, and even of the paramilitary agents' very existence, and he has often cast doubt that there were many, if any, offenses at all. This followed a consistent pattern of denial on Slobodan Milosevic's part, as was the case when he expressed shocked surprise about the existence of concentration camps in Bosnia. As he claimed, "I was astonished when I heard information that such camps existed there," but at the same time he sought to question the validity of such reports by casting doubt on the sources: "I cannot be sure.... I cannot even be sure that those who inform me about it have the right information." Interview with Slobodan Milosevic on Radio-TV Belgrade Television Network, 28 August 1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-169, 31 August 1992, p. 41. Slobodan Milosevic also assured journalist Peter Maass that talk of his own responsibility for the atrocities was "dirty accusations without any evidence." "Will Killers Go Free?" Washington Post, 25 February 1996, p. C1. When asked by a U.S. State Department official in 1992 about Arkan, while he was marauding in Bosnia, for example, Slobodan Milosevic had responded that he had never even heard of Arkan. Reported in Laura Silber and Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, London: Penguin 1995, p. 248.
283. 292. Quoted in Jevric, "The Guilty Ones With the Blue-Red-Gray Sleeves," p. 25.
284. 93. Reported in Aleksandar Cotric, "Dobrovoljci srpske garde krecu u Gospic" [The Volunteers of the Serbian Guard Are Deploying to Gospic], Srpska rec, 28 October 1991, p. 44.
285. 94. Serbian journalists tracking the movement even registered the escorting Republic of Serbia police vehicle's license plate. Dejan Anastasijevic, "Tigrovska posla" [Tiger Jobs], Vreme, 16 October 1995, p. 11.
286. 595. See Vanja Bulic, "Krvna osveta u krugu dvojke" [Blood Feud in Runs of Two], Duga, 10-23 December 1994, p. 37. A Serbian Guard veteran also related that the Serbian police on one occasion had orders, which it enforced, not to allow his unit to cross the Danube into Slavonia, while an official of Slobodan Milosevic's ruling party was sent there to inform them that the police were empowered to shoot if need be. Interview with Milan Jankovic by Vanja Bulic, "Slike sa iskljucenog televizora" [Images from a Turned-Off Television Set], Duga, 29 March-11 April 1992, p. 13. The Serbian authorities, however, did allow the Serbian Guard to deploy to Gospic instead at that time. See Bulic, "Giska's Earthworms," p. 34.
287. 696. "The government gave us arms and buses [earlier].... [In 1995] They [the Serbian authorities] did not stop us anywhere [on our way to fight in Western Slavonia]; rather they prevented us here, in Belgrade, from chartering buses.... We know that Slobodan Milosevic is behind that. For example, we chartered buses through some travel agencies, but they canceled the following day." Interview with Seselj, "I Would Suggest to All Serbs from Croatia That They Leave," p. 12.
288. 797. Interview with Ulemek, "I Am a Serb and Proud of It," p. 20. Underlining the decisive influence that Serbia's officials could have in shutting down paramilitary agent operations, once Captain Dragan was seen as an uncooperative competitor by the Slobodan Milosevic government, he was effectively neutralized. As Captain Dragan summed it up, "After him [Minister of Internal Affairs Radmilo Bogdanovic], in the area of defense there was no longer any room for me." Interview with Captain Dragan "No One Admits His Mistakes," p. 48.
289. 898. Djukic, "Between Glory and Anathema," p. 268.
290. 999. The first arrest occurred in 1994, after a brawl in parliament, when Seselj had spat on the Premier, Radoman Bozovic, a close Slobodan Milosevic ally. The rivalry had been exacerbated by public insults that Seselj had directed at Slobodan Milosevic. These included the charge that Slobodan Milosevic's wife was the boss in the family. Seselj was arrested again in 1995 after organizing a political rally in Gnjilane, Kosovo as the latest venue for a string of protest meetings that were held throughout the country and that were meant to embarrass Slobodan Milosevic. See Petar Ignja, "Uloga drzavnog neprijatelja" [The Role of an Enemy of the State], NIN, 9 June 1995, pp. 20-21; and Batic Bacevic, "Radikalski bluz" [Radical Blues], NIN, 16 June 1995, pp. 16-18.
291. 000. Quoted in Andjelkovic and Bacevic, "Are the Tigers Leaving?", 21 April 1995, p. 11.
292. 01. Serbia's Ministry of Defense, typically, provided buses to take paramilitary agent personnel to the front. Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, p. 61.
293. 202. In Bogdanovic, "Postponed Knock-out," p. 15.
294. 03. "One day, [Vojislav Seselj] requested that Simovic provide him with a helicopter to inspect 'his people' on the ground." General Simovic did not have any helicopters, and his assistant suggested that he instead contact JNA General Blagoje Adzic, who provided the helicopter. "When Seselj needed to get a helicopter to return in order to attend a session of Parliament, we went about it the same way." This is related by Gajic-Glisic, Srpska vojska, pp. 16-17.
295. 04. According to the interview with Bozovic, "We Will Be the Army of a Modern and Humane Serbia," p. 17.
296. 505. Jovan Dulovic and Roy Gutman, interviewed on "Rights & Wrongs," "Yellow Wasps" part 1, Globalvision, 31 May 1995; and Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, New York: Macmillan 1993, pp. 20-23.
297. . Interview with Vojkan Djurkovic by Slavica Jovovic, "Kako je Bijeljina zaista ociscena od Muslimana" [How Bijeljina Was Really Cleansed of Muslims], Intervju, 17 April 1995, p. 16.
298. . During the SDG's operations in Bosnia in 1995, Arkan was in Belgrade, where he passed down orders to his subordinates in the field. As Arkan's deputy noted, he had to ask Arkan for permission to engage his forces in Prijedor and called Arkan on his cellular phone with that request. Interview with Ulemek, "I Am a Serb and Proud of It," p. 22. Subsequently, at the height of the operation, Arkan himself, apparently unhindered by Serbian security or border controls, went to Bosnia from Belgrade to oversee operations. Interview with Ulemek, "I Am a Serb and Proud of It," p. 22.
299. . Arkan's combination residence, command center, and the headquarters of his business empire and of his Serbian Unity Party is also highly visible. It is located on Vasa Pelagic Street in the exclusive Belgrade neighborhood of Dedinje, where many of Serbia's top officials, including Slobodan Milosevic, also live. The complex's existence is well-known and is accessible. The Serbian press has reported on more than one occasion on his headquarters, which carries plainly his party's name over the doorway, and has published photos of it. See, for example, Aleksandra Bilanovic, "Tajna Arkanovog zamka" [The Secret of Arkan's Castle], NIN, 9 September 1994, p. 29. At least one other paramilitary agent commander, Sinisa Vucinic, commander of the United Royalist Youth [Udruzena Rojalisticka omladina] also lives on Dedinje Hill. Stefanovic, Tajni zivot srpske opozicije, p. 220.
300. . Tasks have included providing crowd control for a concert in Belgrade given by Arkan's wife, a popular pop-singer, on 23 November 1995. A photograph of the uniformed SDG personnel at the concert was published in Vreme, 4 December 1995, p. 27.
301. . Dejan Anastasijevic, Jelena Grujic, and Filip Svarm, "Danak u krvi" [Blood Tribute], Vreme, 26 June 1995, p. 14.
302. . According to Colonel Ulemek, "All we do is take them off the bus and shave their heads." Interview with Ulemek, "I Am a Serb and Proud of It," p. 21.
303. . Interview with Marko Nicovic by Borivoje Solesa, "Sto pedeset Specijalaca sredilo bi kriminal u Srbijii" [One Hundred Fifty Special Forces Would Take Care of Crime in Serbia], Duga, 23 December 1995-5 January 1996, p. 98.
304. . Arkan is no stranger to the social scene and maintains a high profile in public. For example, he attended the televised gala premiere of a new movie in June 1995, on which occasion he reportedly was seen talking to many of the leading political figures, such as the Federal President, Zoran Lilic, the mayor of Belgrade, Nebojsa Covic, and Yugoslavia's Foreign minister, Vladislav Jovanovic. M. Mirkov, "Ma sedi, Rado, gde hoces, ovo sam i onako sve ja platio" [Come On, Rada, Sit Anywhere You Want, Since in Any Case I Paid For Everything], Telegraf, 5 July 1995, p. 2. Arkan also lunches at the "Writers' Club" at 7 Francuska Street, in Belgrade, where United Nations officials, who also dine there, have been introduced to him. See the interview with Susan Manuel, the American-born United Nations spokesperson in Belgrade, by Snezana Rakocevic-Novakovic, "Arkanova poznanica iz Ohaja" [Arkan's Acquaintance from Ohio], Intervju, 19 April 1996, p. 16. Even after the Dayton Accords, Arkan was still highly visible in Belgrade society, including at public dinners with Hadzi Dragan Antic, the editor of the state-run daily Politika and a close ally of Slobodan Milosevic. Tracy Wilkinson, "Acceptance of Warlord Sends Mixed Signals," Los Angeles Times, 1 December 1995, p. 1. In 1994 a state-run Belgrade newspaper still described Arkan's men as "fighters who achieved glory in many battles." Stevic, "Martic Fulfilled His Promise," p. 19. Arkan apparently is still able to travel abroad. He traveled to Hungary in 1995 and, as of late 1995, planned to attend a kick-boxing tournament in the Ukraine. Interview with Pelevic, "I Do Not Recognize Capitulation," p. 59.
305. . When Arkan married in 1995, his lavish wedding was the social event of the year in Belgrade and was attended by official representatives of the Slobodan Milosevic government and other national institutions, such as the state-run media and the Serbian Orthodox Church. The ruling SPS party spokesman Ivica Dacic and the Minister for Sport both attended. Milivoje Glisic, "Vatreno vencanje" [Fiery Wedding], NIN, 24 February 1995, p. 23; and Roger Cohen, "Serbia Dazzles Itself; Terror Suspect Weds Singer," New York Times, 20 February 1995, p. A3. A government-controlled newspaper, writing about Arkan's wedding, identified him as "a successful businessman." M. Aksic, "Ceca kao Skarlet" [Ceca As Scarlett], Evropske Novosti, 18 February 1995, p. 11.
306. . For example, in May 1996, Milan Nikolic Djeneral and Goran Vukovic, minor paramilitary figures who seem not to have belonged to any political party, were sentenced for killing several Croatians and Slovaks in Voyvodina. See OMRI Daily Digest (Prague), 29 April 1996, citing a Vecernje Novosti report of 28 April 1996. Background on the Vukovic group is found in Gordana Jovanovic, "Ubistva sa prigusivacem" [Killing with a Silencer], Intervju, 21 July 1995, pp. 21-23; and Dragljub Petrovic, "Sudjenje 'Djeneralovoj grupi'" [The Trial of the "Djeneral Group"], Svet, 8 January 1996, pp. 6 and 38.
307. . The accused admitted, inter alia, that they had cut the ear off one Muslim and had shot civilians near Zvornik. However, the indictment was relatively mild, and read, "In the former Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 there was civil war, and D. Vuckovic and his older brother Vojin set off to the former Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to help the Serbian people to hold on to their territory." Jovan Dulovic, "Sudjenje za ratni zlocin: Sabacka posla" [Trial for War Crimes: The Sabac Business], Vreme, 2 January 1995, p. 19.
308. . See M. M. "Witness in Hiding," Politika Ekspres, 16 January 1996, in FBIS-EEU-96-011, 17 January 1996, p. 83. According to an observer present at the trial, the prosecution had been described as being blatantly perfunctory in any event. Human Rights Watch, Former Yugoslavia; War Crimes Trials in the Former Yugoslavia, New York: June 1995, pp. 43-44.
[Footnotes 309-317 were not included in the original document.]
318. For example, Dafina Milanovic claimed that she had had the personal support of Slobodan Milosevic for her activities and that he had asked her to "carry on." Dimitrije Boarov and Ivan Radovanovic, "Srpska majka ili maceha" [Serbian Mother or Step-mother], Vreme, 25 April 1994, pp. 15-17. Admissions by Dafina Milanovic and published receipts indicate that many government officials -- as well as paramilitary agents such as Arkan, Vojislav Seselj, and Captain Dragan -- had profitable, if suspect, transactions with her bank and that Mrs. Milanovic also contributed large sums of money directly to government projects. See Ljiljana Habjanovic-Djurovic, "Klosara su nova kategorija stedisa" [Tramps Are a New Category of Depositors], Duga, 4-17 February 1994, p. 9; Ljiljana Habjanovic-Djurovic, "S kim je Dafina bila fina?" [To Whom Was Dafina Nice?], Duga, 30 April-13 May 1994, pp. 19-24; Ljiljana Habjanovic-Djuric, "Trazimo istinu o nasim parama" [We Are Seeking the Truth about Our Money], Duga, 30 April-14 May 1994, pp. 25-30; and Zoran Markovic, "Istina sa kamatom umrtvljene banke" [The Truth with Interest of the Comatose Bank], Duga, 14-27 October 1995, pp. 24-26.
319. Slobodan Milosevic himself had said of Seselj that, while the two were allied, of all the opposition leaders "I value Seselj the most ... since he is consistent in expressing his political views." Interview with Slobodan Milosevic, "Kakvi su bili marksisti, takvi ce biti biznismeni" [As They Were Marxists, So Shall They Be Businessmen], Ilustrovana Politika, 23 March 1992, p. 2.
320. Radovan Pavlovic, "Mnogo vojske pod jednom komandom" [Many Armies under One Command], Politika, 11 November 1993, p. 9.
321. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Annex III. A; Special Forces, document S/1994/674/Add. 2, 28 December 1994, para 97. Slobodan Milosevic had established effective control over the state-run media already in the early days of his consolidation of power and has long used it skillfully for political ends. See Djukic, "Between Glory and Anathema," pp. 70-72, 90.
322. The Fund was covered favorably on Belgrade TV, 13 September 1992 news broadcast, for example. See also Vesna Pantelic, "Ogranak Fonda 'Kapetan Dragan'' u Sapcu; Hrana za Benkovac" [The Branch of the "Captain Dragan Fund" in Sabac; Food for Benkovac], Evropske Novosti, 19 July 1994, p. 15.
323. Stevan Mirkovic, in "Ljudi i vreme" [People and Times], Vreme, 5 July 1993, p. 73.
324. Bogdanovic, "Postponed Knock-out," p. 15. A copy of the certificate was published along with the article.
325. D. Petrovic, "Badza u prvom 'izvlacenju' dobio najvisi moguci cin" [Badza on His First Try Achieved the Highest Possible Rank], Nasa Borba, 1 April 1996.
326. Indictment of Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, paras 15 and 17, p. 8.
327. See section V, supra.